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
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
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
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2. The report consists of an overall evaluation together with narrative summaries and evaluations of significant operations, enemy activities, psychological operations and pacification activities of Allied forces in RVN. Annexes are included to expand upon the summaries in certain cases.

3. The content of the Quarterly Evaluation, in the main, comes from reports submitted by senior commanders and advisors under the command or operational control of COMUSMACV and from evaluation and statistics provided by designated chiefs of staff agencies of MACV.

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## QUARTERLY EVALUATION REPORT

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SECTION I

OVERALL EVALUATION

1. (S) GENERAL:

a. US/RVNAF/Free World Military Assistance Forces continued to press their advantage over the enemy in 1st Qtr, CY69. To that end they systematically pursued the "One War" concept in its three interdependent aspects: combat operations, pacification and RVNAF expansion and improvement.

b. During Jan and the first three weeks of Feb, CY69 hostilities were at a relatively low level with limited large unit contact noted. Allied Forces continued their program of providing security for the RVN populace and searching out enemy base camps, supply and weapons caches and infrastructure elements. On 23 Feb the enemy initiated his "Post-TET" offensive. Vigorous Allied reaction to widespread attacks by fire and limited ground attacks resulted in heavy enemy losses.

c. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was successfully concluded on 31 Jan 69. Goals were exceeded in upgrading hamlet security status and inducing individual enemy to become Eoi Chanh. The infrastructure neutralization goal was 78.9 percent attained. With this momentum, the government pressed on with a vigorous pacification program in 1st Qtr, CY69. RVNAF units increased their assigned strength by 23,291 in 1st Qtr, CY69, in keeping with Phase II Accelerated Force goals. Further, specific measures were taken in hand to resolve the major problem of desertions in RVNAF. Training proceeded over a broad spectrum as RVN units assumed more responsibility in the war effort.

d. The high point of enemy activity in this quarter was the "Post-TET" offensive, which began with coordinated indirect fire attacks or ground attacks on Allied military positions and population centers. Significantly, the enemy failed to launch an effective internal terrorist campaign during the offensive and failed to elicit support in large population centers. The indirect fire attacks continued with sporadic ground probes of friendly positions at the end of the quarter.

e. Throughout this quarter, and generally since the bombing halt, the enemy repaired and improved his logistics system in the North Vietnam panhandle. He also strengthened his air defense capability and road network in southern Laos, while continuing to supply his trans-border sanctuaries uninterrupted, using Cambodian lines of communication.

2. (S) ENEMY STRATEGY: In the near future, the enemy will probably pull back a number of his units from contact and move to sanctuary, either in-country or to Cambodia. He can be expected to regroup, consolidate, and prepare for another offensive sometime in late spring or summer. Evidence suggests that his forces in I CTZ have broken contact and may be moving to in-country base areas, or north of the Ben Hai River.

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In the B-3 Front area of II CTZ, the 24th and 66th NVA Regiments (which moved in-country in Jan 69 after a four-month period in Cambodian sanctuaries) are probably also returning to those sanctuaries. In III CTZ the 9th VC Division will probably remain in Cambodia. Major elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions may move to Cambodian sanctuaries, while the 5th VC Division will probably stay in-country in war Zone D. In IV CTZ, enemy units will probably avoid contact as much as possible in the near future in order to refit and receive recruits. In the meantime, the enemy will continue reconnoitering and repositioning, while he plans future offensive activity. While avoiding major contact, he will apply military pressure by indirect fire attacks, harassment, and terrorism. When the enemy believes he can launch a new offensive, he will concentrate most of his effort in MR-2 and III CTZ, with Saigon as the ultimate goal.

3. (S) GROUND OPERATIONS:

a. I CTZ: Operations in I CTZ in 1st Qtr, CY69 resulted in heavy enemy casualties and destruction or capture of large quantities of his war materiel. These operations succeeded in their purpose of restricting enemy movement while at the same time denying him the initiative. The enemy found his situation further complicated by the continued successes of the pacification program. Especially noteworthy were operations DEWEY CANYON and VERNON LAKE, the former resulting in high totals for both enemy KIA and enemy/friendly KIA ratio, and the latter a noteworthy enemy/friendly KIA ratio. ARVN units participated in seven of the eight described significant operations in I CTZ. This was a reflection of the continuing emphasis placed on combined operations previously noted in 4th Qtr CY68.

b. II CTZ: First Qtr, CY69 in II CTZ was marked by small unit saturation patrolling of the countryside as well as numerous cordon and search operations. Emphasis was placed on coordination with province officials especially in urban center defense reinforcement. Progress was made in intelligence production and utilization throughout II CTZ, especially throughout the ARVN intelligence system. Though ARVN intelligence reports are still incomplete, speed and accuracy of reporting showed improvement. The importance of this improvement was underlined by the increasing elusiveness of large enemy units. This period was marked by a large number of enemy stand-off mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attacks as well as ground attacks against isolated hamlets and RF/PF units. In anticipation of these tactics, the disposition of forces was adjusted so as to provide US forces with greater flexibility.

c. III CTZ: In III CTZ during 1st Qtr, CY69 airmobility assets made a substantial contribution as operations emphasized improved response

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time while the interdiction of enemy movement toward Saigon remained a major objective. Except for six days in Feb, the enemy continued to avoid contact. During this "Post-TET" fighting he attempted attacks in the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area, suffering heavy casualties. Though most of the period was one of enemy probes of fire support bases, there was a significant increase in enemy losses. Moreover, emphasis was placed on combined operations; and the number of large operations increased especially in enemy base areas. The performance of ARVN units continued to improve. Perhaps of greatest significance was the fact that in this Qtr, as previously, the enemy's major technique of attacks against population centers and installations was substantially frustrated.

d. IV CTZ: During 1st Qtr, CY69, the QUYET THANG Campaign in IV CTZ proceeded at a brisk tempo, having as its objectives interdiction of infiltration routes, penetration of enemy base areas and securing of LOCs. Though the Qtr saw an increase in VC-initiated incidents, neutralization of VCI increased markedly. Contact increased 41 percent on major unit operations and 50 percent on small unit operations. The result was a 65 percent increase in VC KIA while weapons captured rose by 47 percent. During the Qtr self-defense weapons continued to be issued: 50,000 of the 57,099 authorized were on hand. Critical equipment shortages for RF/PF units remain in motor vehicles. The first advisory priority remained improvement of the capabilities of ARVN, RF/PF and PSDF. Because large land areas in IV CTZ remain in enemy hands, this priority emphasizes night operations and use of reaction forces.

#### 4. (S) NAVAL OPERATIONS:

a. SEA LORDS operations conducted during 1st Qtr, CY69, were evaluated as markedly successful. This determination is based on enemy losses, coordinated efforts the interdiction operations have developed, and the psychological advantages achieved through permanent occupancy of waterways heretofore under enemy control.

b. Similarly, Operation GAME WARDEN achieved a high degree of success during the 1st Qtr. Using many of the tactics developed in SEA LORDS and concentrating efforts on known crossing points, river patrol boats on the major Delta rivers maintained a high level of effectiveness with fewer resources than previously available.

c. MARKET TIME forces continued to be successful in countering infiltration from the sea throughout the Qtr, and inhibited coastal transshipment of personnel and logistical supplies in all areas of TF 115 coastal control except in the Long Toan and Thanh Phu secret zones located in the Song Co Chien and Song Ham Luong estuaries. Thus, with the exception of the two VC secret zones and despite a large allocation

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of available patrol craft to operation SEA LORDS, the inshore patrol achieved a high degree of surveillance effectiveness and coastal security.

d. The Mobile Riverine Force continued successful operations against the enemy after a shift to tactics employing small unit operations. Merging of Mobile Riverine Force assets enhanced unit integrity and flexibility and freed naval assets for participation in other type operations.

e. Despite increasingly heavy demands imposed by the heightened tempo of naval operations, the supporting activities satisfactorily responded to all requirements of the operating forces.

5. (S) AIR OPERATIONS:

a. Seventh Air Force strike operations during 1st Qtr, CY69 generally paralleled those of the 4th Qtr, CY68 both in numbers of sorties and weight of effort. There was a slight decrease in the level of ARC LIGHT operations with emphasis on attacks against known infiltration routes leading from Cambodia toward the Saigon area. Airlift activity continued the decline noted in previous quarters with demands consistently falling below projected requirements. In the area of new developments, AC-119 gunships became operational in the 71st Special Operations Squadron while the COMMANDO VAULT system of helicopter landing zone clearance was implemented.

b. First Marine Aircraft Wing continued its participation in 7th AF interdiction operations and in 7th Fleet operations (BARRIER CAP) during 1st Qtr, CY69. A high tempo of operations continued to be maintained throughout I CTZ in support of III MAF ground operations.

c. Army aviation continued to contribute mobility, flexibility, and quick reaction capability to offensive and defensive combat operations. Army aircraft logistical and operational support continued at a high level. In terms of effectiveness, armed helicopters yielded increased results in all categories. For other aircraft, the numbers of troops lifted, tons carried and casualties evacuated all showed significant increases. Combat loss rates reversed their previous decline reflecting an increased intensity of combat. Command emphasis upon aviation safety has again resulted in a reduction of the operational (non-combat) loss rate.

(C) PACIFICATION: On 22 Feb 69 the enemy launched his "Post-TET" offensive. Throughout the country the VC/NVA initiated attacks by fire, accompanied in many instances by ground attacks on GVN installations, hamlets, villages, and population centers. In the first six days, the civilian casualties were approximately 2,000 with an unknown number

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missing. By the close of 1st Qtr, CY69, these numbers had risen to approximately 4,500. Concurrently over 6,800 homes had been destroyed with a resultant total of 27,500 homeless. However, indications were that pacification had been set back or halted in eight and suffered no or only slight effects in the other 36 provinces. It appeared that the overall pacification effort had not been as adversely affected as during previous instances of heightened enemy offensive activity.

7. (S) RVNAF PROGRESS:

a. ARVN forces continued the previously noted trend away from the performance of security type operations during 1st Qtr, CY69. This was reflected in an upsurge of combat operations of all types with particular attention to combined operations with other Allied forces. ARVN reaction to the enemy "Post-TET" offensive was spirited with all elements performing satisfactorily while many exceeded expectations. Moderate improvement in overall effectiveness continued as new equipment continued to be added and training was upgraded. Problem areas persisted in leadership, overcentralization and continued relatively high rates of desertion.

b. The employment of the Vietnamese Navy during the Qtr continued to be satisfactory and the effectiveness has increased with the USN assets received. The present personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy is 22,597 officers and men, an increase of 2,936 during the reporting period. In order to meet the expanding role of the Navy, the authorized strength will be increased to 28,700 by late CY69. Vietnamese Navy Fleet Command ships, PCF's, and Coastal Groups, operating in conjunction with CTF 115 forces in Operation MARKET TIME, continued to deter any infiltration attempt during the Qtr. RAIDS employed on Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, and coastal groups and other units employed on Operation TRAN HUNG DAO, denied the enemy infiltration routes in key border areas.

c. Successful Vietnamese Marine Corps combat operations during the Qtr indicate a continuing high degree of combat readiness, tactical skill, and leadership. The VMCM consistently demonstrated the ability to operate successfully with the US Navy in the Delta. Despite the success of these combined riverine operations, the Amphibious Task Force concept continues to be hampered by lack of adequate troop lift. This has relegated the VNM contribution to the Amphibious Task Force to a logistic role.

d. Vietnamese Air Force operations during 1st Qtr, CY69 did not reach programmed levels in all areas although the number of assigned strike missions was exceeded. Constraints on operations were attributed to intermittent poor weather conditions and the TET holiday stand down. Equipment modernization continued although the delayed arrival of UH-1H helicopters threatened the first operational readiness date. Increases in the effectiveness of the transport effort were apparent with marked increases in both passengers and cargo carried.

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8. (C) LOGISTICS: As in previously reported quarters the overall level of logistic support within RVN was satisfactory. All US logistic requirements were satisfactorily fulfilled while VNAF logistics were responsive to the bulk of demands on the system. Continued effort at improving the responsiveness of the logistic activities of RVNAF was applied throughout. Upgrading and receipt of new weapons, aircraft and equipment continued while problems of adequate maintenance and supply of spares in RVNAF units were still evident. Low maintenance skill levels and inability to cope with sophisticated supply systems remain as basic causes.

9. (S) SUMMARY: The 1st Qtr, CY69 can be summarized as a period of heightened emphasis on the implementation of the three co-ordinate elements of the "One War" concept:

a. Combat operations were concentrated on the detection, pursuit and destruction of hostile military forces and dislocation of their logistic system. Allied forces responded to the enemy "Post-TET" offensive with alacrity, dealing harshly with attacking forces.

b. Pacification programs continued to be pressed at a high tempo following the highly successful accelerated campaign of the preceeding Qtr.

c. Improvement in the effectiveness of RVNAF was carried on by means of continued expansion of training and equipment modernization. New measures to stem the continuing flow of desertions were taken, although the degree of their ultimate effectiveness was unclear at the end of the quarter.

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## SECTION II

### ENEMY ACTIVITIES

#### 1. (S) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION:

##### a. Cut-of-Country:

(1) North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) strength was estimated to be about 464,900 as of 31 Mar 69, including some 69,200 NVA troops in RVN and about 54,200 NVA troops in Laos.

(2) The enemy air defense capability in the Laotian prahandle, a-long major lines of communications, increased during 1st Qtr, CY69. The addition of several new air defense threat areas is a strong indication that the enemy is determined to maintain his logistical flow through the Laotian pipeline.

##### b. In-Country:

###### (1) I CTZ:

(a) During Jan and the first three weeks of Feb 69, enemy activity was at a low level. On 23 Feb, the enemy initiated his "Post-TET" offensive with coordinated indirect fire attacks and ground attacks. Until approximately 25 Mar, the indirect fire attacks continued, with sporadic ground probes of friendly positions.

(b) Enemy activity during Jan was at the lowest level of the Qtr. There were no large scale attacks launched by enemy forces, nor did aggressive Allied operations engage any large size enemy units. Da Nang Air Base, Hoi An City, Dien Ban District Headquarters and the Marble Mountain Air Facility received mortar and rocket attacks. Elements of the 36th NVA Infantry Regiment and the N<sup>o</sup> 2 NVA Division were preoccupied with Allied Operations LINN RIVER and TAYLOR COMMON. There was no significant enemy activity in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.

(c) Throughout Feb, an unidentified enemy artillery unit employed 122mm artillery fire against US forces participating in Operation DEWEY CANYON in southern Quang Tri Province. This operation uncovered huge enemy ordnance caches. Until 23 Feb, enemy activity throughout the remainder of I CTZ was generally light. On this date the enemy initiated the "Post-TET" offensive with widespread, coordinated indirect fire attacks and limited ground attacks in the southern three provinces. Fire Support Base Sword in Quang Tri Province received a mortar attack, and on 25 Feb Fire Support Bases Neville and Russell were attacked by probable elements of the 246th and 27th NVA Infantry Regiments, respectively. Enemy activity was conspicuously absent in Thua Thien Province

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throughout the offensive. Activity was primarily focused on Southern I CTZ, where indirect fire attacks, interspersed with ground probes, continued throughout the remainder of the month. However, the attacks decreased in number and intensity from the initial assaults. Primary targets were friendly forces, installations and population centers. The An Hoa Industrial Complex, Da Nang area, Chu Lai Air Base, Tam Ky, Tien Phuoc CIDG Camp and Quang Ngai City were frequently hit by indirect fire attacks. Virtually all elements of Front 4 were identified in contact in Quang Nam Province. In Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, enemy local force elements suffered the brunt of the attacks, although, elements of the 31st NVA Infantry Regiment, NT 2 NVA Division, were identified in the vicinity of Tien Phuoc CIDG Camp, and elements of the 22d NVA Regiment, NT 3 NVA Division, were engaged west of Quang Ngai City by friendly forces.

(d) During Mar, the enemy continued his indirect fire attacks on military installations, outposts and population centers. The attacks were interspersed with sapper forays and ground probes. The Da Nang area, An Hoa Combat Base, Tien Phuoc CIDG Camp and Quang Ngai City and airfield were all subjected to repeated rocket and mortar attacks. On 19 Mar, the enemy launched the most concentrated indirect fire attacks of the month. Also on 19 Mar, the 1st Bn 5th Marine Regiment, located 11 kilometers northeast of An Hoa, received a mortar and ground attack from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 72 enemy KIA. In another significant attack on 25 Mar, 15 kilometers west of Hoi An, the 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion was attacked by an estimated two enemy companies, resulting in 100 enemy KIA. These two attacks were the most significant enemy ground assaults. There were no enemy initiated large-scale ground attacks; however, friendly forces inflicted heavy casualties on the 22d NVA Infantry Regiment, NT 3 NVA Division, the 27th NVA Infantry Regiment and the 36th NVA Infantry Regiment. Operation DEWEY CANYON, conducted from 22 Jan to 18 Mar, was a highly successful operation uncovering some of the largest munitions and arms caches of the Vietnam conflict. Approximately 525 tons of enemy weapons and ammunition, as well as 356 tons of rice, were discovered. Significant materiel included 770-122mm rockets; 7,287 rounds of 122mm artillery ammunition; 4,983 rounds of 120mm, 23,281 rounds of 82mm and 34,633 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition; and 23,730 rounds of 37mm AA ammunition. The enemy also lost twelve 122mm guns, four 85mm guns and 92 assorted vehicles. Almost all the enemy weapons and equipment found during this operation were destroyed in place. Enemy losses were 1,617 KIA. It would appear the enemy utilized frequent indirect fire attacks, supplemented by small-scale ground attacks, to give the impression of a significant Corpswide offensive. However, he was unable, or unwilling, to mass his forces for any major ground assault. Thus, his economy of force measures maintained continual pressure on Allied forces without the excessive casualties to enemy forces that result from massive ground assaults.

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### (2) II CTZ:

(a) Jan reflected a sharp increase in enemy activity. Major contacts occurred with the 24th NVA Regiment that had entered the highlands from Cambodia. Attacks by fire and harassments increased in the coastal provinces and numerous company-size attacks occurred in Binh Thuan Province. Feb saw the initiation of the enemy's "Post-TET" Offensive which continued throughout Mar. Attacks by fire were launched against rural areas, military installations and headquarters and all major population centers. Ground attacks were not prevalent. The enemy employed armor at Ben Het in Kontum Province during the first part of Mar.

(b) During Jan, the level of enemy activity throughout most of the provinces showed a marked increase. The appearance of the 24th NVA Regiment, which had been in Cambodia, and the discovery by friendly forces of significant food and arms caches in the highlands indicated the enemy's offensive designs. Ban Me Thuot and Kontum Airfields were mortared several times during the month. On 18 Jan, the ARVN 23d Division Headquarters at Ban Me Thuot received 15 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Several attacks against population centers occurred in the highlands. On 28 Jan, an estimated 60 enemy burned 117 huts in Plei Pham Klah Village (AR892295) in Pleiku Province. Limited indirect fire attacks characterized enemy activity in the coastal provinces. The enemy was most active in Binh Dinh Province. On 3 Jan, a tank farm of the 240th US Quartermaster Battalion was subjected to an enemy sapper attack. Friendly losses were light. The level of enemy-initiated activity increased in the southern provinces, and especially in Binh Thuan Province. On 26 Jan, Phan Rang Air Base (BN770896), received a sapper attack followed by 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Friendly losses were 14 KIA and two aircraft destroyed and 18 damaged. Enemy losses were 14 KIA and three detained. The relocation of the 186th VC Battalion from Lam Dong Province to Binh Thuan Province suggested that enemy activity might continue at a high level in Binh Thuan Province.

(c) The month of Feb was highlighted by the enemy's launching of his "Post-TET" Offensive. On the night of 22 Feb and the morning of 23 Feb, the enemy conducted attacks by fire against friendly installations, LOCs, rural areas and major population centers throughout most of the provinces. Ground attacks were very limited. It was obvious that the enemy's offensive was designed to demonstrate his strength while, at the same time, conserving his manpower resources. During the period 22-27 Feb, approximately 147 attacks by fire occurred; however, only 40 were launched in conjunction with a ground attack. In the highlands, the enemy's offensive consisted of fire attacks against CIDG camps, isolated hamlets and Kontum City. Ben Het received over 400 rounds of artillery fire from the vicinity of the Cambodian border. On 23 Feb, Kon Horong Village (ZB126159) was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion resulting in 68 civilians killed, in excess of 100 civilians wounded and over



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125 houses destroyed. Approximately 3,000 persons were made homeless. The enemy also employed mixed mortar, artillery and rocket fire against Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot cities. In the coastal provinces, significant activity was centered along Highway #1 from Bong Son to Phu Cat and along Highway #19 west of An Khe. On 11 Feb, Cheo Reo in Phu Bon Province received 75-100 rounds of mixed mortar and B-40 rocket fire that resulted in 24 friendly killed, 33 friendly wounded and partial destruction of the sector and district headquarters. Enemy losses were seven KIA. On 22 Feb, Phu Cat Airbase was attacked by an estimated enemy squad employing small arms, B-40 rockets and satchel charges. Friendly forces lost one MIA while enemy losses were four KIA and one NVA captured. In the southern provinces, most of the enemy's activity centered in Binh Thuan Province. On 12 Feb, elements of three enemy battalions attacked Landing Zone Sara (AN909189), losing 67 KIA and 11 detained. Friendly losses were four KIA and 14 WIA. On 22 Feb, Phan Rang Airbase received 74 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Friendly losses were five wounded, ten aircraft damaged and three trucks damaged. Also on 22 Feb, Landing Zone Betty (AN803068) received 30 rounds of mortar fire followed by a ground attack. Friendly losses were two KIA and 29 WIA. Enemy losses were 12 KIA and one detained.

(d) During the first three weeks of Mar, the intensity of enemy activity remained at a moderate level, still primarily characterized by indirect fire attacks. A significant development was the relocation of the 66th NVA Regiment from Cambodia to southwestern Kontum Province. On 1 Mar, at YA837966, A/3/12 US Infantry was attacked by an unknown size enemy force which lost 30 KIA. Friendly losses were one KIA and 13 WIA. On 3 Mar, Ben Het CIDG Camp received approximately 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire followed by a tank/infantry probe. The tanks came within 4,000 meters of the camp before two were destroyed by friendly tank fire and air strikes. The tanks were identified as Soviet-made PT-76s. On 13 Mar, Kon Pe Long Hamlet (AR781941) was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Friendly losses were 14 KIA, 42 WIA, 5 MIA and one school and 18 houses destroyed. Enemy losses were two KIA and several weapons captured. On 20-21 Mar, the enemy launched the second phase of his "Post-TET" offensive with fire attacks against friendly installations and some ground attacks against villages. The Ben Het area received fire attacks almost daily to the end of the month. Pleiku City, Duc Co and Plei Djereng received heavy rocket and mortar fire. On 10 Mar, in the vicinity of Qui Nhon, an ammunition storage area received mortar and small arms fire that resulted in over 1,700 tons of ammunition destroyed. Attacks by fire and company-size ground attacks continued in the southern provinces. On 1 Mar, four kilometers southwest of Tan Tai (ZT083553), elements of the 3/503 US Infantry discovered one of the largest rice caches ever found in the southern provinces. The total amount of rice was estimated to be 300 tons. On 21 Mar, 12 kilometers north-northeast of Cam Ranh (CP030295), the 92d Assault Helicopter Company received 30-40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that

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damaged 16 helicopters. Reports indicated that two new units, the 482B VC and the 200C NVA Battalions were operating in Binh Thuan Province. Throughout the provinces, enemy activity showed a marked decline after the second phase of the "Post-TET" offensive had subsided.

### (3) III CTZ:

(a) The first quarter of CY69 was highlighted by the initiation of the enemy's "Post-TET" offensive. During Jan, the enemy continued to reposition and refit his forces. Enemy forces attempted to avoid large scale engagements which would prematurely commit significant numbers of personnel before infiltration of replacements and resupply missions had been completed. That the enemy had placed a high priority on these missions was evidenced by increased activity along the infiltration routes of the Song Be, Saigon and Vam Co Dong Rivers. In early Feb, the enemy continued his offensive preparation. On 22-23 Feb, the enemy launched a corpswide offensive. This offensive was characterized by extensive attacks by fire against base camps, airbases and some major cities, and ground probes against several Allied base camps and support bases. Enemy attacks by fire and ground probes continued through Mar. The major actions were concentrated in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Long Khanh Provinces. The quarter ended with Allied Forces witnessing only minor ground probes and small-scale attacks by fire.

(b) During Jan, the enemy continued to reposition his forces while attempting to avoid large scale contacts. There were small unit contacts along the Song Be and Saigon River corridors, indicating continued enemy infiltration of men and material into central III CTZ. The 74th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, was identified in contact along the Song Be corridor in West-central Phuoc Long Province. On 12 Jan, the 165th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, was contacted south of the Cambodian Fishhook area in Northeast Tay Ninh Province. This contact resulted in 37 enemy KIA. The 95C NVA Regiment was identified in contact 14 kilometers northeast of Nui Ba Den. On 25 Jan, elements of the 272d VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, were contacted in the Angel's Wing area in Tay Ninh Province. In southeast III CTZ, the 1st VC Regiment, 274th VC Regiment, and units subordinate to the 5th VC Division continued to pose a threat to the Long Bien-Bien Hoa complex and Bearcat Base Camp. During Jan, the enemy succeeded in avoiding major contacts with the exception of an ambush by elements of the 95C NVA Regiment on 14 Jan, in which the enemy lost 122 KIA. The enemy continued to reconnoiter routes to Saigon from all directions, indicating his intention to conduct attacks in the future.

(c) During early Feb, the enemy in III CTZ continued to refit and resupply his forces in preparation for future engagements. During this time, the enemy employed minor attacks by fire, indicating movement of supplies and personnel into attack positions. Late Feb saw the inauguration of new enemy attacks in III CTZ. During the early morning of 22-23

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Feb, enemy forces in III CTZ commenced a corpswide offensive. This offensive included extensive attacks by fire as well as ground assaults. On 23 Feb, Saigon received ten 122mm rockets, resulting in 11 friendly killed and 31 wounded. On the same day, the 3d Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, along with other elements of the regiment, attacked the Long Binh Post (YT0602). Enemy losses in this attack were 194 KIA. On 23 and 25 Feb, the 272d VC Regiment lost 284 KIA in attacks on FSB Diamond. Throughout the latter half of Feb, enemy attacks varied in intensity. Attacks by fire, sapper attacks and ground probes were noted during this phase. Sustained ground probes were noted at FSBs Diamond and Mahone, Dau Tieng Base Camp, the Bien Hoa-Long Bien complex and Song Be. Main force divisional units appeared to have been conserved and uncommitted except in a few instances, such as at FSB Diamond opposite the Angel's Wing area. Feb ended with the enemy continuing his offensive. During this period, he used non-divisional and sapper elements primarily, while his divisional forces continued to maneuver into attack positions.

(d) The enemy continued his offensive during Mar. The major actions were concentrated in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Long Khanh Provinces. The enemy also maintained light to moderate pressure on other provinces throughout III CTZ. The major emphasis was on attacks by fire against fire support bases, night defense positions, outposts, air bases, and Special Forces camps. These attacks seemed designed to inflict maximum casualties on friendly units, at minimum cost to the enemy. This attack plan was in accordance with the enemy's stated objective of "destroying a significant amount of the Allied war potential." On 3 Mar, Saigon was shelled with 122mm rockets. This attack resulted in 12 civilians killed and 20 wounded. On 4 Mar, the 2/12th US Infantry was attacked by elements of the 88th NVA Regiment, resulting in 179 enemy KIA. In addition to these attacks, significant attacks were launched by the 95C, 272d, 18B, 101D, 33d, 275th, 268th, 101st and 274th VC/NVA Regiments. Worthy of note was the use of trained sapper elements to spearhead several attacks. This tactic was possibly adopted to enable the enemy to retain his flexibility, practice economy of force with main force units and, at the same time, present a show of strength. Mar ended with the enemy continuing to initiate attacks by fire and minor ground actions in hopes of eroding Allied defenses.

#### (4) IV CTZ:

(a) Enemy activity during Jan remained constant as it had in 4th Qtr, CY68, sharply increased in late Feb and leveled off at a relatively high rate during Mar. During Jan, large enemy units continued to avoid contact with friendly forces while local force and guerrilla units conducted attacks by fire and small ground attacks. In Feb, after three weeks of relatively light activity, the enemy launched his "Post-TET Offensive." A high level of activity was maintained throughout Mar with most of the incidents recorded being attacks by fire and small ground attacks.

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(b) Activity during Jan continued at approximately the same level as it had during the 4th Qtr, CY68. Large enemy units continued to avoid friendly forces, but a multi-battalion ARVN operation in the U Minh Forest resulted in nearly 200 enemy KIA. The two most significant attacks of the month occurred on the 9th and 10th at Binh Thuy Airfield and on the 25th at a regional headquarters near Tan Hiep in Dinh Tuong Province. Binh Thuy Airfield received over 100 rounds of mixed 75mm recoilless rifle and 75mm pack howitzer fire in a two day period. The regional headquarters was hit by 60 rocket grenades and 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. These two attacks highlighted an otherwise light period of enemy activity.

(c) Throughout the month of Feb, the enemy launched heavy attacks by fire and small scale ground attacks against military targets and installations. The monthly highpoint occurred on the morning of 22-23 Feb when the enemy initiated his "Post-TET" offensive with widespread, well-coordinated attacks by fire. These attacks followed the pattern of an accelerated effort against the Allied pacification program rather than large scale commitments of troops against provincial cities. Enemy units suffered heavy casualties from B-52 airstrikes in MR-3 and as a result were forced to concentrate their efforts on secondary targets. These casualties undoubtedly reduced his overall capability for future attacks.

(d) The enemy initiated incident rate leveled off during Mar. However, heavy attacks by fire on the night of 14-15 Mar created a second high point of the offensive. The most significant of these attacks was the shelling of the My Tho City with 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Despite these attacks, the enemy continued to suffer extremely heavy casualties and may be forced to continue his present tactics of attacks by fire and small ground attacks indefinitely.

### 2. (C) SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. Strengths: (see paragraph 2a, Annex E).
- b. Enemy Initiated Attacks: (see paragraph 2, Annex D).
- c. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment:

(1) A document captured on 27 Dec 68, at ZC183403 in Quang Nam Province reveals that a briefing was conducted by the Command of Military Region 5 during a Political-Military Conference held in Jun 68. Attending the conference were military and political cadre from the entire military region. The conference was a type of reorientation course. The MR 5 Commander made comments on the strong and weak points of present combat activity within MR 5. He stated:

Unit commanders should launch 'small attacks' but score

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'great victories'. One-third to one-half of a force should be held in reserve to take advantage of opportunities to continuously destroy the enemy. When attacking cities, small forces consisting of well-trained troops are to infiltrate and occupy cities and motivate the people to demonstrate in support of the occupation. Sapper forces are used to initiate attacks. The forces must seek to 'destroy agencies' and 'annihilate key officials'."

The same document mentioned the tactic of exploding mines and raising South Vietnamese Liberation Front flags simultaneously in GVN areas to cause Allied forces to destroy their own areas. Verification of the current validity of the information contained in this document was given by PW Nguyen Hanh from the 31st NVA Infantry Regiment, who was captured on 11 Jan 69. He stated that recent training presented by battalion officers has stressed infiltration of an objective prior to an attack and the use of fewer men than at present during the assault to facilitate movement and preclude detection.

(2) An analysis of recent VC mortar attacks on the US base camp at Dong Tam indicates the use of close-in firing positions and possible use of the low angle method of fire. Firing positions and observation posts were discovered within 600 meters of the base camp. These positions were established in heavy vegetation adjacent to populated no-fire areas. A test conducted at night with an 82mm mortar using "firing charge two" revealed that the flash could not be detected by observation aircraft.

(3) During 1st Qtr, CY69, the enemy launched numerous attacks against objectives of both military and political significance. These attacks showed a degree of coordination. An item of particular note was the enemy's extensive use of sapper and special action tactics. A document captured during Jan contained information pertaining to a new special action tactic. The document stated that "the special action tactic consist of disguising the attacking forces throughout the attack phase or for a limited length of time, launching surprise attacks against the enemy, then withdrawing quickly."

(4) Closely related to the increase in sapper-trained units is the refinement of sapper tactics. Interrogation of a rallier who was a member of an elite NVA sapper unit revealed a new sapper technique against bridges. Enemy sappers are reportedly being taught to employ a technique called indirect demolition. A very large explosive charge is brought to the bridge site by a sapper swimming under water with the river current. The sapper does not attempt to place the charge against a bridge structural member; it is placed instead under the bridge span. The exploding charge forces up a powerful waterspout which destroys the span.

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(5) A new sapper technique was employed against a 4th Infantry Division fire support base in Mar 69. Investigation of the incident revealed that an enemy sapper force deployed to surround the perimeter of the fire support base under cover of a heavy 82mm mortar barrage. A listening post on the outside of the perimeter was attacked first. The enemy neutralized the listening post with a satchel charge. The enemy then hand-lowered two satchel charges attached to 20-foot bamboo poles over the defensive wire, blowing the wire in places and caving in part of the two bunkers.

(6) On 10 Mar 69, the dredge "Western Eagle", operating in Long An Province, received three hits on the starboard side from what was later identified as contact fuzed 107mm rockets. This rocket attack is significant in that it is the first reported instance where the enemy has direct-fired the 107mm rocket at a waterborne target at almost point-blank range.

(7) On 9 Feb 69, elements of the 3d VMC Battalion discovered a cache in an underground bunker complex 28 kilometers southeast of Katum (XT544719). The cache contained 66 overcaliber 107mm rockets and ten 122mm overcaliber rockets. The overcaliber 122mm rocket consists of four major components: an unknown type of fuze (possible the ChiCom type 2 or type 6 Fuze); a VC/NVA-fabricated warhead, 250mm in diameter; a standard 122mm rocket motor with fins removed; and a VC/NVA fabricated shroud-type stabilizer assembly, 259mm in diameter. The marking "DB 1-A" was hand-painted on the warhead. A capped metal tube 0.75 inches in diameter and approximately 5.5 inches long projects 1.5 inches outside the warhead from the lower inclined surface of the warhead toward the rear of the rocket. The purpose of this capped tube is not definitely known, but it is believed to be for a secondary fuzing function of unknown type. The overcaliber 107mm rocket consists of four major components: an unknown type fuze (possibly the ChiCom Type 1 Rocket Fuze); a VC/NVA fabricated warhead, 170mm in diameter; a standard 107mm rocket motor; and a VC/NVA fabricated stabilizer assembly, 180mm in diameter. The marking "ED 12-A" was hand-painted on the warhead. The design and manufacture of both types of rockets appear to be standardized.

(8) On 20 Feb 69, elements of 9th US Marine Regiment recovered a Soviet 122mm Field Gun, Model D-74 towed in the vicinity of coordinates YD198060, Quang Tri Province. This is the first Soviet 122mm field gun, Model D-74 that has been captured in South Vietnam. The Soviet 122mm D-74 towed field gun is a medium field artillery weapon consisting of a 122mm Cannon, recoil mechanism and carriage.

(9) On 4 Mar 69, elements of US and Vietnamese Special Forces recovered a Soviet PT-76 Amphibious Tank in the vicinity of Ben Het, II CTZ. This is the first reported utilization of Soviet light armor within the Ben Het Area. On 15 Mar 69, one badly damaged PT-76 tank was

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evacuated to CMEC for exploitation. The basic role of the PT-76, with its three-man crew, is tactical reconnaissance; thus the vehicle is organic to reconnaissance units of tank, mechanized, and rifle armies. With appropriate modifications, the basic PT-76 Tank chassis serves as the BTR-50C APC, as the carrier vehicle for Frog 2, 3, and 4 series rocket launcher and as the Penguin, polar type, cross-country vehicle. The PT-76 has several strong points. Its principle strengths are: (1) its uncluttered basic design, low silhouette, and high degree of mobility, (2) its amphibious characteristics, (3) its ability to fire its main and secondary armament from a "hull-down" position while afloat, and (4) its ability to maneuver in the water and remain afloat for extended periods of time. Its principle weaknesses are: (1) thin armor, (2) relatively light 76mm gun main armament and (3) reduced capability for close-in defense because of its single coaxially mounted 7.62mm machinegun.

(10) The VC/NVA are using 55-gallon, weatherproofed, POL drums buried in the ground or submerged in water to conceal caches of munitions. RVNAF and FWMAF have uncovered these containers along the banks of streams and rivers, in the berms of rice paddies, along major infiltration and supply routes, and in the vicinity of VC/NVA base camps. The VC/NVA cut a rectangular hole in the center of the curved surface of the drum and weld a flanged frame in place over the hole. Matching holes are drilled in the frame, a sheet metal cover, and a rubber gasket. When the cover and gasket are bolted to the flange, the container is watertight, protecting the contents from the elements. The 5th ARVN Ranger group successfully located these containers in Hau Nghia Province by probing with bayonets. When buried, the top covers of the containers are usually about six inches below the ground.

### 3. (S) ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

#### a. Courses of Action:

(1) Resume an offensive of the type seen in the initial phase of the recent offensive: widely scattered attacks by fire throughout the Republic and ground attacks against limited objectives.

(2) Mount significant ground attacks against two or three secondary targets.

(3) Mount a major attack across the DMZ.

(4) Conduct an all out multi-divisional assault on Saigon.

(5) Break off from present positions and withdraw forces to out-of-country sanctuaries.

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## b. Discussion and Analysis:

(1) Resume an offensive of the type seen in the initial phase of the recent offensive: widely scattered attacks by fire throughout the Republic and ground attacks against limited objectives. He could resume the offensive at anytime, although his forces are in great need of rest, resupply and reinforcements. Nevertheless, many of his battalions remain intact after recent offensive activity.

(2) Mount significant ground attacks against two or three secondary targets. The enemy tried to carry out this in opening rounds of his recent offensive. Although he has been hurt, he still possesses the forces and they are disposed to carry out such attacks. Throughout the country the most likely targets would be: The DMZ and the Quang Nam lowlands, Tay Ninh City, military targets to the north and west of Saigon, Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex, and the My Tho/Dong Tam area.

(3) Mount a major attack across the DMZ. There is no doubt that the enemy has the capability for such action. Since the bombing halt, he has built up very large logistical stores throughout the area from Dong Hoi to the DMZ. He could bring back those divisions of the North Vietnamese Army which probably returned to their garrison areas last summer -- the 304th, 308th and 320th NVA Divisions -- and possibly a new 325th Division which has been identified by a PW. Since Jan, remarkable progress has been noted in the development of a road net skirting the western edge of the DMZ. This is an extension to the southwest of two parallel roads from the main north-south arteries in the North Vietnamese Panhandle and the extension north from Route 925 in Laos. These will probably soon join providing the enemy with a motorable capability to support forces operating south of the DMZ either from stores in North Vietnam or from the Tchepone base area complex. Thus far there are no indications of a large scale attack across the DMZ. Such attacks would risk a resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. The enemy may wait until completion of his new road net, the use of which would obviate the political risks inherent in attacks across the DMZ.

(4) Conduct an all-out multi-divisional assault on Saigon. This is always a tempting prize. It is obvious from the forces the enemy has concentrated in III Corps that he ultimately hopes to take the capital by force. He maintains the capability to attempt this, and evidence continues to mount concerning his plans for future attacks on the capital. His forces, however, are not now disposed to carry out such an attack. Furthermore, it is believed that the enemy will not try to do so unless and until he sees some very real political opportunity such as the rupture of GVN solidarity or a widespread demand for a change in government. The evidence of the enemy's plans for Saigon closely



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links attacks with political agitation, demonstration and proselyting, intended to fracture the governmental fabric. This would lay the groundwork for a final assault on Saigon designed to win the war. There are presently no indications that the GVN is about to disintegrate.

(5) Breakoff from present position and withdraw forces to sanctuary. The enemy may elect this, since his units have been hurt in the recent fighting, with many of his battalions at low strength. The enemy has suffered from artillery and B-52 strikes, there are indications of food shortages, and the enemy is currently depleting the stocks of forward caches. Furthermore, his forces are now in forward positions vulnerable to pre-emption. This course would reduce the cost to his resources and allow him to retain his greatest potential for future activity. There is some evidence that certain B-3 Front forces are withdrawing or have already withdrawn to border sanctuaries.

#### 4. (S) OVERALL ASSESSMENT (CONCLUSIONS):

a. Probable Course of Action: In the near future, the enemy will probably pull back a number of his units from contact and move to sanctuary, either in-country or to Cambodia. He can be expected to regroup and consolidate and prepare for another offensive sometime in late spring or summer. Evidence suggests that his forces in I CTZ have broken contact and may be moving to in-country base areas, or north of the Ben Hai River. In the B-3 Front area of II CTZ, the 24th and 66th NVA Regiments, which moved in-country in Jan 69 after a four-month period in Cambodian sanctuaries, are probably also returning to those sanctuaries. In III CTZ, the 9th VC Division will probably remain in Cambodia. Major elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions may move to Cambodian sanctuaries, while the 5th VC Division will probably stay in-country in War Zone D. In IV CTZ, enemy units will probably avoid contact as much as possible in the near future in order to refit and receive recruits. In the meantime, the enemy will continue reconnoitering and repositioning, while he plans future offensive activity. While avoiding major contact, he will apply military pressure by indirect fire attacks, harassment, and terrorism. When the enemy believes he can launch a new offensive, he will concentrate most of his effort in MR-2 and III CTZ, with Saigon as the ultimate goal.

#### b. Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy forces are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks and to vertical envelopment by airmobile forces.

(2) Because of limitations on the enemy's logistical system, those units in RVN which are separated from the sanctuaries of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam are vulnerable to sustained friendly operations.

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(3) The enemy's logistical system is vulnerable to ground, sea, and air interdiction.

(4) Enemy main force attacks are characterized by extensive preparations and inflexibility in execution. They are vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling actions.

(5) Enemy base areas and supply caches are vulnerable to destruction.

(6) The VC are dependent upon the people. Continued Allied emphasis on the Revolutionary Development Program will stimulate the shift of the population from VC to GVN control.

(7) As a result of high personnel turnover, low quality of replacements, protracted peace talks and failure to achieve objectives, the enemy is highly vulnerable to military and psychological pressure.

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## SECTION III

### GROUND OPERATIONS

#### 1. (C) GENERAL:

a. Objectives: The major objectives of the GVN/US/Free World Military Forces in RVN are (1) to inflict casualties on the enemy at a rate exceeding his ability to replace losses, (2) to upgrade the security of friendly base areas and lines of communication and (3) to extend overall security progressively to encompass all the population and territory of the RVN.

#### b. Relative Combat Strength: (Annex E)

(1) The enemy personnel strength as of 31 Mar 69 was estimated to be 229,416, a decrease of 29,820 from the 4th Qtr, CY69. The greatest decrease was in the VC strength. Total enemy maneuver battalions increased from 245 to 247.

(2) The total GVN/US/FWMAF personnel strength at the end of the Qtr was 1,575,371, an increase of 34,721 since 31 Dec 68. During the period friendly ground force strength increased by four maneuver battalions, from 306 to 310. Table 1 lists maneuver battalions by nationality and type. Table 2 shows distribution by CTZ.

TABLE 1

#### MANEUVER BATTALIONS

<u>NATIONALITY (TYPE)</u>	<u>AS OF 31 DEC 68</u>	<u>AS OF 31 MAR 69</u>
US	112	112
(ARMY)	(89)	(89)
(USMC)	(23)	(23)
GVN	166	167
(INF)	(131)	(132)
(ABN)	(9)	(9)
(RGR)	(20)	(20)
(MAR)	(6)	(6)
FW	28	31
(ROK)*	(22)	(22)
(AUST)	(3)	(3)
(THAI)	(3)	(6)
TOTAL	306	310

\*Includes four ROK Marine Bns.

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TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS BY CTZ (AS OF 31 MAR 69)

<u>NATIONALITY (TYPE)</u>	<u>CTZ</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	
US					112
(USA)	24	17	41	7	89
(USMC)	23				23
GVN					167
(ARVN)	33	27	36	36	132
(RGR)	3	3	9	5	20
(ABN)			9		9
(VPMC)			4	2	6
FW					31
(ROK)	1	18			22
(AUST)			3		3
(THAI)			6		6
TOTAL	87	65	108	50	310

c. Relative Friendly/Enemy Activity:2

(1) The number of both friendly small unit operations and large unit operations increased during the quarter.

TABLE 3

FRIENDLY OPERATIONS

	<u>4TH QTR, CY68</u>	<u>1ST QTR, CY69</u>	<u>% CHANGE</u>
Bn days on operations	25,640	29,219	+14
Large unit operations	2,010	2,523	+25
with contact	884	1,173	+33
Small unit operations	635,638	655,104	+ 3
with contact	2,921	4,499	+54

(2) Enemy initiated attacks during the Qtr were as follows:

<sup>2</sup>See Annex D for a detailed listing of significant contacts.

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TABLE 4

## ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS<sup>3</sup>

	<u>1ST QTR, CY69</u>
Large scale significant	35
Large scale	29
Significant	<u>242</u>
TOTAL	306

(3) Detailed analysis of operational data reflects retention of the military initiative by friendly forces during the Qtr.

(4) Table 5 compares the overall enemy/friendly KIA and weapons lost rates during the 4th Qtr, CY68 with the 1st Qtr, CY69.

TABLE 5

## COMPARATIVE RESULTS

	<u>4TH QTR, CY68*</u>			<u>1ST QTR, CY69</u>		
	<u>EN</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>RATIO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
KIA	29,500	6,129	4.81:1	48,590	7,621	6.37:1
Wpns lost	12,885	759	16.98:1	20,952	1,008	20.78:1

(5) Total Enemy Losses: Total enemy losses consist of five factors; killed in action, died of wounds or permanently disabled (estimated to be 35 percent of KIA figures), prisoners of war, returnees and non-battle casualties (estimated to be 2000 per month). Total enemy losses during 1st Qtr, CY69 numbered 78,801 as compared to 53,190 during the 4th Qtr, CY68.

d. Security Status of LOCs: The 1969 Combined Campaign Plan (AB144) identifies a total of 3,811 km of militarily essential roads and 1,694<sup>4</sup> km of essential waterways. The Vietnamese National Railway System consists of 687.1<sup>5</sup> km of railroad. The security status of these LOCs is shown schematically on the following four pages. Table 6 summarizes the security status of roads, waterways and railroads as of 31 Mar 69. For comparative purposes the security status as of 31 Dec 68 is shown in parenthesis below the 31 Mar 69 figures.

### \*Updated Figures

<sup>3</sup>Appendix 2 to Annex D defines the three categories of enemy initiated attacks.

<sup>4</sup>Reflects change 2 to MACV AB144, 15 Mar 69.


<sup>5</sup>Does not include appx. 400 km of mainlines whose roadbeds have not been restored.

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# **SECURITY STATUS ESSENTIAL MILITARY ROADS**

(As of 31 Mar 69)




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**SECURITY STATUS**

**RAILROADS**

(As of 31 Mar 69)




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# SECURITY STATUS WATERWAYS

## I CTZ


(As of 31 Mar 69)



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
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**CAMBODIA**

**III CTZ**



**SECURITY STATUS  
WATERWAYS IV CTZ**

(As of 31 Mar 69)

----- SECURE  
- - - - - OPEN  
..... CLOSED

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**TABLE 6**  
**SECURITY STATUS OF LOCs<sup>6</sup>**

LOC	SECURE (GREEN)		OPEN (AMBER)		CLOSED (RED)		TOTAL <sup>7</sup>
	KM	%	KM	%	KM	%	
Roads	2392.0 (2222.0)	62.8 (59.0)	1318.0 (1470.0)	34.5 (39.1)	101.0 (73.0)	2.7 (1.9)	3811.0 (3765.0)
Waterways	1147.0 (974.0)	67.7 (64.8)	547.0 (511.0)	32.3 (33.9)	- (19.0)	- (1.3)	1694.0 (1504.0)
Railroads	126.1 (223.9)	18.4 (18.1)	336.5 (310.4)	49.0 (25.0)	224.5 (705.3)	32.6 (56.9)	687.1 (1239.6)

e. Enemy Base Areas: The following table lists the location and status of the 37 recognized enemy in-country base areas.

**TABLE 7**  
**ENEMY IN-COUNTRY BASE AREAS**

<u>LOCATION (CTZ)</u>	<u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>INACTIVE</u>	<u>NEUTRALIZED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I	5	0	0	5
II	8	3	0	11
III	12	0	0	12
IV	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	34	3	0	37

(1) At the end of the 1st Qtr, CY69, eight percent of the enemy in-country base areas had been inactivated. This was a decrease of 20 percent over the end of the 4th Qtr, CY69.

(2) The schematics on the next four pages identify the enemy base areas within the CTZ.

2. (8) I CTZ (III MAF):

a. General:

<sup>6</sup>Para 4 Annex E defines security classification terms and shows the security status of LOCs by geographic area.

<sup>7</sup>Total km of LOCs as reflected in the Combined Campaign Plans AB143 - 1968 and AB144 - 1969


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# I CTZ VC/NVA BASE AREAS

(As of 31 Mar 69)



○ ACTIVE

▨ INACTIVE

● NEUTRALIZED


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**II CTZ  
VC/NVA  
BASE AREAS**

(As of 31 Mar 69)

- ACTIVE
- ◐ INACTIVE
- NEUTRALIZED



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
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# **IV CTZ VC/NVA BASE AREAS**

(As of 31 Mar 69)



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(1) During 1st Qtr, CY69 US/RVMAF/Free World Military Assistance Forces conducted 23 major unit operations and 47,364 small unit operations throughout I CTZ. Objectives were to reconnoiter in force, locate and destroy enemy forces, installations and war materiel, interdict enemy lines of communication and support pacification.

(2) III MAF Unit Operations, 1st Qtr, CY68 compared with 4th Qtr, CY68:

(a) Major Unit Operations:

	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>
FWMAF	23	31
US	4	11
ROKMC	3	3
Combined JS/ARVN	16	17

(b) Small Unit Operations:

Total operations	47,364	47,769
Contacts	4,621	2,856
Enemy KIA	4,466	2,299
Friendly KIA	432	161
Kill Ratio	10.3:1	14.3:1

(c) Special Operations:

STING RAY Operations conducted	58	232
Enemy KIA	19	62
Friendly KIA	0	5
Kill Ratio	19:0	12.4:1

b. Significant Operations:

(1) SCOTLAND II commenced on 14 Apr 68 in Quang Tri Province and terminated on 28 Feb 69. The operation was initiated to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in NW Quang Tri to locate and destroy enemy

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forces, caches, installations and interdict lines of communication. Units participating included 4th Marines and F/2/3d Marines. 3d Mar Div (TF HOTEL) was the controlling Headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr. CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	196	3,311
	POW	2	64
	Individual Wpns Cptd	36	969
	Crew served Wpns Cptd	7	242
Friendly:	KIA	55	463
	WIA (Evac)	139	2,180
Kill Ratio		3.6:1	7.2:1

(2) MONTAFA MAULER commenced on 23 Mar 69 in Quang Tri Province and is continuing. The combined operation was initiated to conduct reconnaissance in force operations to locate and destroy elements of the 27th NVA Regiment between Dong Ha Mountain and Mutters' Ridge. Units participating were 1/11 Inf; 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech); elements of 3/5 Cav; 1/2/9th Marines and 1st Bn, 2d ARVN Regt. 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) is the controlling headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr. CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	267	267
	POW	0	0
	Individual Wpns Cptd	22	22
	Crew Served Wpns Cptd	6	6
Friendly:	KIA	33	33
	WIA (Evac)	182	182
Kill Ratio		8.1:1	8.1:1

(3) DEWEY CANYON commenced 22 Jan 69 in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and terminated on 18 Mar 69. The combined operation was initiated to conduct search and clear operations in the Southern Da Krong

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River area to locate and destroy enemy forces and caches and interdict major enemy lines of communication. Units participating were 9th Marines, E and G Co's, 2/3d Marines and 2d ARVN Regiment. 9th Marines was the controlling headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	1,617	1,617
	POW	4	4
	Individual Wpns Cptd	1,219	1,219
	Crew Served Wpns Cptd	242	242
Friendly:	KIA	121	121
	WIA (Evac)	616	616
Kill Ratio		13.4:1	13.4:1

(4) NEVADA EAGLE commenced on 17 May 68 in Thua Thien Province and terminated 28 Feb 69. The operation was initiated to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, caches, support facilities, base camps and installations and support GVN by conduct of combined operations and pacification operations. Units participating included 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, 101st ABN Div (AM); elements of 3/5 and 2/17 CAV, and 2/34 Armor, Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf, Troop D, 1/1 Cav, Americal Div, 1st ARVN Regt, 3d ARVN Regt, 54th ARVN Regt, and 7th ARVN CAV. The 101st ABN (AM) was the controlling headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	319	3,299
	POW	22	853
	Individual Wpns Cptd	273	3,379
	Crew Served Wpns Cptd	16	322
Friendly:	KIA	30	205
	WIA (Evac)	198	1,357
Kill Ratio		10.6:1	16.1:1

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(5) KENTUCKY JUMPER commenced 1 Mar 69 in Thua Thien Province and is continuing. The operation was initiated to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, caches, support facilities, base camps and installations and support GVN by conduct of combined operations and pacification operations. Units participating include the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, 101st ABN Div (AM); elements of 3/5 and 2/17 CAV, and 2/34 Armor; Company L (Ranger), 75th Inf; Troop D, 1/1 CAV, Americal Div, 1st ARVN Regt, 3d ARVN Regt, 54th ARVN Regt, and 7th ARVN CAV. The 101st ABN Div (AM) is the controlling headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	199	199
	POW	16	16
	Individual Wpns Cptd	139	139
	Crew Served Wpns Cptd	13	13
Friendly:	KIA	48	48
	WIA (Evac)	157	157
Kill Ratio		4.1:1	4.1:1

(6) TAYLOR COMMON commenced on 7 Dec 68 in Quang Nam Province and terminated on 8 Mar 69. The operation was initiated to conduct combined operations with ARVN to find, fix and destroy enemy in An Hoa area while Marine A conducted search and clear operations in Base Area 112 to destroy enemy forces, caches, and installations. Units participating were 5th Marines, 1/3d Marines, 3/3d Marines, 2/26th Marines, 3/26th Marines, C and D Co's, 1/7th Marines, B and C Co's, 1/1st Marines, 1st ARVN Ranger Group and 51st ARVN Regt. 1st Mar Div (TF YANKEE) was the controlling headquarters.

		<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy:	KIA	1,053	1,399
	POW	22	29
	Individual Wpns Cptd	470	610
	Crew Served Wpns Cptd	18	23
Friendly:	KIA	135	150

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	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
WIA (Evac)	877	1,036
Kill Ratio	7.7:1	8.7:1

(7) FREDERICK HILL commenced on 18 Mar 69 in Quang Tin Province and is continuing. This operation was initiated after realignment of 196th Inf Bde and 5th ARVN Regt in a joint area of operations to conduct joint and unilateral operations to locate and destroy enemy forces located therein and conduct pacification operations to gain support for GVN. Units participating were 1/46th Inf, 1/52 Inf, 2/1 Inf, 3/21 Inf, 4/31 Inf, elements of 1/1 CAV, F Troop 17th CAV, and 5th ARVN Regt. 196th Inf Bde is the controlling headquarters.

	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy: KIA	230	230
POW	3	3
Individual Wpns Cptd	45	45
Crew Served Wpns Cptd	5	5
Friendly: KIA	29	29
WIA (Evac)	161	161
Kill Ratio	8.0:1	8.0:1

(8) VERNON LAKE II commenced on 2 Nov 68 in Quang Ngai Province and terminated on 28 Feb 69. This combined operation was initiated to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division operating in the vicinity of Song Ve and Song Re Valleys and Ha Thanh SF Camp. Units participating were 1/20 Inf, 4/21 Inf, E/1 CAV and 4th ARVN Regt. 11th Inf Bde was the controlling headquarters.

	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Enemy: KIA	252	455
POW	2	8
Individual Wpns Cptd	41	140
Crew Served Wpns Cptd	1	5

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		<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
Friendly:	KIA	13	23
	WIA (Evac)	50	110
Kill Ratio		19.4:1	19.8:1

c. Overall Assessment: Ground combat operations conducted by III MAF during 1st Qtr, CY69 were aggressive and wide ranging, aimed at inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, interdicting his movements, destroying his war materiel and supporting pacification. Of particular note were Operations DEWEY CANYON in terms of total enemy KIA and enemy/friendly KIA ratio and VERNON LAKE with reference to enemy/friendly KIA ratio. The emphasis on combined operations with elements of RVNAF previously noted in 4th Qtr, CY68 was continued with significant participation by ARVN units in all but one of the eight described significant operations in I CTZ.

### 3. (S) II CTZ (I FFORCEV):

#### a. Objectives and Progress:

(1) During the 1st Qtr, CY69 emphasis was allotted between support of pacification and the conduct of both large and small unit operations. As large enemy units become more and more elusive, strategy was to shift away from massed operations towards saturating the countryside with small unit patrols. Numerous cordon and search operations were undertaken in conjunction with province authorities.

(2) In aid of the military support of pacification, action was taken by II Corps ROKFV-FC and I FFORCEV to improve coordination between tactical unit commanders and province officials. To improve this coordination, CG, II Corps directed that province chiefs hold monthly meetings with tactical unit commanders. At the request of DCG, ROKFV-FC, a combined letter promulgating this concept was prepared and signed by the three national commanders in II CTZ.

(3) Early in the quarter, it became apparent that contingency plans were required for the rapid reinforcement of forces defending urban centers, RF/PF forces and other GVN activities in rural areas. In response to this need, a combined LOI was published. This LOI prescribes that, where possible, ARVN regular forces provide the primary reaction forces while second nation forces provide secondary reaction forces. Sector/province chiefs retain primary responsibility for the defense of urban centers. In the rural areas, subsector/district chiefs and, in turn, sector/province chiefs have primary responsibility for defense. Requests

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for deployment of forces to rural areas begin at the subsector level. Sector chiefs who cannot provide reaction forces request assistance from the designated senior ARVN commander who in turn requests second nation assistance if required. Primary and secondary reaction forces are designated for each of 13 major urban centers and for each of the 12 provinces. Both ARVN and second nation forces must be prepared to deploy one rifle company in one hour and the battalion minus in five hours.

## b. Significant Operations:

(1) Disposition of Forces: During the 1st Qtr, CY69 the 1st Bde 4th US Inf Div deployed some of its elements out of northern Kontum Province and the 4th Div AO was adjusted accordingly. The purpose of this move was to give the 24th STZ a greater share of responsibility in the defense of the highlands and provide US forces with the flexibility for employment of major forces elsewhere.

(2) Summary of Ground Operations: During the Qtr the tempo of ground combat increased. The enemy employed a large number of stand-off mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attacks as well as ground attacks on isolated hamlets and RF/PF units. As a whole he continued to avoid decisive combat and concentrated his efforts on attacks of villages, hamlets, US installations and outlying military positions. Allied units placed emphasis on small unit operations and revised their contingency plans so as to improve reaction both from the standpoint of time and impact. The following summary covers the significant activities for the quarter in the four major geographic areas in II CTZ.

(a) Western Highlands: At the beginning of the Qtr, ground combat increased in intensity. Allied forces intensified operations against enemy units, base areas and lines of communication. Cordon and search operations were conducted to identify and capture the VCI and to assist the GVN in regaining control of contested hamlets. A major activity of significance was Operation BINH TAY/SLEDGEHAMMER which took place west of Plei Mrong in Jan. During Feb activity in the three Highland Provinces continued to be heavy. Activity in Western Pleiku and Northwestern Kontum Provinces was characterized by large-scale ground and standoff attacks against Allied forces, installations and civilian population centers. Enemy activity in the Ben Het - Cambodian border and Polei Kleng CIDG Camp areas reached the highest level of intensity for the year to date. In Mar the focal point of enemy initiated activity was in the Western Highlands primarily in the Ben Het and Polei Kleng areas. Allied forces countered the enemy's threat with the timely deployment of substantial infantry and armored forces and heavy reliance upon artillery and air power. The 4th Inf Div killed 873 enemy in the area and severely crippled the 24th and 66th NVA Regts. Significant enemy equipment captured or destroyed included six 2 1/2 ton trucks, four 105mm guns and two PT-76 tanks.

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(b) Binh Dinh Province: Activity stepped up in Binh Dinh Province during Jan. Allied forces found with increasing frequency enemy base areas and supply caches. ROK forces terminated operation BUN KAE 68-5. In Feb, Binh Dinh Province activity continued to lead all other provinces in number of incidents; however, the majority of the reported actions were small unit contacts with generally minor results. Enemy activity was directed predominantly against territorial forces and civilian population centers. Operations during Mar witnessed several significant contacts by the 173d ABN Bde. Emphasis remained on offensive small unit operations. Hawk (Hunter-Killer) Teams killed nearly 200 enemy during the month. As the month closed, Operation SKY SCOPE had impressive results. A brigade OP was established on a mountain SE of Bong Son and equipped with terrestrial binoculars. Personnel manning the OP observed enemy activity six km away. Quick reaction resulted in 50 enemy killed and 41 enemy sampans sunk.

(c) Central Provinces: During Jan, ROK forces commenced operation NAE SAN JIN 6 and terminated operation BAK JEE 2-5, both with excellent results. RF and PF elements discovered a VC district headquarters in Phu Yen Province. Elements of a "US armor platoon" teamed up with RF elements and virtually wiped out an enemy company. In Feb operations were characterized by excellent results in this area. Thirty-eight km SW of Tuy Hoa, the 3d Bn, 28th ROK Regt, 9th ROK Inf Div terminated JUN MA 6 targeted against rear service forces of the 5th NVA Div. The 7 day operation resulted in 21 enemy KIA, one PW and 16 SA captured. Friendly casualties were two KIA. Twenty-seven km SE of Tuy Hoa, the 1st Bn 18th ROK Regt terminated Operation UN MA 7 resulting in 107 enemy KIA, seven PW's, 48 SA and nine CS CIA. ROKs had six MIA. The 4th Bn (Abn) 503d Inf also participated in this operation at the end of the Qtr. Two ROK divisions conducted a total of nine battalion and eight regimental size operations in their AO's. During Mar, an intensive psyops campaign resulted in 50 small arms being turned over by the people. ROK forces killed 462 enemy and captured 250 small arms during the month.

(d) Southern Provinces: In Jan, Task Force South, paired off with the 53d and 44th ARVN Regiments, continued spoiling attacks in the southern provinces. The 53d ARVN Regt gained its third operational battalion. The extra battalion added to the balance of combat power required for security in the vicinity of Bao Loc, Di Linh, Duc Trong and Dalat. Action in the Southern Provinces showed an increase in activity over the previous months. During Feb activity remained at a low level of intensity throughout most of the month. The majority of enemy initiated incidents were squad and platoon size attacks against territorial forces with the intent of harassment rather than overrunning the positions. Enemy activity increased beginning 22 Feb to include both light and heavy standoff attacks against US and Vietnamese installations, and civilian population centers of Phang Rang, Phan Thiet and Dalat. In combined operations with the 23d ARVN Division, several large

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caches were discovered during the period. In Mar elements of Task Force South captured a 204-ton rice cache. US and ARVN forces conducted combined operations in the Le Phong Forest area SW of Song Mao. A massive psyops campaign, saturation patrolling, and the capture of large stores of food induced significant numbers of people to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program. A total of 137 people turned themselves in including two VC hamlet chiefs. TF South/23d Light CP killed 102 enemy at the end of the Qtr.

## (3) Operational Assessment:

(a) Allied units continued to place a great deal of emphasis on small unit operations as the enemy continued to avoid decisive combat. These small units conducted numerous patrols and ambushes both day and night making it extremely difficult for the enemy to move about the countryside.

(b) Feb and Mar was the period of heaviest activity in a year. Over 900 standoff and ground attacks were initiated by the enemy during Mar alone, with over 400 attacks directed at US forces. Similarly, attacks against RF/PF units were up during the Qtr. Attacks against ARVN remained at a relatively low level.

(c) In response to the upsurge of attacks on villages and hamlets, explicit guidance was given to OPCON units and province senior advisors for increased protection and preemptive measures. Mobile forces were positioned to screen LOCs and to be more responsive to attacks on villages and hamlets. Twenty-four hour liaison was established in each district headquarters and radio communications were supplemented by tactical sets. Parallel instructions were issued in ARVN channels as a further means of improving reaction.

## c. Significant Activities:

(1) STINGRAY Concept: During the last two Qtrs, the enemy has fragmented his forces, avoiding decisive engagement, while reverting more and more to standoff ground attacks against lightly defended outposts. Because the enemy continues these tactics, our weaponry, mobility and intelligence assets must be reoriented in an effort to carry the war to him and engage and defeat him. A need was thus established for a change in tactics. In response to this need, the STINGRAY concept was developed. Emphasis is on massive firepower to fix and destroy the enemy followed immediately by a ground sweep of the area. The operation would be conducted in six phases.

(a) Phase I: Identification. HQ I FFORCEV focuses intelligence collection on potential enemy areas. When a target of battalion size or larger is found, the reaction force commander is notified.



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(b) Phase II: Attack. The target area is a one square kilometer box, saturated in succession with non-persistent CS, air-delivered ordnance and an artillery preparation which includes improved special munitions.

(c) Phase III: Assault. Immediately after the attack phase, a heliborne assault force consisting of one rifle company with combat tracker teams and one air cavalry troop combat assaults into the area.

(d) Phase IV: Search. One rifle company supported by the air cavalry troop makes a complete search of the target box.

(e) Phase V: Extraction or Reinforcement. Upon completion of the search of the target box, the reaction force is extracted. If the ground force has been decisively engaged it will be reinforced by units previously designated for this purpose.

(f) Phase VI: Stay Behind. If the operation has been successful, a stay behind force is left in the area.

#### d. Overall Assessment:

(1) 1st Qtr, CY69 saw measurable improvement in intelligence production and operations throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. ARVN made significant improvement throughout the intelligence system. ARVN speed and accuracy of reporting continued to improve although intelligence reports are still not complete.

(2) The primary factor in pacification during the first quarter was the success of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, showing the value of short term, high impact campaigns.

(3) Progress was particularly noteworthy in the following areas: Chieu Hoi, qualitative VC neutralization, village/hamlet elections, and control of population. Problem areas included the increasing number of refugees on the rolls, the slowdown of resettlement and the returning of refugees. This area will require constant attention and increased effort.

#### 4. (S) III CTZ (II FFORCEV):

##### a. Significant Operations:

##### (1) General:

(a) During the 1st Qtr, CY69, II FFORCEV conducted ground combat operations in Long Khanh, Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Binh Duong, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces. US/FWMAF

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spent 5,621 battalion days on combat operations during the Qtr compared to 6,125 battalion days in 4th Qtr, CY68. Combined operations of US/FWMAF and the RVNAF were directed toward the defeat of enemy forces in III Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Campaign TOAN THANG II and III continued throughout the quarter. It encompassed all II FFORCEV and III Corps units located in III Corps Tactical Zone. The effort against the enemy continued with an emphasis on ground combat operations designed to defeat the enemy, interdict his movement toward the capital and extend GVN control throughout III Corps Tactical Zone. Airmobility assets substantially contributed to the II FFORCEV ability to destroy the enemy and interdict the enemy's movements by improving the response time for units operating on a broad front. To exploit these assets, II FFORCEV moved out to meet the enemy, to attack his logistical lines, to conduct extensive operations in his base areas and to react rapidly to hard intelligence to engage the enemy. The effectiveness of these operations can be seen in terms of the enemy's losses and his inability to conduct successful attacks against installations and population centers.

(2) US/FWMAF: The 1st CAV DIV (AM) continued to conduct operations in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Hau Nghia, Phuoc Long and Long Khanh Provinces. In early Feb operations were extended into Bien Hoa Province and War Zone D. The 1st Infantry Division conducted offensive operations in Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (less one squadron) remained under the operational control of the 1st Inf Div throughout the Qtr. The 3d Bde of the 9th Inf Div continued offensive operations south of Saigon with one brigade. The remainder of the 9th Inf Div is under the operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Capital Military Assistance Command continued offensive operations in Gia Dinh Province to locate and destroy enemy forces while mitigating his rocket capability. The 25th Inf Div continued offensive ground operations in Hau Nghia, western Binh Duong and Tay Ninh Provinces.

(3) ARVN: During the 1st Qtr, CY69, the Vietnamese Army continued to conduct offensive operations as part of Campaigns Toan Thang II and III. Based on the issue of new weapons and equipment, the potential of the ARVN units increased. Large unit offensive operations and combined operations increased. The number of enemy losses increased significantly from 3,073 last Qtr to 5,201 this Qtr. The 31st Divisional Tactical Area (25th ARVN Division) showed an increase in both small and large unit operations. In the 1st Qtr, CY69, 444 large unit and 225 small unit operations were conducted as compared to 4th Qtr, CY68 when 307 large unit and 121 small unit operations were conducted. The 5th ARVN Division (32d Divisional area) conducted military operations in the Iron Triangle, Filhcl Plantation, Ho Bo Woods and the An Son area. Interdiction operations were conducted in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.

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Large-scale operations were generally successful and the results obtained compared favorably with last Qtr. In the 33d Division Tactical Area (18th ARVN Division) elements of the division participated in 23 company or larger sized operations involving RF/PF or national Police elements during the quarter. In actions during Mar, division units engaged in heavy contacts and killed 273 NVA soldiers. Capital Military District (CMD) dispositions remained relatively unchanged with its forces operating in the north, east, south and within the city of Saigon. During the first half of the quarter, enemy activity was relatively light. The last half of the quarter resulted in moderate enemy activity with a number of small unit contacts and rocket attacks.

(4) RF/PF: The increased effectiveness of RF/PF during 1st Qtr, CY69 can be attributed to continually improving leadership, the advisory effort, improved weaponry and high morale. RF/PF inflicted enemy losses for the Qtr were 934 killed and 433 prisoners. There was an 85 percent increase in the number of individual weapons captured and a 340 percent increase in crew served weapons captured.

(5) Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne): During the 1st Qtr, Company A conducted 514 company-size and 213 platoon-size operations in III Corps Tactical Zone. Company A had 700 contacts during the period and accounted for 809 enemy killed. The CIDG program in III CTZ continued its intensive saturation patrolling throughout the Special Forces TAOR with a goal of maximum sureveillance and interdiction. The use of Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), to cover wide frontages continued as a successful operation for surveillance and interdiction of the enemy.

## b. Significant Activities:

(1) The 2d Bde, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) closed in RVN in early Feb 69. Force strength was 5,700 personnel. The brigade became operational on 21 Feb 69 and commenced combat operations in Dien Hoa Province.

(2) Commencing in mid-Mar 69, the 1st Cav Div (AM) was relieved of its responsibility for a specific Tactical Area of Interest. The division is currently employed as a highly mobile and responsive "swing" division. As determined by timely intelligence indicators, the division was assigned temporary Tactical Areas of Operation throughout the entire III CTZ.

(3) The impact of operation GIANT SLINGSHOT along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers, which began on 6 Dec 68, became apparent during the middle and latter part of the Qtr. As of 31 Mar 69, there had been 267 patrol contacts. The operation was credited with 405 enemy killed, 60 enemy captured, and 89 caches uncovered which have yielded approximately 93.3 tons of munitions.

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(4) On 18 Mar 69, Operation ATLAS WEDGE, the largest combined operation conducted within III CTZ during the 1st Qtr, CY69 with 12 US battalions and two ARVN battalions, was initiated against the 7th NVA Div in the Michelin Plantation area. A total of nine days of fighting in and around the plantation resulted in 444 enemy killed and 16 captured. The enemy, driven from his sanctuaries, sustained further casualties from the massive series of B-52 strikes directed against his withdrawal routes and base areas adjacent to the Michelin Plantation.

(5) The initial phase of the Song Bo Road operation was completed during the quarter. The section of the road from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai was repaired and opened. A two hundred meter wide path was Rome plowed on either side of this segment of the road to deter enemy ambush and sniper activity.

(6) Efforts continued at the improvement of the physical security of the critical bridges in III CTZ during the 1st Qtr, CY69. Lighting and pier protection of four bridges were accepted from the contractor and turned over to MACV. Anti-swimmer booms and floating pier protection collars were designed to protect against underwater sapper attacks.

c. Overall Assessment: During 1st Qtr, CY69 operations continued at an accelerated tempo against the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Qtr was characterized by the enemy continuing to avoid contact except during the period 23-28 Feb when he attempted to attack the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area, suffering heavy casualties; fire support bases were also probed. Following are significant cumulative for this quarter: FWMAF losses: 765 killed (15 Australian, one New Zealand, 20 Thai), four missing, 4,811 wounded (111 Australian, 16 New Zealand, 187 Thai, three USN); FWMAF inflicted enemy losses: 8,878 killed, 412 prisoners, 1,914 detainees; 2,598 small arms, 553 crew served weapons, 525.04 tons rice captured; 88 small arms, 117 crew served weapons, 447.81 tons rice destroyed.

## 5. (C) IV CTZ:

### a. Significant Operations and Activities:

#### (1) Military Operations:

(a) A comparison of operational statistics for 4th Qtr, CY68 and the 1st Qtr, CY69 is as follows:

	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Major Unit Operations	1,460	1,575
Contact on Major Unit Operations	711	1,000

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	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Small Unit Operations	194,684	212,522
Contact on Small Unit Operations	924	1,383
VC KIA	9,615	15,912
Friendly KIA	1,145	1,951
Weapons Captured	3,399	4,985
Weapons Lost	356	633

(b) The number of operations and operational results against the VC during the 1st Qtr, CY69 increased over the 4th Qtr, CY68. The QUYET THANG Campaign commenced on 1 Jan 69. The objectives of the QUYET THANG Campaign are the interdiction of VC infiltration routes, penetration of base areas and pursuit of the VC in operational areas. The initiative of the campaign during the 1st Qtr, CY69 was definitely in favor of the ARVN forces.

(c) During the 1st Qtr, there were 1,217 VC initiated incidents. VC initiated incidents increased from 303 in Jan to 424 in Feb and to 490 in Mar. Eighty-four of the incidents were ground attacks, representing an increase of 33 ground attacks over 4th Qtr, CY68. In addition to the objectives of the QUYET THANG Campaign, advisory emphasis continues to be placed on night operations and reaction forces, security of LOC's, and support of the Pacification Program.

(2) Attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure: The 1st Qtr saw a further increase in the neutralization of VCI which, was marked by a significant increase in the number of VCI ranking at District level or higher. The command guidance and direction of the program continued at its previous level of excellence. All PLOCC's and DIOCC's were manned and operating, and the program was moved to lower echelons with village and hamlet authorities being given a greater role. Given the continued emphasis and priorities to the PHUNG HOANG Program, a further increase in both the quantity and quality of neutralizations in IV CTZ was expected.

(3) Defense of Installations and Vital Centers: Security of urban political and economic centers continued to improve. Operational emphasis by friendly forces was placed on interdiction of VC infiltration, penetration into VC base areas and pursuit of VC forces throughout the Delta. Although the VC TET Offensive was initiated on 22 Feb 69, the VC were unable to mass troops to launch large-scale ground attacks against military installations and political and economic centers. However, a large number

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of indirect fire attacks were conducted against district and province towns and the 9th US Inf Div base at Dong Tam. Friendly troop distribution and strength continued to make large-scale ground attacks highly unlikely. Traffic along Highway 4 continued to move with only 17 incidents during the quarter. The QUYET THANG Campaign continued to produce significant results in the security of military installations and key economic and political centers.

## b. Significant Developments:

### (1) ARVN:

(a) ARVN units maintained combat readiness with the capability of performing their assigned missions.

(b) As of 31 Mar 69, all divisions had an assigned strength in excess of 80 percent of that authorized. There were no major equipment shortages that affected combat or combat support units.

(c) RD refresher training was suspended on 3 Dec 68 by JGS and to date has not been reinstated. Ten battalions remain in direct support of RD.

### (2) Regional Forces/Popular Forces:

(a) There were 532 Regional Force companies, 1,999 Popular Force platoons, 15 River Patrol companies, 17 Mechanized platoons, 16 Intelligence platoons, 91 Intelligence squads, 16 Heavy Weapons platoons, 16 A&DSL companies and 82 Command Groups authorized in IV CTZ at the end of the Qtr. This represents an increase of 104 RF companies and 22 Command Groups over those authorized at the end of the last quarter.

(b) The combat effectiveness of the Regional and Popular Forces at the end of the Qtr was considered satisfactory. During the 1st Qtr, emphasis was placed on the upgrading of RF/PF units, night operations, ambushes, and improvement of unit leadership. The major problems encountered were the shortage of 3,381 RF NCOs and the present for duty strength since last quarter. The Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) continued to improve the combat effectiveness of many RF/PF units. There were 116 MATs deployed in IV CTZ.

(c) The status of RF/PF equipment improved during this quarter. The major improvement was the receipt of several hundred M-79 Grenade launchers and M-60 Machine guns. The critical equipment shortages in IV Corps RF/PF units were 2 1/2 ton trucks and office machines for A&DSL companies.

c. Overall Assessment: Initiative in the IV Corps remained with GVN Forces during the quarter. The QUYET THANG Campaign commenced on 1 Jan 69 and continued at a rapid tempo. The objectives of the campaign are the

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interdiction of VC infiltration routes, penetration of base areas, and securing of LOCs. Neutralization of VCI increased during the quarter. All PLOCCs and DIOCCs are manned and operating. The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program was moved to lower echelons with village and hamlet authorities being given a greater role. With continued emphasis there should be a marked increase in the elimination of VCI in the IV CTZ during the next quarter. An additional eight retail commissaries became operational. During this quarter self-defense weapons have become available at a constant rate. There are 50,000 of the 57,099 authorized on hand; the remainder will be issued during the next quarter. The advisory effort will continue to emphasize raising the effectiveness of ARVN, RF, PF and PSDF through the expansion of training programs and encouragement of aggressive spirit, night operations and constant use of reaction forces.

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SECTION IV

NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. (S) GENERAL:

a. Naval operations in RVN during the 1st Qtr, CY69, fell into four major operational categories:

(1) MARKET TIME operations, the mission of which is to ensure the security of the coastline and river estuaries throughout RVN, and designated harbors in II, III, and IV Corps.

(2) GAME WARDEN operations, the objectives of which are: the security of major rivers of the Delta and other inland waterways; the denial of the use of these waterways by the enemy; and the protection of shipping thereon.

(3) Mobile Riverine Force, the naval component of which is tasked with the transport and support of elements of USA/ARVN/VNMC in riverine operations in the Mekong Delta and other areas of IV Corps to destroy the enemy main and local forces and their resources. The purpose of these operations is to assist the GVN in extending control of waterway systems and contiguous land areas.

(4) SEA LORDS operations, including operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, the primary objectives of which are: the interdiction of VC infiltration routes from Cambodia into III and IV CTZ; the pacification of designated waterways; the maintenance of patrol presence on the Cambodian Border waterways; and harassment of the enemy by river raids and ambushes in areas heretofore immune to attack from waterways.

b. Common to all of these operations were certain procedures and tactics among which were patrol surveillance, visit and search, support of troops ashore, harassment and interdiction fire, psychological operations, enforcement of curfew, mining and countermining operations. Other tactics were peculiar to specific operations. For example, large scale troop insertions and extractions are best conducted by craft of the Mobile Riverine Force.

c. Operation SEA LORDS continued to be the most significant of these operations in 1st Qtr, CY69, as it had been in the previous Qtr. Integrated task units were employed to form a series of interdiction barriers, designed to prevent infiltration/exfiltration of enemy personnel and supplies across the Cambodian Border. To this end, much effort was expended in extending existing barriers and in instituting new barriers to complete the interdiction chain. The effectiveness of these barriers was enhanced by the development of new tactics. Notable among these was

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the extensive and successful use of night ambush tactics. Extensive use of sophisticated detection devices and quick reaction thereto likewise met with considerable success. Similarly, quick reaction to enemy initiated ambushes by artillery, Light Helicopter Fire Teams, and troop insertion were also used to advantage.

d. The Accelerated Turn Over (ACTOV) Program is a coordinated effort to provide the VNN with the material and training to accept and properly employ USN waterborne and ashore assets. During the Qtr 33 River Assault Craft were turned over to the VNN to form River Assault Interdiction Divisions (RAIDS) 70 and 71. An energetic training program was continued to prepare the VNN for the eventual turn over of virtually all river patrol boats presently in-country.

e. Operations MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN and the Mobile Riverine Force continued at a high tempo, despite the fact that a considerable draw down of resources was required for the execution of Operation SEA LORDS.

f. The overall evaluation of the USN operations and VNN progress during the 1st Qtr, CY69 is excellent. The Naval role in the Vietnam conflict continued to be primarily that of interdiction. The success attained in this effort was largely measurable in negative terms. The enemy was unable to infiltrate personnel or material in large numbers or amounts from Cambodia or from seaward. Neither was he able to effectively relocate his resources across the major waterways of III and IV Corps.

## 2. (C) US NAVY/US COAST GUARD OPERATIONS:

### a. SEA LORDS Operations:

(1) Operation SEARCH TURN: This operation involved resettlement of the civilian population along the Rach Gia - Long Xuyen Canal after disruption of VC communication routes to preclude their reestablishment. In addition the TAOR was expanded from 10 kms to 25 kms on both sides of the Rach Gia - Long Xuyen Canal. This allowed random PER operations over a large network of inland waterways, including the Cai Be and Cai Lon Rivers. Later this TAOR was again expanded to cover the Gulf of Thailand in the Rach Gia area, as intelligence had indicated that the enemy, having had his inland routes interdicted, shifted his supply routes to this shallow area of the Gulf.

### (2) Operation BARRIER REEF:

(a) The commencement of Operation BARRIER REEF on 2 Jan 69 completed the interdiction line from northwest of Saigon near Tay Ninh City to the Gulf of Thailand at Ha Tien.

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(b) Initial phases of the operation saw River Division 535 patrolling the Kinh La Grange to the Kinh Ong Lan and along the Kinh Ong Lan to the Cong Hoa-Tu Mai Canal intersection. River Division 531 was assigned the Kinh Dong Tien and Ong Lan Canals to the Cong Hoa-Tu Mai Canal intersection. The USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST 846) moved into the vicinity of An Long to act as the primary support base of River Division 531.

### (3) Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT

(a) From its commencement in late CY68 to the 1st Qtr, CY69 GIANT SLINGSHOT has developed into a permanent interdiction effort in areas heretofore considered sanctuaries by the enemy. The units involved in GIANT SLINGSHOT significantly disrupted movement along and across the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers denying the enemy his previously unhindered movements between sanctuaries in Cambodia and his objective in the RVN.

(b) The GIANT SLINGSHOT operation developed into a joint US/VNN effort utilizing seventy PBR's, forty RAC, four MSM's, three support ships from US assets and 33 VNN RAID units which were deployed at five advanced tactical support bases and patrolled approximately two hundred miles of waterways in the III and IV CTZ's.

(c) The newly organized Vietnamese River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAIDS) joined in GIANT SLINGSHOT for tactical training and integration into joint operations. These units, while still in the developing stage, proved to be aggressive, dependable, and eager.

### (4) SEA LORDS Operational Results, 1st Qtr, CY69:

	<u>SEARCH TURN</u>	<u>GIANT SLINGSHOT</u>	<u>BARRIER REEF</u>
Number of firefights	22	266	24
Enemy KIA/captured	29	453	17
Structures/bunkers/ junks/sampans destroyed or captured	235	545	73
Friendly KIA	7	27	8
Friendly WIA	23	320	29
Boat casualties	4	61	9
Weapons caches discovered	13	53	0

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### b. MARKET TIME (TF 115):

(1) The inshore surface surveillance patrols consisted of 54 stations, of which 40 are under CTF 115 operational control and are patrolled by PCF's and WPB's. Approximately 57 percent of the 1,175 nautical mile coastline is at present designated as GVN restricted areas. Rigid enforcement of these zones throughout the Qtr effectively controlled illegal movement of personnel and material within the coastal region. Detections totalled 121,193. This is an increase of 10,073 over 4th Qtr, CY68. The inspection percentage for all contacts this quarter was 73 percent.

(2) PCF's and WPB's accounted for 216 VC KIA, 2,295 sampans destroyed, 445 sampans damaged, 136 junks destroyed and 1,475 structures damaged. This damage was accomplished in 2,211 gunfire support missions, with the expenditure of 42,110 81mm mortar rounds.

(3) Offshore surveillance units (WHEC/DER) accounted for five VC KIA, 73 sampans destroyed, four sampans damaged, 32 secondary explosions, 94 structures destroyed, 150 structures damaged, 72 bunkers destroyed and 80 bunkers damaged. This damage was accomplished in 96 gunfire support missions.

(4) MARKET TIME operational results exclusive of those for Operation SEA LORDS, 1st Qtr, CY69:

NGFS missions	1,813
Coastal engagements	153
Structures/bunkers/craft damaged or destroyed	3,010
Enemy KIA/captured	301
Detections	131,261
Inspections/boardings	97,831
Detainees	3,295
Junks detained	355

### c. GAME WARDEN (TF 116):

(1) CTF 116 was successful in substantially immobilizing enemy waterborne traffic. During the Qtr, GAME WARDEN forces destroyed, damaged, or captured 1,696 enemy waterborne craft and structures. The

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Qtr saw an increase in combined USN/VNN/ARVN/USA operations by GAME WARDEN units. PBR's provided troop lifts, blocking forces, and gunfire support for the ground forces.

(2) There was an increase in combined operations with the VNN and National Police River Patrol Force during the quarter. PBR's, VNN craft and police craft conducted joint resource control and interdiction operations in conjunction with both GAME WARDEN and SEA LORDS operations.

(3) GAME WARDEN operational results, 1st Qtr, CY69:

Number of firefights	202
Enemy KIA/captured	523
Friendly KIA	10
Friendly WIA	83
Craft detected	497,191
Craft inspected/boarded	270,202
Detainees	2,926
Hoi Chanhs	23

d. Mobile Riverine Force (TF 117):

(1) During the Qtr, the enemy was generally encountered in small elements. Therefore, the 2d Bde, US 9th Inf Div, altered its tactics from multi-battalion riverine strike operations to company and platoon-size water-mobile and air-mobile operations conducted over a wide area. Air-mobile operations were emphasized during the Dry Season Campaign due to the availability of additional assault helicopter assets. While operating in this manner the Mobile Riverine Force still retains the flexibility to mass its forces and re-deploy on short notice.

(2) On 3 Mar, TF 117 forces were realigned by merging Mobile Riverine Groups ALFA and BRAVO. This realignment provided increased effectiveness and flexibility by reducing Mobile Riverine Base defense requirements and enabling Squadron Commanders to retain their unit integrity. In addition, the realignment made it possible to provide one additional River Assault Division in support of Operation GIANT SLING-SHOT.

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### (3) Mobile Riverine Force operational results, 1st Qtr, CY69:

US KIA	59
US WIA	589
ARVN/VNMC KIA	19
ARVN/VNMC WIA	237
Enemy KIA	2,206
Enemy POW	47
Weapons captured	194
Bunkers destroyed	1,927
Sampans destroyed	188
Rice captured	5,050 lbs
Ammunition captured	35,747 rds
Documents captured	40.2 lbs
Medical supplies captured	11 lbs

#### e. SEAL Operations:

(1) In Dec 68, intelligence reports indicated a significant increase in enemy activity in coastal Tuy Phuoc District of Binh Dinh Province, with the reported enemy intention to attack Qui Nhon City and its strategically valuable port facilities. In response to this threat, one SEAL platoon (two officers/12 enlisted) with its assigned Light SEAL Support Craft (LSSC) and crew were airlifted from IV Corps to Qui Nhon. Intelligence derived as a result of the platoon's operations during the period 1 - 7 Jan 69 revealed general plans for the coming offensive in the Qui Nhon area.

(2) Due to the increasing SEAL employment opportunities along the RVN coast, COMNAVFORV shifted operational control of one SEAL team platoon to CTF 115 in late Jan. Since that time, squads from this platoon have performed coastal reconnaissance and raider missions in the II and IV Coastal Zones.

(3) In support of Operation SEA LORDS, special warfare units were positioned at Ha Tien and Vinh Gia on 12 Feb. These units incorporated

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USN SEALs, VNN LDNN, and Special MACV units in joint operations which continued through the remainder of the Qtr. Their AO extended from Ha Tien to Chau Doc, 10 km on either side of the Vinh Te/Rach Giang Thanh waterway, exclusive of Cambodian territory. The units are supported by USN LHPT and two USA UH-1D Helicopters based at Ha Tien. These special warfare units were originally scheduled for a 30 day operation; however, the success of the operation dictated a 30 day extension.

### I. Support Activities:

#### (1) Third Naval Construction Brigade:

(a) LOC upgrade of the Vietnamese highway system in I CTZ commenced full operation during this quarter. Initial emphasis was placed upon the stockpiling of construction materials. Paving operations were underway on those sections of highway in which base preparation had been completed.

(b) In-country SEABEE strength remained at ten battalions during the quarter. In addition to the LOC upgrade program in I CTZ, a major portion of SEABEE capability has been directed toward maintenance of Route QL-1 through the Hai Van Pass as well as of several key secondary highways south of Da Nang and in numerous support construction projects throughout RVN.

#### (2) US Naval Support Activity, Da Nang:

(a) Three new management programs instituted during the Qtr were instrumental in aiding NAVSUPACT Da Nang to attain its goals:

Operation CUTBACK - designed to fix the level for stocked items to correspond with needs in order to provide a well rounded range of items while investing the minimum amount of stock fund dollars.

Project RAMROD (Review all Material Retrograde or Dispose) - instituted to screen all material in use and in stock to determine excesses upon which either retrograde or disposal action will be taken.

Project ASAP (Abolish Stealing of American Petroleum) - established to impose rigid quality and quantity control measures on POL; this project was successful in reducing petroleum losses due to pilferage.

(b) Due to a reduction in depot stocks ordered from CONUS and a drawdown of I CTZ ammunition stock levels, there was a decrease in the number of deep draft ships calling in the port of Da Nang. Although the supply activity was not as heavy as the preceding Qtr, the port handled 605,955 M/T of goods, during 1st Qtr, CY69.

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### (3) US Naval Support Activity, Saigon:

(a) Expanded GIANT SLINGSHOT/SEA LORDS operations on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers necessitated the establishment of Advance Tactical Support Bases at Tuyan Nhon, Tan An, Tra Cu, Go Dau Ha, and Moc Hoa, on which construction commenced 1 Jan 69.

(b) In the 1st Qtr, CY69, NAVSUPPORT Saigon commenced supporting VNN personnel in the ACTOV PBR turnover program at So Duc, My Tho, Binh Thuy, Nha Be, YRBM-16, YRBM-20 and Mobile Base II and continued efforts to upgrade the VNN through on-the-job training. NAVSUPPORT Saigon participated in planning within the logistic sections of ACTOV (ACTOVLOG) in order to develop a VNN logistic system and a detailed plan for effecting the USN-VNN transition.

(c) A new NAVSUPPORT Detachment at Ben Luc was being constructed to provide support for GIANT SLINGSHOT Advance Tactical Support Bases. The basic construction at the Newport Warehouse complex in Saigon has been completed, resulting in more efficient support to Naval Forces.

(d) On 19 Feb, fire destroyed NAVSUPPORT Saigon Warehouse No. 7 located in Saigon. Value of material lost was approximately one million dollars. Requisitions for replacements are being expeditiously processed.

### 3. (S) OVERALL ASSESSMENT:

a. SEA LORDS operations conducted during 1st Qtr, CY69, were evaluated as markedly successful. This determination is based on enemy losses, coordinated efforts that interdiction operations have developed, and the psychological advantages achieved through permanent occupancy of waterways heretofore under enemy control.

b. Similarly, Operation GAME WARDEN achieved a high degree of success during the 1st Qtr. Using many of the tactics developed in SEA LORDS and concentrating efforts on known crossing points, river patrol boats on the major Delta rivers maintained a high level of effectiveness with fewer resources than previously available.

c. MARKET TIME forces continued to be successful in countering infiltration from the sea throughout the Qtr, and prevented coastal transshipment of personnel and logistical supplies in all areas of TF 115 coastal control except in the Long Toan and Thanh Phu secret zones located in the Song Co Chien and Song Ham Luong estuaries. Thus, with the exception of the two VC secret zones and despite a large allocation of available PCF's to operation SEA LORDS, the inshore patrol achieved a high degree of surveillance effectiveness and coastline security.

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d. The Mobile Riverine Force is unique among USN or USN supported operations in that it is the only force whose effectiveness can best be measured in classical military terms, specifically, enemy killed and kill ratios. Its continued success as reflected by previously cited operational statistics is apparent.

e. The supporting activities continued to provide all required support, despite the increasingly heavy demands imposed by the rising tempo of naval operations.

## 4. (C) VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN) OPERATIONS:

### a. Significant Operations and Activities:

(1) During the 1st Qtr, CY69, the ACTOV Program was approved and progress was made in its implementation. Some of the ACTOV highlights for the quarter were:

(a) The turnover of 25 River Assault Craft from US forces was accomplished in Feb. Combining these craft with eight ASPB's received under the MASF Program, the VNN formed two River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAIDs) which conducted successful operations in conjunction with US Navy.

(b) Four PBR's, six PCF's and 14 ASPB's were turned over by MASF to VNN in the 1st Qtr. In addition, eight USN ASPB's were turned over. Crew training in both operation and maintenance continues to be conducted.

(c) The turnover of the radar sites at Cu Lao Re and Poulo Obi in Mar 69.

(2) An increase in the number of VNN personnel on board from 19,661 on 31 Dec 68 to 22, 597 on 31 Mar 69.

(3) The present personnel strength of the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard is 1,651 (1,521 shop workers, 106 laborer and 24 junk construction workers). A total of 300 military personnel who were formerly employed at the shipyard have been returned and are working at the shipyard. Draft deferments are now available for shipyard workers; losses to the draft have stopped and the personnel situation has become stabilized, although it should be recognized that the on-board count is far below authorized strength. The authorized civilian personnel strength of the shipyard is 1,883 plus 250 laborers and 221 junk construction workers for a total of 2,354 personnel.

(4) During the 1st Qtr, CY69, the VNN Political Warfare Group continued work on established projects and created new goals. These goals are in support of the RVN Pacification and Development Program.

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(5) The VNN maintained 21 Fleet Command patrol ships on station off the coast of RVN, manning MARKET TIME stations and providing Naval Gunfire Support. Five additional ships were on river patrol duties, and one was engaged in commercial convoy escort to the Cambodian Border. These ships fired 220 gunfire support missions. During the Qtr, 13,398 junks and 49,416 persons were searched, and 19 junks and 39 persons were detained. Motor Launch Minesweepers and Landing Craft Mechanized Minesweepers continued daily sweep operations on the Saigon, Long Tau, Dong Nai and Nha Be Rivers. The Vietnamese Navy has full responsibility for command detonated mine countermeasures on these rivers.

(6) For the 1st Qtr, CY69, overall VNN river assault forces averaged 60 amphibious operations and 95 blocking operations per month. The Vietnamese Navy Riverine Force, for the first time, planned and executed a major amphibious operation. This operation was designed to close the strategic Bassac River/Can Tho crossing corridor to the Viet Cong by blockading Cu Lao May Island complex. A coordinated sweep of the islands was made by the 42d ARVN Ranger Bn and VNN RAG units from Can Tho, My Tho and Vinh Long. The operation lasted for two weeks and was termed a success.

(7) Another major effort by VNN was Operation TRAN HUNG DAO which was executed along the Rach Gian Thanh-Vinh Te Canal between Ha Tien and Chau Doc. The operation's objective was to interdict infiltration from Cambodia. All four coastal groups of IV Coastal Zone were involved in this operation, as well as two VNN PCF's and units of RAG 26.

### b. Overall Assessment:

(1) The employment of the Vietnamese Navy during the Qtr continued to be satisfactory and the effectiveness has increased with the USN assets received. The present personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy is 22,597 officers and men, an increase of 2,936 during the reporting period. In order to meet the expanding role of the Navy, the authorized strength will be increased to 28,700 by Fall CY69.

(2) Vietnamese Navy Fleet Command ships, PCF's, and Coastal Groups, operating in conjunction with CTF 115 forces in Operation MARKET TIME, continued to deter any infiltration attempt during the Qtr. RAIDS employed on Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, and coastal groups and other units employed on Operation TRAN HUNG DAO, denied the enemy infiltration routes in key border areas.

## 5. (C) VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC) OPERATIONS:

### a. Significant Operations:

(1) The 1st VNMC Bn conducted a notably successful night ground assault on 3-4 Feb 69. Early on 3 Feb, the 1st Bn, proceeding south

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on Highway 22 in Tay Ninh Province, observed an airstrike east of the road. The Bn Commander learned that a US Cavalry unit with local RF/PF companies was in heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force and had been engaged for several hours. The necessary liaison and coordination were made and at 031910H, VNMC and US forces commenced a tank/infantry assault and penetrated approximately 150 meters into the enemy positions before being temporarily stopped by heavy fire. At 0030H, the 1st Bn made a successful infantry assault which yielded 53 NVA KIA and one captured, with only one wounded Vietnamese Marine.

(2) On 8 Feb 69, the 23 VNMC Bn was conducting a clearing operation in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, nine KM from the Cambodian Border, and discovered 12 weapons/munitions caches. The caches were found after overrunning a command post bunker complex, killing the security element and capturing the commanding officer who was from the B54 Rear Service Group which supported the 7th NVA Div. The caches yielded weapons and munitions reported to have been the largest such find uncovered by GVN troops during the war including rockets of 257MM caliber, which were classified as "oversized 122MM rockets".

(3) On 19 Mar, VNMC Brigade BRAVO commenced riverine/reconnaissance in force operations with Task Group 117.2 in the Twin Rivers area to the SW of Can Tho. Moderate contact was established on 20 and 21 Mar. The supporting River Assault craft were ambushed five times on the morning of 21 Mar. Marines of the 4th Bn landed and established contact with support from 105MM and flame monitor type boats. Prisoners from the 309th VC Bn revealed that the battalion's mission was to attack the combined USN/VNMC force. On 22 Mar, elements of the 6th VNMC Bn were helilifted to the south of the 4th VNMC Bn where light contact was made, and 10 VC bodies from the previous day's fighting were discovered. From 23 to 25 Mar, operations continued in the southeastern Twin Rivers area with light contact. A VC Hospital, training center, and POW camp were found and destroyed.

b. Overall Assessment. The successful combat operations during the Qtr indicate a continuing high degree of combat readiness, tactical skill, and leadership. The VNMC consistently demonstrated the ability to operate successfully with the US Navy in the Delta. Despite the success of these combined riverine operations, the Amphibious Task Force concept continues to be hampered by lack of adequate troop lift. This has relegated the VNN contribution to the Amphibious Task Force to a logistic role.

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## SECTION V

### AIR OPERATIONS

#### 1. (S) US AIR FORCE (7th AF):

a. Objectives and Progress: The objectives of the 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control System remain the optimum application of tactical air power in direct response to ground force requirements in-country and the maintenance and improvement of the interdiction program in the extended battlefield areas. Progress in these areas can be measured best in the effectiveness of the operations cited below.

#### b. Operations and Activities:

##### (1) Fighter/Bomber:

(a) Strike operations under 7th AF TACC during the 1st Qtr, CY69 generally paralleled those of the previous Qtr in both numbers of sorties and weight of effort. Strike sorties in-country totalled 51,490, of which 6,676 were in support of troops in contact. This compares to 52,396 sorties for 4th Qtr, CY68, with 4,085 sorties supporting troops in contact. The rise of sorties in support of troops in contact reflects the general increase in ground activity through the first three months of CY69. The weight of effort by service was as follows:

TABLE 1

<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>RAAF</u>
29,599 (57.5%)	12,922 (25.1%)	1,621 (3.1%)	6,619 (12.9%)	729 (1.4%)

(b) Many of the tactical air sorties flown during the Qtr were in support of code-named ground operations, including Operations BOLLING, MACARTHUR, NEVADA EAGLE, QUYET CHIEN and TOAN THANG; 24 such operations had 14,410 sorties flown in support, with a total ordnance expenditure of 24,259 tons, resulting in an overall average of 1.68 tons of ordnance delivered per sortie.

(c) Forward Air Controllers flew 15,725 sorties controlling air-strikes, during the 1st Qtr, and an additional 30,863 visual reconnaissance sorties. During hours of darkness, AC-47 Spooky and AC-119 Shadow gunships logged 1,804 sorties supporting troops in contact and hamlets and villages under enemy attack.

(d) During the Qtr, close air support and air interdiction missions resulted in the following recorded bomb damage assessment (destroyed):

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TABLE 2

<u>ENEMY STRUCTURES</u>	<u>ENEMY VEHICLES</u>	<u>GUNS</u>	<u>CAVES/TUNNELS DESTROYED</u>	<u>STORAGE AREAS DESTROYED</u>
26,106	82	1,541	18,691	13

In addition, 1046 sampans were reported destroyed, 1365 secondary explosions occurred along with 1539 secondary fires, and 2649 enemy were reported killed by air strikes.

(e) In addition to tactical strike sorties, B-52s flew 3,303 sorties over RVN. These ARC LIGHT missions expended 82,057 tons of ordnance. A major portion of this total was dropped on known infiltration routes leading toward Saigon from Cambodia in a continuing effort to forestall possible enemy attacks on the populous Capital Military District.

(2) Reconnaissance: In-country reconnaissance flew 3,917 sorties resulting in successful coverage of 6,316 individual targets in addition to the previously noted 30,863 visual reconnaissance sorties flown by forward air controllers.

## (3) Airlift:

(a) Airlift tonnage totals continued to drop, reflecting lowered operational requirements of ground commanders. Quarterly airlift in-country by C-130, C-123 and C-7 (Australian A-4) totalled 361,369 tons, compared to the 4th Qtr, CY68 total of 389,346 tons, and the 3d Qtr, CY68 total of 399,381 tons. Airlift has shown a general downward trend since the heightened enemy activity of Aug 68. The lowered activity was further reflected in the number of high priority sorties called for. Combat Essential (CE) sorties totaled 933, a significant drop from the previous figure of 1,562. The Emergency Resupply (ER) was 16 compared to 109, and tactical Emergency (TE) sorties registered a one-third drop from 45 to 30. The tons-per-sortie rate remained at an acceptable level; C-130s carried 6.03 tons, C-123s airlifted 2.81 tons, and C-7s averaged 1.37 tons per sortie. These figures did not take into consideration the 1,236 tons that were air dropped during the period.

(b) In anticipation of increased enemy activity during the TET holidays, the 834th Air Division deployed the majority of its aircraft to those bases it felt were relatively safe from attack. The major impact of the moves was upon scheduling and support facilities. The enemy offensive was less severe than expected but 14 aircraft did receive damage from enemy fire in the ten days following the Lunar New Year. The most damage sustained was by C-123s, nine of which were hit during one mortar attack on Phan Rang AB.

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## (4) Special:

(a) RANCH HAND UC-123s flew 1,263 sorties, expending 1,233,000 gallons of defoliant. This was sufficient to defoliate approximately 410,000 acres of enemy cover. The RANCH HAND aircraft sustained 76 hits through the Qtr in accomplishing their mission.

(b) Two hundred twenty-two US and Allied military personnel were rescued by units of the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group between 1 Jan and 31 Mar. Of these, 143 were classed as combat saves and 79 were categorized as non-combat saves. These brought the total since 1 Dec 64 to 2426 saves; 1652 were combat recoveries while the remaining 774 were non-combat. During the Qtr, six ARRGp aircraft sustained damage as a result of enemy action. Of the six, one HH-43F and one HH-53B were totally destroyed.

(c) In other special activities Psychological Warfare aircraft flew 5,966 sorties, dropping 864,400,000 leaflets and broadcasting 5,247 hours. There were 9,556 Chieu Hoi returnees, of which 71 percent were from IV CTZ. In-country reconnaissance (photo, infrared, radar, etc) flew 3,917 sorties, resulting in successful coverage of 6,316 individual targets. USAF and USMC units using MSQ-77 and TPQ-10 radar systems controlled 10,487 Combat Skyspot sorties during night and weather conditions which prevented visual bombing. The Combat Skyspot total made up approximately 20 percent of the strikes during the Qtr.

## (5) New Developments:

(a) COMMANDO VAULT, previously under evaluation by 7th AF DCO (Operations and Training), passed into the operational phase under TACC. This operation involved the use of the M-121 10,000 pound bomb dropped from a C-130 aircraft to create an "instant helipad" in dense jungle areas. A total of five M-121s were employed subsequent to 16 Mar 69, resulting in successful construction of three helicopter landing zones.

(b) Operation COMMANDO SHACKLE, which incorporates the Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) system was implemented on 1 Mar 69. This system is a transportable automatic relay station designed to monitor sensor fields through an airborne relay platform or ground relay station. Its purpose is to provide surveillance of infiltration from the Cambodian border in support of II FFV. The DART is deployed at Bien Hoa and integrated into the Tactical Air Control System as a sub-element of the DASC.

(c) A 30-day SEA evaluation of the Improved Forest Penetrator was concluded on 10 Mar 69. Five units using all three helicopter types (HH-53, HH-3E and HH-43) participated in the tests. Original evaluation reports concluded that the penetrator was an effective device for protecting the rescue against dense jungle foliage, with the few deficiencies noted reported to the action agencies.

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(d) Project NEWBOOK which was the internal airlift analysis system noted in 4th Qtr, CY68 was discontinued as of 17 Mar 69. The procedures implemented under NEWBOOK were firmly established and no longer require daily monitoring.

(e) Additional AC-119G gunships arrived in RVN during the Qtr and became operational on 5 Feb. The 71st Special Operations Squadron at Nha Trang Air Base received eighteen aircraft. Five aircraft were deployed to Tan Son Nhut, and six to Phan Rang. The aircraft are equipped with the Night Observation System (NOS) and four side firing 7.62mm miniguns. The gunship's primary mission is the defense of hamlets, outposts, and Special Forces camps. The AC-119s were actively engaged in the direct air support mission and supported the A Shau Valley interdiction campaign.

c. Overall Assessment: 7th AF strike operations during 1st Qtr, CY69 generally paralleled those of 4th Qtr, CY68, both in numbers of sorties and weight of effort. There was a slight decrease in the level of ARC LIGHT operations with emphasis on attacks against known infiltration routes leading from Cambodia toward the Saigon area. Airlift activity continued the decline noted in previous quarters with demands consistently falling below projected requirements. In the area of new developments, AC-119 gunships became operational in the 71st Special Operations Squadrons while the COMMANDO VAULT system of helicopter landing zone clearance was implemented. New aerospace rescue and recovery equipment in the form of an improved forest penetrator underwent test and evaluation.

## 2. (S) US MARINE CORPS (III MAF):

a. Objectives and Progress: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided increased support for ground units throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone and also supported the US Air Force interdiction effort. Weather limited air operations on only a few days and aircraft losses were somewhat reduced over previous quarters. Barrier CAP aircraft were also provided to 7th Fleet during the quarter.

### b. Operations and Activities:

#### (1) Fighter/Attack:

(a) Total in-country Fighter/Attack sorties	14,227 <sup>1</sup>
III MAF (USMC)	8,277
US Army	5,200

<sup>1</sup>Includes other than strike sorties not reported to 7th AF.

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ARVN	275
ROKMC	475

(2) Reconnaissance:

ECM/ELINT Sorties	977
Photo Sorties	462
IR Sorties	147

(3) Airlift (Helicopter):

Sorties/Tasks	135,313/15,403
Flight Hours	42,852
Passengers	207,485
Cargo (Tons)	28,727

(4) Other Tactical Sorties: Total - 195

(5) Aircraft Losses:

<u>COMBAT</u>		<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	
CH-46A/D	11	F-4B/J	2
UH-1E	3	UH-1E	3
A-6A	2	CH-46A/D	2
F-4B/J	3	A-4C/E	1
A-4C/E	8	UH-34D	3

(6) Developments and Tactics:

(a) On 5 Feb 69, VMA(AW)-225 arrived in-country with 15 A-6A aircraft and on 30 Mar 69, VMFA-232 arrived with 15 F-4J aircraft. These additional aircraft greatly enhanced the fighter/attack posture of this command.

(b) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continued to provide support for the USAF out-of-country interdiction effort. Support was also provided to 7th Fleet (BARCAP). During the Qtr both fixed wing and helicopter

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support was provided such significant operations as NEVADA EAGLE, TAYLOR COMMON, BOLD MARINER, RUSSELL BEACH, VICTORY DRAGON, MAINE CRAG and DEWEY CANYON.

## c. Aircraft Inventory:

<u>FIXED WING</u>		<u>HELICOPTER</u>	
F-4B/J	59	UH-34D	35
A-6A	36	CH-46A/D	105
A-4C/E	60	CH-53A	30
RF-4B	9	UH-1E	58
EF-10B	9		
EA-6A	6		
OV-10A	29		
TA-4F	10		

d. Overall Assessment: Throughout the 1st Qtr, CY69 the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing continued to provide air support for the 7th Air Force interdiction programs and for the 7th Fleet (Barrier CAP). This command also maintained the high tempo of operations against the enemy throughout I Corps Tactical Zone in support of III MAF ground forces. It is anticipated that this support will be continued at its present rate throughout the coming quarter.

## 3. (C) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF):

### a. Operations and Activities:

#### (1) Strike Aircraft:

(a) The 524th Fighter Squadron completed refresher training in early Mar 69 and passed a HQ VNAF Operational Readiness Inspection on 18 Mar. The squadron was declared operationally ready on 25 Mar 69.

(b) The 520th Fighter Squadron began refresher training on 3 Mar 69. Completion of training was forecast to occur well in advance of the established 15 May 69 O/R date.

(c) The 516th Fighter Squadron began refresher training on 10 Mar 69 using 524th Squadron assets due to late delivery of 516th A-37 aircraft. Completion of training was forecast to occur well in advance of the established 15 Aug 69 operational readiness date.



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(d) The AC-47 training program continued during the Qtr. Training was accomplished in conjunction with TACC fragged airborne alert missions in III and IV Corps.

(2) Liaison: Liaison Squadron Psy-War capabilities were undergoing increase and modernization. Presently six speaker-equipped U-17s have been delivered and were in use in I and II CTZ's. Additionally 10 speaker modification kits have been received and when installed will provide 10 additional speaker aircraft for a total inventory of 16 U-17s. These aircraft also have a limited target leaflet capability.

(3) Airlift:

(a) The 413th Transport Squadron began an extensive first pilot upgrading program designed to bring the aircrew status to authorized strength.

(b) During this quarter the VNAF airlifted 60,916 passengers which is a 34.4 percent decrease, and 2,577 tons of cargo which is an 11.3 percent increase, over the 4th Qtr, CY68.

(c) The 211th and 217th Helicopter Squadrons continued combat assault operations with the 164th Combat Assault Group through the end of Mar 69. During this period, route, crew and aircraft tail number fly away plans were made for the 1 Apr 69 stand down dates for both squadrons. This is the last quarter that the H-34 aircraft will be used for combat assault by these two squadrons.

(4) New Techniques and Equipment:

(a) VNAF strike mission capability was enhanced during the Qtr when the 524th and 520th (A-37B) Squadrons began to expend ordnance on pre-planned targets on some of their weapons training missions. This technique resulted in the addition of 39 strike sorties in II CTZ and 35 strike sorties in IV CTZ.

(b) The 7th AF requested that one squadron (16 aircraft) of USAF AC-47's be turned over to the VNAF based on the optimum VNAF acceptance capability.

(c) Plans were completed for pathfinder teams for each of the four UH1 Squadrons, and forwarded for approval by the VNAF Commander. These teams will be responsible for assisting in heliborne operations by providing communications links, troop handling, staging field control and POL notification.

(d) Six speaker-equipped U-17s and conversion kits to provide speakers for 10 additional U-17s, providing VNAF with an increasing PSY-

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WAR capability, were delivered. A limited target leaflet capability is also available. The overall assets will allow the VNAF to assume some of the effort presently being furnished by USAF resources.

### b. Major Problem Areas:

(1) A-37. Underfly occurred due to conversion and training status. One squadron, the 524th, was declared O/R during the final week of the Qtr. The other two squadrons were in training status on a delayed schedule due to late delivery of aircraft assets.

(2) A-1. Underfly was caused by 170 weather cancellations, 88 maintenance cancellations, and the effect of the conversion of the 516th and 520th Squadrons from A-1 to A-37. Additionally, during the month of Feb, A-1's were in stand down status for three days for TET alert.

(3) F-5. Underfly was caused by 74 weather cancellations, 60 maintenance cancellations and 19 TOC/Operations cancellations. F-5's were in stand down status for three days in Feb for TET alert.

(4) Helicopter pilot and flight mechanic shortages continued to be a problem. 35 flight engineers are programmed to begin three months of training in Apr 69. Programmed UH1 pilot transition for 55 more VNAF pilots has begun with 13 entering training on 21 Mar 69.

(5) The acute shortage of VNAF O-1 aircraft continued. Relief is dependent on release of aircraft from USAF inventory. No delivery date is available.

### c. Overall Assessment:

(1) Fighter aircraft flew only 90.1 percent of programmed flying hours; however, they flew 107 percent of assigned strike mission requirements.

(2) Liaison aircraft flew 91 percent of their program this Qtr. This is up from 87 percent the preceding Qtr. The underfly is attributable to a number of reasons such as poor weather for liaison operations and the TET Holiday stand down.

(3) Arrival of UH-1H helicopters for the conversion plan was behind schedule. Their availability was not, as of 31 Mar, delayed to an extent which threatens the first O/R target date. The first O/R target date is 1 May 69 for the 211th Squadron.

(4) Transports performed well during the Qtr. Flying hours increased to 60 hour/aircraft/month for the C-119 aircraft and total flight hours increased to meet the new allocation. This increased flying was evident in a steady increase in cargo tons hauled. The C-47 aircraft continue to con-

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sistently overfly programmed flying hours and lifted 45 percent of allowable cabin loads, primarily passengers. The AC-47 aircraft are steadily increasing their capability and consistently overflying their flying hour program.

### 4. (C) US ARMY (USARV):

a. Objectives and Progress: The mission of Army Aviation is to augment the capability of the Army to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. In the Republic of Vietnam, Army aviation provides tactical mobility and logistical supply support to the US Army, FVMAF and to ROK and GVN Forces in support of combat operations. Specific functions are maneuver of forces, application of firepower, reconnaissance, command and control, logistical support, and medical evacuation. Progress can be measured in terms of comparison of rate of performance shown in statistical data in paragraph b.

b. Operations and Activities: Army operational statistics for the 3d and 4th Qtrs, CY68 and 1st Qtr, CY69 are as follows:

	<u>CY68-69</u>		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Flying Hours	776,425	789,435	806,929
Total Sorties	1,902,112	1,822,712	1,977,279
Combat Sorties	1,600,067	1,490,873	1,627,814

Flying hours increased by 2.2 percent over 4th Qtr, CY68 figures. Total sorties increased by 8.5 percent and combat sorties increased by 9.2 percent. The average sortie length decreased 3.8 percent from 26 minutes to 25 minutes.

### (1) Armed Helicopters:

	<u>CY68-69</u>		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Armed Helicopter Combat Sorties	218,903	226,215	199,001
VC KRA	6,584	5,995	8,797
Structures Destroyed	6,740	8,850	9,870
Structures Damaged	3,027	4,166	3,267

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	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Sampans Destroyed	3,901	4,186	5,091
Sampans Damaged	1,122	945	564

While armed helicopter sorties decreased by 12 percent, the number of hours flown by armed helicopters increased 6.3 percent from 124,159 to 131,963. Thus the average armed helicopter sortie length increased 21 percent from 32.9 to 39.8 minutes. VC KBA, structures destroyed and sampans destroyed increased by 47 percent, 11.6 percent and 21.6 percent respectively. The numbers of structures and sampans damaged decreased by 21.5 percent and 40.3 percent respectively. The increased gunship sortie length and the performance results are indicative of both an increased enemy presence and more effective and accurate employment of the armed helicopter.

## (2) Airlift:

	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Troops Airlifted	2,760,520	2,681,261	2,755,935
Cargo Transported (Tons)	291,421	267,161	297,934

During the 1st Qtr, CY69, the number of troops airlifted and cargo carried increased by 2.8 percent and 11.5 percent respectively over the results attained in the 4th Qtr, CY68.

(3) Rescue/Medical Evacuation: The number of patients moved by US Army helicopter medical evacuation missions increased 12.6 percent from 57,798 in the 4th Qtr, CY68 to 65,076 in the 1st Qtr, CY69.

## (4) Special:

	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Support of GVN Forces			
Flying Hours	54,493	60,520	72,705
Sorties	142,820	183,533	223,969

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	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Support of ROK Forces			
Flying Hours	22,067	14,564	13,046
Sorties	81,407	64,924	55,202

Support of GVN Forces continued a previous uptrend with a 20 percent increase in flying hours and a 22 percent increase in sorties over the previous quarter. Support of ROK Forces continued a previous downtrend with a 10.5 percent decrease in flying hours and a 14.1 percent decrease in sorties from the preceding quarter. Combined support to GVN and ROK Forces increased by 14.2 percent in flying hours and 12.6 percent in sorties from the 4th Qtr, CY68.

(5) Inventory and Facilities:

(a) Aircraft Inventory (As of 31 Mar 69):

	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
	3,771	4,075	4,168

Total aircraft density increased by 93 aircraft during the quarter. This is 146 less than the number programmed for the end of the 1st Qtr, CY69. The shortage occurred principally in gunship, helicopters and U21 airplanes.

(b) Aviation Facilities: US Army responsibility for the operation of airfields within RVN increased by 1 (An Thoi) to a total of 120 airfields. Of these, 43 have US Army Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities. One GCA radar set was destroyed during the quarter. No other significant changes in major items of ATC equipment occurred.

(6) Aviation Accidents and Combat Losses:

	CY68-69		
	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Aircraft lost due to accidents	118	106	105
Aircraft lost due to combat	91	91	128

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Aircraft loss figures for the 3d Qtr, CY68 and 1st Qtr, CY69 are confirmed losses to the US Army inventory taken from the Monthly Summary of Aviation Losses and Performance. Data for the 1st Qtr is OPREP-5 information and is subject to later confirmation. Accident losses remained stable in number but continued to decrease on a rate basis. Combat losses increased by 40.6 percent for the 1st Qtr, CY69 reflecting combat activity associated with the winter-spring enemy offensive. The following attrition rates are provided for comparison purposes:

### RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS

	<u>3d Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>CY68-69</u>	
		<u>4th Qtr, CY68</u>	<u>1st Qtr, CY69</u>
Accident	15.2	13.7	13.0
Combat	11.7	11.7	15.9
Combined	26.9	25.4	28.9

c. Overall Assessments: In the 1st Qtr, CY69, Army aviation continued to contribute mobility, flexibility, and quick reaction capability to offensive and defensive combat operations. Army aircraft logistical and operational support continued at a high level. In terms of effectiveness, armed helicopters yielded increased results in all claim categories. For other aircraft, the numbers of troops lifted, tons carried and casualties evacuated all showed significant increases. Combat loss rates reversed their previous decline reflecting an increased intensity of combat. Command emphasis upon aviation safety has again resulted in a reduction of the operational loss rate.

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## SECTION VI

### PACIFICATION

#### 1. (C) GENERAL:

a. During 1st Qtr, CY69, the relatively secure population of RVN, as reported by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), rose from the 31 Dec 68 figure of 76.3 percent to 82.1 percent. Concurrently, contested and VC controlled population fell from 11.4 and 12.3 percent to 7.8 and 10.1 percent respectively.

b. Territorial Forces training programs continued with 80 percent of the 277 newly activated RF companies in training; this program is to be completed by 30 Jun 69. Peoples Self Defense Forces (PSDF) enrolled figure reached 1,215,030, a 207,289 increase over 31 Dec 68. The Chieu Hoi program achieved a total of 9,564 returnees, 1,766 more than 4th Qtr, CY68. Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) increased in strength by 20 percent and 4 percent respectively. Refugees totalling 129,102 were added to the rolls during 1st Qtr, CY69. This increase was due to new refugees generated during the 1969 "Post-TET" offensive in which over 6,500 homes were destroyed or more than 50 percent damaged, and better accounting procedures which reported many not heretofore counted. Neutralization of VCI dropped to 4,000 against the 6,000 removed in the 4th Qtr, CY68. This drop was caused by refined criteria which no longer regard as political cadre low level enemy supporters.

c. The activities and accomplishments noted took place during the period of the closing month of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (ending 31 Jan 69), holiday preparation (early Feb), and the heavy attacks of the "Post-TET offensive" (22 Feb 69 through Mar 69).

#### 2. (C) PACIFICATION STATUS:

##### a. Attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI):

(1) During the Qtr 1,002 VC Revolutionary Committees (formerly known as Liberation Committees) were identified in villages throughout RVN, about one-third of them elected. An additional 719 have been reported but not identified in cities, hamlets, provinces, districts and precincts throughout Vietnam. The total reflects improved intelligence collection and evaluation rather than an increased rate of establishment. Committees exert a strong influence in areas wherein approximately 2.2 million people live, but their influence is minor, insignificant, or non-existent over more than three million people in areas also having Revolutionary Cadre. While the total political cadre strength remains in excess of 78,000, the elimination or detention of at least 4,000 VCI through the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG program during the 1st Qtr, CY69 puts a heavy, if not yet critical strain on their activities. The general decline of VCI influence, however, is a function of the presence of GVN/FWMAF resources.

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## (2) Infrastructure Neutralizations:

TABLE 1

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Hamlet	364	276	275	915
Village	586	722	904	2,212
City	117	42	21	160
District	175	163	224	562
Province	<u>52</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>136</u>
TOTAL	1,294	1,230	1,481	4,005

## b. Territorial Security:

Analysis of Hamlet Evaluation System Trends: The following tables depict HES trends during the quarter.

TABLE 2

### TOTAL POPULATION (PERCENT)

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
Relatively Secure	79.2	80.3	82.1
Contested	9.4	8.7	7.8
VC Controlled	11.4	11.0	10.1

TABLE 3

### RURAL POPULATION (PERCENT)

Relatively Secure	69.0	70.4	72.9
Contested	13.5	12.9	11.7
VC Controlled	17.5	16.7	15.4



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TABLE 4  
HAMLET STATUS CHANGE

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
Net-Progression Into Relatively Secure Category	+427	+120	+247

3. (C) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES:

a. Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES): The following tables depict mission assignments and operational results for RF and PF units, based on TFES returns:

TABLE 5  
RF/PF PARAMILITARY STRENGTH<sup>1</sup>

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
RF	220,865	228,488	
PF	174,466	174,673	174,367

TABLE 6  
REGIONAL FORCE MISSIONS (NUMBER OF UNITS)<sup>1</sup>

Hamlet/Village Security	391	372	384
Province/District Town Security	207	195	200
Key Installations Security	116	118	105
LOC Security	211	226	231
Offensive Operations	215	244	260

TABLE 7  
POPULAR FORCE MISSIONS (NUMBER OF UNITS)<sup>1</sup>

Hamlet/Village Security	3,184	3,210	3,263
Province/District Town Security	552	557	547
Key Installations Security	112	113	84

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	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
LOC Security	591	580	580
Offensive Operations	100	108	99

TABLE 8

REGIONAL FORCE OPERATIONAL RESULTS<sup>1</sup>

Friendly KIA	442	436	477
Enemy KIA	1,662	1,992	2,280
Friendly Weapons Lost	103	144	135
Enemy Weapons Captured	716	724	860
Small Unit Operations	86,205	72,930	82,280
With Contacts	2,167	2,646	3,529

TABLE 9

POPULAR FORCE OPERATIONAL RESULTS<sup>1</sup>

Friendly KIA	324	446	458
Enemy KIA	1,287	1,417	1,475
Friendly Weapons Lost	160	230	249
Enemy Weapons Captured	432	514	543
Small Unit Operations	152,573	138,091	148,315
With Contacts	2,904	3,303	3,288

<sup>1</sup>SOURCE: Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES).

b. RF/PF Improvement Program:

(1) Weapon Upgrading: During 1st Qtr, CY69, RF/PF weapons issue rose to a total of 155,914 M16 rifles and 9,472 M79 Grenade Launchers. M16 issue is ahead of schedule while M79s remain in short supply.

(2) Organizational Improvement: The status of activation and training of new Regional Force companies shows 277 of the allocated 278 companies have been activated. These include 48 trained and 224 in training, with 273 to be completed by 30 Jun 69.

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(3) Leadership: Availability of experienced officers and NCOs has become a greater problem due to the increase in allocation of 278 new companies during the 1st Qtr. Plans to assign regular ARVN officers and to commission qualified NCOs were being implemented.

### 4. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:

a. Revolutionary Development (RD) and Truong Son Revolutionary Development (TSRD) Cadre Strength:

TABLE 10

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
RD Cadre Groups	779	*1,456	1,458
Strength	43,922	44,161	43,199
TSRD Cadre Groups	108	108	108
Strength	7,334	7,326	7,132

\*New 30 Man Teams

### b. Chieu Hoi:

(1) Returnee, Armed Propaganda Team (APT), and Kit Carson Scout (KCS) total for the 1st Qtr of CY69 are as follows:

TABLE 11

Hoi Chanh	3,229	2,450	3,885
APT Strength	3,858	4,037	4,016
KCS Strength	1,594	1,673	1,844

(2) During the 1st Qtr, CY69, 9,564 individuals rallied; during the 4th Qtr, CY68, the total was 7,798; the first quarter improvement was therefore 22.65 percent.

### c. Refugee Resettlement:

TABLE 12

#### REFUGEE STATISTICS

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Resettlement	65,096	75,446	7,932	148,474

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	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Return to Village	<u>9,319</u>	<u>2,920</u>	<u>15,770</u>	<u>28,009</u>
Totals Reestablished	74,415	78,366	23,702	176,483

### 5. (C) NATIONAL POLICE:

a. National Police (NP): Total strength of NP (other than Field Forces) is now 62,380 a decrease of 4,444 from the end of CY68.

b. National Police Field Forces (NPFF): Strength of NPFF has risen approximately 3,000 since the 4th Qtr, CY68. Its total strength is now 14,732. The effectiveness of this force has continued to increase in operations against the VCI.

6. (C) PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (PSDF): At the beginning of the quarter there were 1,007,741 organized, 516,970 trained and 98,815 armed members of the PSDF. By the end of 1st Qtr, CY69 these figures had risen to 1,215,030 organized, 741,989 trained and 205,064 armed.

7. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT: On 22 Feb 69 the enemy launched his "Post-TET offensive". Throughout the country the VC initiated attacks by fire, accompanied in many instances by ground attacks on GVN installations, hamlets, villages, and population centers. In the first six days, the civilian casualties were 453 killed and 1,514 wounded, with an unknown number missing. By the close of 1st Qtr, CY69, these numbers had risen to 1,049 killed and 3,539 wounded. Concurrently over 6,500 homes had been destroyed with a resultant total of 27,500 war victims. Reports from the field indicated that pacification had been set back in two provinces (Kontum and Phuoc Long); halted with some lowering of rural security in two provinces (Quang Tin and Nau Nghia); slowed with no lowering of rural security in four provinces (Quang Nam, Thua Thien, Gia Dinh, and Dinh Tuong); and suffered no or slight effects in the other 36 provinces. However, it appeared that the overall pacification effort had not been as adversely affected as during previous instances of heightened enemy offensive activity.

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## SECTION VII

### LOGISTICS

1. (C) US: The MACV logistics posture during 1st Qtr, CY69 satisfactorily met all operational requirements throughout RVN.

a. Supply:

(1) Stock levels generally showed slight increases and the stockage position of all classes of supply remained sufficient to support the mission. The Class I (subsistence) stockage position as of 28 Feb 69 as compared to the stockage position reported 30 Nov 68 was as follows:

TABLE 1

	I CTZ		II, III & IV CTZ	
	% STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE		% STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE	
	30 Nov 68	28 Feb 69	30 Nov 68	28 Feb 69
Meal, combat, individual (MCI)	110	120	170	120
Refrigerated (R)	41	57	107	107
Non-Refrigerated (S)	95	113	98	91

(2) The required refrigeration storage capacity is 2,909,190 cubic feet. Total refrigeration storage capacity as of 28 Feb 69 was 2,527,979 cubic feet compared with 2,741,243 as of 30 Nov 68. The primary causes of the decrease in overall refrigerated storage were the release of the refrigerator ships SS Parismina and Bodie in Dec 68 and the destruction of one refrigerator bank of 33,252 gross cubic feet capacity in a rocket attack at Da Nang. Three refrigerator banks of 34,000 cubic feet each were completed at Da Nang during the 1st Qtr, CY69. Refrigerated warehouses currently under construction at Long Binh and Qui Nhon will provide additional refrigeration storage and allow for the further release of floating refrigerated storage.

(3) The overall Class III (POL) posture throughout RVN remained excellent. Transitory low inventory positions were reported during Feb at Qui Nhon and Phu Cat due to restrictions in Qui Nhon's tanker discharge lines and enemy interdiction of the Qui Nhon/Phu Cat pipeline. Both locations were brought to capacity by the end of the month. One 10,000 barrel JP-4 tank was lost to enemy action at Da Nang on 22 Feb 69. Consumption increased sharply from 3,492,000 barrels in Nov 68 to 3,866,000 barrels in Jan 69. This trend was continued during the short month of

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Feb with a consumption of 3,500,000 million barrels. This trend was attributed to increased diesel fuel consumption in I CTZ and an improved accounting system in I CTZ which permitted more accurate reporting of consumption. Military Tankage increased from 2.653 MBBLs in Nov 68 to 2.813 MBBLs in Feb 69. Commercial tankage dedicated to storage of military products increased from 1.086 MBBLs to 1.111 MBBLs.

(4) Supply levels of Class V and VA (Ammunition) remained satisfactory. For the primary types of Class V artillery being used in RVN the percentage of stockage objectives as of 28 Feb 69 were as follows:

TABLE 2

<u>ARVN</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE (RDS)</u>	<u>ON HAND (RDS)</u>	<u>% S/O</u>
105mm HE	1,290,960	1,231,913	95
155mm HE	209,952	238,109	113
<u>USARV</u>			
105mm HE	1,683,200	1,269,302	75
155mm HE	625,860	376,577	60
175mm HE	88,110	80,686	92
8" HE	134,160	37,550	27
<u>III MAF</u>			
105mm HE	390,420	463,277	118
155mm HE	97,200	102,280	105
8" HE	12,600	11,828	93

For mortars the percentage of stockage objectives were:

TABLE 3

<u>ARVN</u>			
60mm HE	903,240	502,253	55
81mm HE	322,371	1,010,579	313
4.2" HE	23,917	124,566	520

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<u>USARV</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE (RDS)</u>	<u>ON HAND (RDS)</u>	<u>% S/O</u>
60mm HE	172,306	162,857	94
81mm HE	895,450	784,184	87
4.2" HE	359,480	306,697	85
<u>III MAF</u>			
60mm HE	109,440	114,284	104
81mm HE	194,400	198,426	102
4.2" HE	66,825	126,511	189

The stockage position for Class VA ammunition was as follows:

TABLE 4

Fire Bombs

7th AF	26,932	15,483	57
VNAF	5,751	16,029	279
I MAF	6,425	18,400	286

GP Bombs

7th AF	86,198	90,692	105
VNAF	25,561	30,404	119
1 MAF	78,750	101,796	129

b. Transportation: Statistics for movement of cargo by the military are:

TABLE 5<sup>1</sup>

<u>PORTS</u>	<u>DEC 68</u>	<u>JAN 69</u>	<u>FEB 69</u>	<u>CY68 MONTHLY AVG<sup>2</sup></u>
Short Tons (STON)	1,261,000	1,251,000	1,009,000	1,270,000
Avg No. Ships in RVN	42	39	28	55.8
Avg No. Days in Port	10.5	8.6	7.4	12.3
Intra-Coastal Ships STON Handled	421,000	436,000	407,000	351,000

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<u>HIGHWAY</u>	<u>DEC 68</u>	<u>JAN 69</u>	<u>FEB 69</u>	<u>CY68 MONTHLY AVG<sup>2</sup></u>
STON Handled	1,532,000	1,291,000	1,269,000	1,288,000
Port and Beach	693,000	586,000	473,000	647,000
Local Haul	604,000	490,000	578,000	403,000
Line Haul	235,000	215,000	218,000	238,000
<u>RAIL STON HANDLED</u>	32,000	26,000	21,000*	28,000
<u>AIRLIFT STON HANDLED</u>	132,000*	125,000*	113,000*	129,000

\*Tonnages include an average of 19,000 STON carried by an average of 79.7 USAF C-7A aircraft assigned to Field Commands and others on a dedicated use basis.

<sup>1</sup> Dec through Feb period reflects latest data as of reporting date.

<sup>2</sup> CY68 average through Dec 68.

## c. Maintenance:

(1) Operational readiness (OR) status for the following monitored aircraft were:

TABLE 6

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>OR OBJ %</u>	<u>DEC %</u>	<u>JAN %</u>	<u>FEB %</u>	<u>CY69 MO AVG %</u>
<u>7th AF</u>					
F-4C/D	71	71.8	67.3	71.0	69

Operational Readiness Rate for the C-7A and F-100C/D/F was above the OR objective for the Qtr. They were deleted from the monitored aircraft.

TABLE 7

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>OR OBJ %</u>	<u>DEC %</u>	<u>JAN %</u>	<u>FEB %</u>	<u>CY69 MO AVG %</u>
<u>USARV</u>					
UH-1H	75	73.1	73.9	73.9	73.9
CH-47A	65	59.2	62.1	62.1	62.1
CH-47B	65	59.2	62.1	62.0	62.0



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<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>OR OBJ %</u>	<u>DEC %</u>	<u>JAN %</u>	<u>FEB %</u>	<u>CY69 MO AVG %</u>
OH-6	70	67.2	70.3	71.9	71.1
CH-54A	64	64.0	57.5	62.1	59.8
UH-1C	72	65.3	69.3	67.0	68.1

## III MAF

F-4B/J	65	53	55	51	53
CH-46A/D	60	51	55	70	62.5
UH-1E	75	66	69	63	66

Operational Readiness Rate for the A-4C/E was above the OR objectives for the Qtr. It was deleted from the monitored aircraft.

(2) Maintenance of major items of equipment continued to be satisfactory throughout the Qtr.

d. Hospitalization and Evacuation: The following statistics for US personnel are available during this reporting period:

TABLE 8

	<u>DEC 68</u>	<u>JAN 69</u>	<u>FEB 69</u>	<u>CY68 AVG</u>
Total Hospitalized	16,236	16,022	15,184	18,124
Total Evacuated	4,562	4,593	4,891	5,067
Battle Injury	3,514	3,916	4,932	5,821
Disease and Non-Battle Injury	12,722	12,106	10,252	12,436
Malaria Cases	1,009	866	704	1,201

## e. Construction:

(1) The status of engineer troops at the end of 1st Qtr, CY69 is as follows:

<u>Engineer Units</u>	<u>Location</u>				
<u>ARMY</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CBT BNS*	3	5	3	2	13

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	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONSTR BNS	0	5	6	3	14
<u>NAVY</u>					
HMCS	10	0	0	0	10
<u>AIR FORCE</u>					
RED HORSE SQDMS	1	3	1	0	5
<u>MARINE*</u>					
FMF BNS	3	0	0	0	3

\* Does not include divisional engineer battalions.

(2) Engineer troop units continued to contribute significantly to the overall construction program in RVN during the quarter. Engineer troop effort was distributed in the following categories:

<u>CATEGORY OF WORK</u>	<u>ENGINEER UNITS</u>				
	<u>Army Cbt</u>	<u>Army Const</u>	<u>HMCS</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>USMC</u>
Operational Support	55	37	9	0	6
Lines of Communication	17	25	29	0	33
Base Development	28	37	62	100	61

(3) Contractor forces maintained an average of 25,000 men during the quarter. Seventeen major projects were completed during 1st Qtr, CY69 including the Tan My Port Facility at Hue, and construction at two Naval Training Centers, at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Major projects commenced numbered seven all with estimated completion dates well before the end of CY69.

## 2. (C) RVNAF:

a. ARVN/RF/PF: During 1st Qtr, CY69 ARVN provided adequate support to the combat units as reflected in the following significant activities:

### (1) Supply:

(a) In Jan 69, the 20th Ordnance Supply Base Depot (OSBD) was provided an additional supply source by being allowed to requisition on US

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Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV), Long Binh, for repair parts listed on its authorized stockage list. Guidance for implementing the requisitioning system was provided by HQ MACV. Since implementation of these procedures the 20th OSD has placed 1,029 requisitions on this supply source. Although final evaluation was not possible at the end of the Qtr, excellent support was received.

(b) The 20th OSD received two Army Microfilm System (ARMS) viewers on 4 Feb 69 which were installed in the stock control editing section and the requisitioning section. Reference films files were also received and employed, permitting the implementation of improved requisition and supply accounting procedures.

(c) The US Army Depot Command, Japan (USAD CJ) stockage list was received in tape format. This presented a machine programming and listing problem as this was the first receipt of the stockage list in this format. Requests for establishment of a program and production of the required listings were placed on the ARVN computer facility at JGS. Until machine support is provided, USAD CJ stockage lists in printed form are being requested in order to maintain supply data continuity.

(d) A continuing effort was made to eliminate excesses from the ARVN supply system: Transactions involving excesses during the 1st Qtr, CY69, resulted in reporting 270 ordnance line items, having an acquisition value of 373,686.06 dollars to USAICCV for disposition.

(e) Engineer Advisory Section of Team #6, I Area Logistical Command (ALC), introduced modified versions of the Program Evaluation & Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM), producing favorable results in offering assistance to ARVN counterparts. During the Qtr the following three projects were initiated and were 50 percent operational:

PROJECT "FOLLOW UP": This project is designed to establish a system for obtaining advice status on outstanding requisitions for critical repair parts and providing a monthly reconciliation of due-outs from the 40th Base Depot.

PROJECT "CHARGE": This project is designed to insure the expeditious issue of new equipment to using units and initiate suspense follow-up on PLL/ASL requisitions by the using units and the Engineer Direct Support Units (EDSU's).

PROJECT "DENSITY": This project is designed to establish: (1) A current listing of all supported equipment, (2) A complete technical library for using units and EDSU's, (3) An interchangeable listing of sub-assemblies and engines for supported equipment and, (4) A procedure for stocking engines at the EDSU's to reduce the need for complete engine rebuild in the maintenance shops, thus reducing deadline time.

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With the increased emphasis on RVNAF Improvement and Modernization, in-country receipts of major engineer items rose to 1,430 items during the Qtr.

(f) Significant Equipment Receipts, 1st Qtr, CY69:

TABLE 9

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
Truck, M151A1	910	196	455
Truck, 1 Ton	12	12*	22*
Truck, M35A2	90	69	258
Water Trailers	0	0	52
M60 Machine Guns	1,187	1,683	2,070
M79 Grenade Launcher	4,804	3,697	1,151
105 HOW	18	13	36
AN/PRC-25 Radio	908	446	1,261
20 Ton Cranes	2	3	0
APC M113	49	29	77

\*Truck Three Quarter Substitute Item.

(g) Equipment Turnover: Equipment turnover from US to ARVN units began in Mar 69. The initial turnover unit was a 105 Howitzer Bn. This unit transfer was 50 percent complete by 31 Mar. Additional units which were directed to effect equipment turnovers were:

One Artillery Bn, 155 Howitzer

Two Engineer Construction Bns.

One Engineer Co (Heavy Equipment)

(2) Transportation:

(a) During the 1st Qtr, CY69, cargo transported by convoy to the 4th Area Logistic Command (ALC) increased 27 percent over that transported during the pervious Qtr. A total of 4,487 two and one-half ton trucks

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and 615 twelve ton semi-trailers were used to transport 19,876 metric tons of cargo in a total of 83 convoys to the 4th ALC during the period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 69. This is in comparison to a total of 3,713 two and one-half ton trucks and 427 twelve ton semi-trailers used to transport 15,604 metric tons of cargo in a total of 88 convoys during the 4th Qtr, CY68.

(b) Inter-ALC shipments by highway increased 48 percent while intra-ALC shipments by highway increased slightly. Inter-ALC shipments by water decreased 21 percent while intra-ALC shipments by water decreased 17 percent.

### (3) Maintenance:

(a) A 13 man US Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMECOM) quick reaction team arrived in-country on 15 Feb 69 to work in the rebuild facility of the 40th Engineer Base Depot and to provide on the job training for the assigned RVNAF mechanics. After the arrival of the team, maintenance backlog was reduced ten percent.

(b) The retrograde of repairable assets to US Army Depot Command, Japan, in the support of the FY69 rebuild program was scheduled for completion by 31 Mar 69. All retrogrades were essentially completed or committed for US transportation by that date. This is the first time that ARVN has been able to meet such a retrograde schedule.

(c) In order to improve repair support operations, and to insure that sufficient repair parts are on hand, both the 451st and 452d Engineer Direct Support units conducted an inventory of parts on hand. At the same time, a survey and evaluation was made of Prescribed Load List (PLL) and Authorized Stockage List (ASL) for engineer equipment already in the field and for new items.

(d) The 451st and 452d Engineer Direct Support Units conducted On-the-Job Training (OJT) and cross-training in an effort to increase the level of efficiency and capability to perform repair support missions. Also, maintenance classes for personnel for EDSU supported units were held periodically on various items of equipment.

### (4) Facilities:

(a) The Popular Force Dependent Housing reorientation was completed. The US and JCS Directives were revised and distributed to the field. In Accordance with the Directives, Joint US and Vietnamese Committees were established at the district level to determine their requirements and forwarded their requirements through RVN channels to JGS/CLC. The requisitions for the initial issue of materials were placed with US logistics agencies for the issue of materials to RVNAF logistic units for

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further distribution to PF units. The reorientation, which was to provide greater RVN participation in the program and closer control of the issue of materials, should improve the effectiveness and operation of the program.

(b) The Dependent Housing portion of the RVN Defense Budget, Chapter 18, Article 7 is one in which the US normally provides 50 percent support to the program as joint support credits to the RVN budget. In CY69, in addition to the joint support funds, commodity support is being provided as a result of the reorientation of the ARVN Self Help Dependent Shelter Program. Commodity support for 6,850 family units was incorporated into the RVNAF Defense Budget Dependent Housing Program which consists of a total of 9,200 family units, to be built by Vietnamese contractors. The program was disseminated to the RVNAF Area Construction Offices for preparation of contract documents. Material requirements were placed with US logistics agencies.

### b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

#### (1) Supply:

(a) An Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) stock records purification team at the Bien Hoa Depot assisted the VNAF Supply personnel in a records purification project. AFLC rewarehousing, inventory and management teams completed VNAF assistance projects.

(b) In addition to above teams, AFLC will be requested to provide a requirements computation team and an excess spares disposition team. It is anticipated that the requirements computations team will arrive during mid CY69. The excess spares disposition team, will be requested immediately after completion of the requirements computation project.

(c) An audit team from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense performed audit of the Bien Hoa Depot in Oct 68. The final report was received during the Qtr and actions required to affect corrections were taken.

(d) Three R-14 Tactical Airfield Dispensing Systems (TAFDS) have been received by the VNAF. These systems have been prepositioned at Bien Hoa, Nha Trang and Binh Tuy air bases pending future requirements.

#### (e) Problem Areas:

The timely processing of material through the VNAF Supply System continued to be a problem. Incoming shipments of material are delayed in the receiving section and again delays are experienced prior to warehousing. Advisory personnel made numerous recommendations in an attempt to improve this situation although progress was slow.

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Support of VNAF vehicles was a problem. AFGF-MSS recently established a special project to improve support of the VNAF vehicle fleet. The number of vehicles deadlined for parts (VDP) exceeded acceptable standards. Action was taken to expedite requirements for the VDP vehicles. Also recommended spare parts listings were provided VNAF with instructions to requisition and place in stock for future requirements.

## (2) Transportation:

(a) VNAF is currently carrying between one-quarter and one-third of RVNAF traffic airlifted in-country. This represents a continued gradual improvement in airlift support capability. VNAF is presently carrying a monthly average of 750 tons of cargo and 22,500 passengers/airborne troops.

(b) Action was taken to identify unauthorized vehicles being operated by the VNAF Wings. A number of such vehicles were found. Corrective action was initiated through VNAF and the Air Force Advisory Teams, to dispose of these vehicles or bring them into proper accountability.

(c) During the Qtr, emphasis was placed on vehicle maintenance, stressing the need for close cooperation and coordination between Transportation and Supply, and between VNAF and ARVN support units. Analyses were initiated of the problem of spares support (VDP); and the division of vehicle maintenance responsibility between VNAF and ARVN.

(d) Better control of 463L System equipment was effected during this quarter. Pallets and nets were more closely monitored to keep them in the air transportation system, and prevent excesses from accumulating at VNAF terminals.

(e) More attention was given to expediting NORS shipments. Procedures established for monitoring the movement of NORS items in VNAF provide for performance analysis and emphasis on improvement.

(f) Personnel requirements were reviewed in relation to proposed VNAF expansion and new unit manning was proposed. Training requirements were identified to permit implementation of required training programs.

## (3) Maintenance:

(a) The UH-1H conversion program was commenced; 17 were received for the 211th Squadron, Binh Thuy. Sixty-seven more will be delivered during 2d Qtr, CY69. These will be distributed to the 217th Squadron, Binh Thuy, 215th Squadron, Nha Trang, and the 213th Squadron, Da Nang. One aircraft received crash damage but could not be repaired in-country. The 34th Support Group will perform an evaluation and prepare for retrograde to CONUS. Other than this crash damage, no major maintenance problems developed.

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(b) There were no A-1 aircraft grounded as a result of the Wing Integrity Program at this time with the delivery of TOTO kits for 1A-1-528, eight aircraft have been completed. All high time A-1 aircraft had either completed TO 1A-1-528 or are in work at present time. With the reduction of UE for A-1 aircraft the number of available aircraft was increased for input into the Wing MOD Program.

(c) Emergency Unsatisfactory Report (EUR) to eliminate the problem of U-17 aircraft accidents which resulted from throttle control linkage separation was disapproved as not feasible nor required, as self locking nuts if properly used will secure the linkage satisfactorily.

(d) In Repair As Needed (IRAN) of VNAF C-47 aircraft continued to progress satisfactorily. Four aircraft were input to IRAN during the Qtr and three aircraft were output from China Airlines.

(e) USAF maintenance specialists for augmentation of the 62d and 74th Wings arrived as scheduled. No problems were anticipated in arrival of augmentees for the 41st Wing.

(f) The three VNAF Tactical Wings attained almost complete capability to perform their own jet engine intermediate level maintenance. The Air Logistics Wing (Depot) will only perform engine maintenance which is beyond the capability of the VNAF Wings possessing the A-37B aircraft.

### (4) Facilities:

(a) FY70 Financial Plan: A total of 1,376,000 dollars in Part I and II requirements for P456 funds (Maintenance Repair and Minor Construction: MRMCM) in FY70 were submitted. Of this amount 1,028,000 dollars are Part I "must have" requirements. Narrative justifications for each of the 20 projects were submitted to 7th AF (DCEP) for consolidation with 7th AF projects and forwarded to PACAF. This year's estimate represents nearly a one million dollar decrease in direct support for VNAF facilities maintenance. Primary reasons were decreases in requirements and increased emphasis on utilization of the RVNAF system for support.

(b) Bien Hoa Power Plant: A cost estimate to operate and maintain the new VNAF power generation plant at Bien Hoa was provided by the USAF contractor, Trans Asia. The contractor's estimate amounted to 11,145 dollars per month which does not include the cost of fuel and lubricants. A copy of the estimate was furnished the VNAF Civil Engineer to be programmed for in the RVNAF Defense Budget.

(c) Military Construction Program (MCP) Project Completions: Five MCP projects were accepted in the 1st Qtr, CY69. They were the Nha Trang Aircraft Maintenance Hangar, the Bien Hoa Depot Roads, the Bien Hoa Dining Hall "Airmen", the Da Nang Supply and Equipment Warehouse, and the Bien Hoa Shop Auto Maintenance.



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(d) VNAF Civil Engineering UMD: It was recommended by AFCE-DCR that VNAF Civil Engineering increase its strength to support a doubling in overall strength of VNAF. Recommended increase is from an existing 530 military to an authorized strength of 1,250 military personnel and an existing 209 civilians to an authorized strength of 970 civilian personnel.

(e) Airfield Maintenance and Repair: VNAF Headquarters announced by message the JGS-recommended CY69 Airfield Repair and Maintenance Fund distribution as follows:

Tan Son Nhut	\$VN 1,800,000
Bien Hoa	\$VN 1,800,000
Da Nang	\$VN 1,900,000
Binh Thuy	\$VN 1,900,000
Nha Trang	\$VN 1,800,000
Pleiku	<u>\$VN 800,000</u>
	\$VN 10,000,000

(f) VNAF Phase II Planning: The VNAF began to hold planning conferences with each of his Wing Civil Engineers. Purpose of these conferences was to determine the facility requirements needed to support the VNAF Phase II Force Structure. AFAT-CE advisors were invited to attend and participate in these conferences.

### c. Vietnamese Navy (VNN):

#### (1) Supply:

(a) ACTOVLOG: A plan to develop sufficient logistic capability within the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) to support its expanded force upon turnover of US Navy (USN) assets under the accelerated Phase II program (ACTOV) was completed. US Navy and VNN personnel completed the conceptual description of the ultimate VNN logistic system which delineates the VNN Logistic Support Command that will be established to provide Supply, Craft Maintenance, Transportation, Base Maintenance and Administrative Support to VNN Operating Forces. Briefings were given to Joint General Staff (JGS) but final approval was not received.

(b) Four 100 foot utility boats were received and were undergoing alteration and repair. They will be positioned at the four Coastal Zone Headquarters providing logistics lift capability supporting outlying units.

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(c) Four of eight LCM-6's planned for conversion to refuelers were completed.

Vietnamese Navy YOG (Yard Oiler, Gasoline) was employed by US Army Saigon Support Command to haul POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) previously carried by commercial contracts. Approximate savings of 36,000 dollars were realized subsequent to 6 Feb 69.

Issue of the Vietnamese Navy allocation of M-16 rifles was begun. Distribution is to be completed by Nov 69.

An intensive program of disposal of scrap and excess material at Vietnamese Naval Supply Center and Shipyard was inaugurated.

### **(d) Status of Special Projects:**

Auxiliary Supply Depots: The establishment of the eighth and last depot at Can Tho was indefinitely postponed until the base development plan is approved and determination of requirement established.

Commissary: The commissary at An Thoi was established but was not fully operational. Regular resupply is now the problem, but continued attention by the Vietnamese Navy should overcome this problem.

### **(2) Maintenance:**

(a) Development of Vietnamese Navy Concept for Small Craft Maintenance: Standards were set for overhaul, Restricted Availability (RAV), Preventative Maintenance System (PMS) and corrective maintenance for VNN small craft. The maintenance functions were categorized and defined by specialties and subspecialties. The number of maintenance personnel required in each category was determined. Personnel will receive on-the-job training (OJT) in their specialty or subspecialty prior to base turnover.

(b) Initiation of a Pilot Rotatable Spare Program: Rotatable spares were allocated to An Thoi Repair Facility and Cat Lai Naval Base under a pilot rotatable spare program. This program is being monitored so that a final program can be developed for the entire Vietnamese Navy.

### **(3) Facilities:**

(a) Base Development: During the 1st Qtr, CY69 progress was made in developing the "Master Plan for the Vietnamese Shore Establishment." In early Mar the Ralph M. Parsons Engineering company made its prefinal submission including detailed base drawings of the 32 bases under consideration. Following the presentation the Base Development Advisor coordinated a review by the Vietnamese Navy of the plans and criteria set forth by the Parsons Study.

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(b) In support of the base development plan the Vietnamese Navy with advisor assistance pursued the acquisition of land for new bases as well as expansion of existing facilities. This effort included site investigations and conferences with district and province officials.

(c) The Vietnamese Navy Logistics Section was developing a list of the non-technical collateral equipment that will be required for the expanded shore establishment.

(d) SeaBee Self-help Program: During the 1st Qtr, CY69, the SeaBee Self-Help Program accelerated. The first two bases visited by the SeaBee teams were the Cuu Long and Cat Lai Naval Bases. At these locations the SeaBees assisted Vietnamese sailors in minor projects ranging from reroofing of existing structures to construction of SEA (Southeast Asia) type huts. Although the intent of the program is interim base improvement, the SeaBees also taught the Vietnamese Navy sailors skills for future projects.

3. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT: As in previously reported quarters the overall level of logistic support within RVN was satisfactory. All US logistic requirements were satisfactorily fulfilled while VNAF logistics were responsive to the bulk of demands on the system. Continued effort at improving the responsiveness of the logistic activities of RVNAF was applied throughout. Upgrading and receipt of new weapons, aircraft and equipment continued while problems of inadequate maintenance and supply of spares in RVNAF units were still evident. Maintenance skill levels and inability to cope with sophisticated supply systems remain as basic problems.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL WARFARE

1. (U) GENERAL: The 1st Qtr, CY69 marked the beginning of the new reporting system, the termination of the NGUYEN TRAI Campaign, the extension of the Third Party Reward Program, the establishment of PSYOP Support Coordination Centers/Committees in the four CTZ's, and the 69 TET Campaign.

2. (U) OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS:

a. The continuing objective of PSYOP during the Qtr was to enhance the image of the GVN sufficiently to persuade enemy forces to rally, surrender, or otherwise cease their resistance. An indication that this objective was partially achieved is the steadily increasing Chieu Hoi rate in all CTZ's. The number of VC/NVA who rallied in Mar 69 was the second highest total since the program began.

b. Another indication of effectiveness has been the disruption of morale caused by friendly PSYOP as evidenced in several captured VC/NVA reports and messages.

3. (S) FRIENDLY OPERATIONS:

a. <u>Operations In RVN</u> :	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
(1) <u>Aerial Activities</u> :			
(a) Leaflets Dropped (Millions)	532.7	660.3	713.4
(b) Leaflet Targets	9185	9870	10,341
(c) Loudspeaker Hours	2094	2276	2430
(d) Loudspeaker Targets	6027	8567	6745
(e) Newspapers Dropped (Millions)	3.1	7.4	6.0
(2) <u>Ground Activities</u> :			
(a) Leaflets Hand Disseminated (Millions)	227	227	332
(b) Ground Loudspeaker Hours	1794	3009	12,706
(c) Waterborne Loudspeaker Hours	438	436	600
(d) Face to Face Operations	5761	6929	12,222

ANNEX A

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**SECRET**

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# SECRET

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
(e) Movies Shown (Hours)	826	990	1347
(f) Posters Distributed (Thousands)	471	268	156
(g) Newspapers Disseminated (Millions)	1.33	2.25	1.50
(h) Leaflet Production in SVN (Millions)	254.6	197.7	248.9

## b. Leaflet Development:

(1) During the Qtr twenty leaflets were developed for use in the TRAIL Campaign. These leaflets were developed by the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO in conjunction with the PSYOP Division.

(2) Twenty leaflets were also developed for use in RVN during the Qtr. Among these were leaflets dealing with VC rocket attacks into cities, GVN accomplishments in providing homes for refugees, and general Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket Leaflets.

## c. Activities, Campaigns, Programs, and Operations:

(1) On 1 Jan 69 a new reporting system became effective. The report form (MACJ3 Form 8) will permit reporting the entire PSYOP effort in Vietnam in a computer compatible format.

(2) The NGUYEN TRAI Campaign, originally scheduled to terminate 15 Jan 69, was extended until 31 Jan 69 in light of the success it achieved, particularly in IV CTZ. Captured enemy documents attested to the widespread defections caused by the Chieu Hoi appeals made under this program.

(3) The 1969 TET Campaign began on 18 Jan 69 and terminated 24 Mar 69. It was a coordinated joint MACV/JUSPAO and GVN effort. The objectives were to produce the maximum number of VC/NVA defections; further erode the morale and effectiveness of VC/NVA personnel; enhance popular support for the Chieu Hoi Program throughout Vietnam; and exploit the growing acceptance of the government of RVN. During the campaign over 100 million leaflets were disseminated in 2347 operations; additionally, there were 1376 hours of loudspeaker broadcast time conducted during 7037 operations.

(4) On 24 Jan 69 the first issues of the new format of Hien Nam Tu Do, a newsheet for dissemination into VC-controlled and contested areas, arrived in-country. The newsheet is now printed in three editions; the main edition, edition A, and edition B, each of the latter two carrying

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one half the content of the main edition. The PSYOP Division has established a "paper route" within Vietnam and approximately 3.2 million of a combination of these newsherts are to be distributed every two weeks.

(5) The Third Party Reward Program was initiated on 1 Nov 68 and was scheduled to terminate 31 Jan 69. The objective of the program was to induce 5000 enemy to rally to the GVN; this goal was surpassed by 31 Dec 68. Because of the results achieved, the Chieu Hoi Ministry has extended the rewards program indefinitely. The success of the PSYOP effort is illustrated by the results of the rewards program which accounted for 34.8 percent (790) of the Chieu Hoi returnees in Nov, and 53.1 percent (1674) of the returnees in Dec. In Jan the rate continued to increase with the reward program responsible for 56.9 percent (1839) of the monthly total. There was a slight decrease to 46.4 percent (1138) in Feb, however, in Mar the total rose to 63.6 percent (2473).

(6) The 1st Qtr, CY69 marked the establishment of combined Psychological Operations Coordination Centers in the II, III, and IV CTZ's. In I CTZ, while there is no formal coordination center, coordination has been functioning effectively for nearly a year through combined PSYOP committees. These activities represent a significant first step toward a unified PSYOP effort throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(7) On 31 Dec 68, Major James N. Rowe, USA, was recovered during an ARVN 21st Infantry Division operation 38 miles southeast of Rach Gia in IV CTZ. Major Rowe, a Special Forces Advisor, had been captured in An Xuyen Province in Oct 63. As a result of the information received from Major Rowe, the PSYOP Division intensified and redirected some of the PSYOP activities in IV CTZ. This included the dissemination of the TU DO newspapers and leaflets in the area where Major Rowe was held captive.

## 4. (U) POLITICAL WARFARE:

a. General: The mission of political warfare within RVNAF is to:

(1) Create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to its leaders, nation, and national ideology.

(2) Gain and maintain the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas.

(3) Destroy the loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation, and national ideology.

b. Continuing Activities:

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(1) General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) Headquarters, JGS:  
GPWD has responsibility for the development of the political warfare system within RVNAF. During 1st Qtr, CY69 GPWD Headquarters published a master plan which provided guidelines and goals for all political warfare activities throughout RVNAF. This master plan is intended to provide a basis for the development of political warfare sub-programs by all political warfare units, departments, and staffs.

(2) Political Indoctrination Department (PID):

(a) The missions of PID are to provide training for the POLWAR cadres throughout RVNAF and RF/PF and to provide motivation and indoctrination materials and guidance in support of the POLWAR cadres in the field.

(b) The POLWAR system currently suffers from a shortage of adequately trained POLWAR cadres in the field. During the 1st Qtr, CY69, two courses of instruction were completed. One course was conducted for Deputy Company Commanders/POLWAR Officers and one for POLWAR Staff Officers.

(c) To assist in the development of the RF/PF, the RF/PF Motivation Indoctrination Program has been developed to improve the combat effectiveness of every unit by increasing the motivation of the individual soldier. To accomplish this, RF/PF units participate in a twelve day training cycle consisting of 96 hours of instruction given on site. Five National Mobile Training teams (MTT's) have been formed by the RF/PF Office of PID to inspect, conduct, and assist in training at sector and subsector. Upon receiving training by the national cadre, the sector and subsector cadres will train the RF/PF units.

(d) PID provides indoctrination and educational materials to the field to support its programs.

(3) PSYWAR Department.

(a) The PSYWAR Department develops broad thematic approaches, plans, and doctrine for national PSYWAR and civil affairs programs and provides media support for and supervision over the implementation of these programs.

(b) To accomplish its mission, the PSYWAR Department writes, edits, and publishes or arranges for the publishing of Vanguard (monthly magazine for RVNAF officers), The Republican Fighter (bi-weekly magazine for RVNAF NCO's), The Tien Tuyen (daily newspaper for all RVNAF), daily POLWAR guidance for the use of POLWAR cadre in the motivation and indoctrination programs, and other printed matter such as banners and leaflets.

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(c) The TV section of the PSYWAR Department produces entertainment and information programming carrying PSYWAR messages. Two shows of 60 to 90 minutes in length are produced each week and transmitted over the Vietnamese National TV network.

(d) The GPWD Radio Section of the PSYWAR Department broadcasts from a 20 kilowatt transmitter located in Saigon. The coverage area extends in a radius of about 150 miles from Saigon, an area which contains approximately 75 percent of the Vietnamese population. Regularly scheduled programs of news, commentary, documentaries, music, and drama are designed to carry PSYWAR messages to a primary audience of RVNAF and their dependents. During 1st Qtr, CY69, the Radio Section increased its program schedule from 16 to 18 hours per day, seven days a week.

(e) The Motion Picture Section produced 29 newsreels, averaging ten minutes in length, which were programmed on the National Television Network. The section also produces still pictures in support of the PSYWAR effort.

(f) Continued media support was provided during 1st Qtr, CY69 for the General Mobilization Program. Radio, television, loudspeaker, and printed messages were designed to motivate the youth of Vietnam to enter the military service.

(g) A booklet outlining Civic Action projects by RVNAF was prepared for civilian distribution. The booklet was printed in 250,000 copies.

(h) The PSYWAR Coordination Center (PCC) is responsible for the coordination of all national PSYOP activities in RVN. The PCC accomplishes this mission by weekly meetings with the US 4th PSYOP Group, by review of operations conducted by POLWAR Battalions and by review of PSYWAR media materials. This concept was implemented during the 1st Qtr, CY69.

## (4) Social Service Department.

(a) The Social Service Department provides social welfare support to all military and civilian personnel subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and their dependents. Assistance in kind is provided in the form of morale and welfare packets while cash payments are provided for indemnification and hardship allowances.

(b) Education: The Department is responsible for providing education to all military dependent children. Currently, however, it is capable of supporting only approximately 75,000 out of 500,000 dependent children. In CY69, the Department plans to open new schools which will increase the number of kindergartens from 119 to 139, elementary schools from 170 to 210, and secondary schools from 7 to 9.

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(5) Chaplain Directorates. The missions of the Chaplain Directorates are to:

(a) Provide for the spiritual welfare of the members of RVNAF and their dependents, widows and orphans.

(b) Provide educational facilities by organizing, building, and operating schools for the dependents of military personnel.

(c) Provide social welfare services for military personnel and their dependents.

(6) POLWAR College.

(a) The missions of the POLWAR College are to provide a college level educational program to produce active duty (regular) RVNAF Political Warfare Officers, to provide political warfare branch training for RVNAF Officers, and to organize and direct political warfare specialist training as required. This school is the primary source of POLWAR Officers.

(b) The POLWAR College is presently completing the training of its first two year Cadet Course of 168 cadets. The cadets are scheduled to graduate in May 1969.

(c) The POLWAR College also conducts Basic Officer Classes for Officers already serving on active duty. These officers receive ten weeks of training in POLWAR techniques and doctrine. The fifth class graduated 98 students on 4 Jan 69. In CY69, there are four classes programmed of 100 students each. However, as there will be no living facilities available for Basic Course students until the graduation of the First Cadet Class, no Basic Courses will begin until May 69.

(7) POLWAR Battalions. The following statistics reflect significant activities conducted by all five POLWAR Battalions, within RVNAF, the civilian populace and against the enemy during 1st Qtr, CY69.

Publications and Pamphlets Distributed	34,000,000
Medical Aid Provided	133,000
Dependent Visits	14,500
Loudspeaker Broadcasts (hours)	34,500

(9) DIEN HONG CAMPAIGN: The nation wide "DIEN HONG" political warfare campaign was initiated on 26 Nov 68 and concluded on 30 Jan 69. The purpose of the campaign was to raise the morale and esprit of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, with the principal target audience being the RF/PF. During the period of the campaign, teams of cadets from the POLWAR

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College at Dalat and the Thu Duc Infantry School were mobilized and received special training in Saigon to assist the General Political Warfare Department in forming the political indoctrination teams which visited each sector and subsector in RVN. The teams explained the GVN position on the bombing halt, the Paris peace talks, the Communist strategy vis a vis Paris peace talks, and the actual military and Political situation in Vietnam. Final status reports indicate that 4,449 Popular Force platoons and Regional Force companies received this indoctrination.

## (10) NGUYEN TRAI Campaign:

(a) The national PSYWAR Campaign NGUYEN TRAI was initiated on 15 Oct 68 and ended 31 Jan 69. This was the first national level campaign directed by General Political Warfare Department (GPWD).

(b) The NGUYEN TRAI Campaign was coordinated with several national programs in a comprehensive pacification effort from Aug 68 to TET 1969. Other programs were PHUNG HOANG (Ministry of Information), SONG NOI (Ministry of Chieu Hoi), and QUYET CHIEN THANG (Ministry of Information). The programs appealed for the return to and support of the Government.

(c) The NGUYEN TRAI Campaign was directed specifically against middle and high ranking VC cadre, and its objective was to increase the return of Hoi Chanh (ralliers) by 50 percent per month. The effectiveness was judged by comparing the median of number of returnees in Jul through Sep 68 and the median of the number of returnees during the campaign. The campaign was adjudged successful as the monthly median rose by 74 percent from 1556 to 2707.

## 5. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT (TO INCLUDE ENEMY VULNERABILITIES).

### a. PSYOP

(1) There was an increase in PSYOP effort in all areas during the Qtr. The most significant result was the increase in Chieu Hoi returnees. The total of 9564 was the second highest total since the program began and is an increase of 1760 over the 4th Qtr CY68.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities: During the 1st Qtr CY69 VCI and VC/NVA personnel in-country have suffered setbacks. The enemy is experiencing increased difficulty in military, financial and political affairs. The following were significant enemy vulnerabilities that were exploited:

(a) Due to continuing combined Allied operations, food and weapons/ammunition caches have been discovered at an increasing rate. VC/NVA units in-country are thus being hampered logistically. In addition VC/NVA units are continually harassed by air strikes and bombings. Current PSYOP intelligence reports state that enemy enlisted men have low morale due to Allied air power directed against their units.

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(b) Due to the pressure of the Phoenix Program the VCI lost 1200 small unit leaders and approximately 1800 other cadres during the Qtr. Most VCI personnel eliminated by Phoenix were financial (tax collectors) and political (propaganda) cadre. Financial problems plague the VC effort due to the Phoenix Program and increased Allied small unit operations.

(c) The enemy is experiencing increased political difficulties because the peasantry is "war weary". Villagers tend to prefer GVN protection, in part, because the GVN taxes are less. RF/PF, and other armed self-defense forces, are also presenting a greater opposition to the VC.

(d) VC recruiting efforts and inductions dropped off during the Qtr because of Allied operations.

### **b. Political Warfare.**

(1) The 1st Qtr CY69 was a period of defining of goals and establishment of guidelines for the political warfare system. The General Political Warfare Department published the CY69 POLWAR master plan which, when implemented, is expected to result in an improvement in the combat effectiveness of RVNAF.

(2) The several departments within the GPWD performed their assigned missions satisfactorily during the Qtr. However, all functioned under budgetary handicaps which bear on availability of facilities, provision of services, conduct of training and overall personnel shortages.

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## COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

1. (U) GENERAL: The major Communications - Electronics (C-E) facilities continue to be expanded and integrated into a system which improves the service in the entire SEASIA area. New service was provided to additional customers and planned expansion programs are continuing. Improvements are being realized every month, resulting in increased capacity and efficiency.

2. (U) Integrated Communication System - Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA): The following activities occurred on the major portions of the ICS-SEA during 1st Qtr, CY69:

a. Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS): On 11 Jan 69 the last high capacity IWCS Phase III link was accepted by the government. The acceptance of this link from Vung Chua Mountain to Nha Trang now provides 240 channels of high quality voice communications. During the last three years, 64 IWCS links have been accepted and are now providing long haul communications.

b. Transportable Microwave Terminals: Plans were completed or were underway to prepare the four sites that are to receive the 120 channel, TSC-82 line-of-sight transportable terminals. The four sites receiving TSC-82 units are Dong Ha, Sa Dec, Dong Ba Thin, and Di An. Emplacement of the Dong Ha terminal was accomplished on 12 Feb 69, however, factory wiring defects have prevented transfer of circuits to this terminal. At the end of the Qtr rewiring was essentially completed and it is anticipated that all circuits will be transferred from other systems by mid-Apr. Di An has been selected as the next site to receive a TSC-82 vice Sa Dec. A delay in resolving security difficulties at Sa Dec necessitated the change in priority. The Di An terminal is expected in-country by 15 Apr 69 with Sa Dec and Dong Ba Thin terminals expected in early May 69.

c. Transportable Portions of ICS-SEA: Numerous transportable/tactical communications systems have been reconfigured, deactivated, and new ones activated to provide appropriate communications support for the increased tempo of combat operations. Most critical was the major reconfiguration of I CTZ communications which was completed in early Jan 69 releasing four temporarily deployed 60 channel AF tropo systems.

3. (U) Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTE):

a. The HQ MACV DTE 1000 line expansion was completed and the III MAF and the 1st Mar Div AN/TTC-28 dial telephone exchange became operational during 1st Qtr, CY69.

ANNEX B

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b. At the end of the quarter, the following telephone capability was operational in RVN:

TABLE 1

<u>OPERATING SERVICE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DTE'S</u>	<u>CAPACITY IN LINES (TOTAL)</u>
Army	20	26,760
Navy/Marines	7	6,900
Air Force	<u>10</u>	<u>20,600</u>
	37	54,260

4. (U) Automatic Telephone Service in SEA (Tandem Switch): Construction neared completion in the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone Service (SEA-ATS) program. Installation was in progress at Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, and Da Nang. The Joint Cutover Integrated Working Group (JCIWG) completed a detailed cutover plan for Da Nang. Bang Pla was cutover on 30 Nov 68, Can Tho on 22 Feb 69, and Korat, Thailand on 29 Mar 69.

5. (U) Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN):

a. At the end of the Qtr, the Phu Lam switch was providing service to 26 subscribers operating a total of 30 high speed leased terminals and low speed Mode V Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) terminals. The daily average traffic figure dropped by 500 to 38,500. During the Qtr the Phu Lam Defense Communication System (DCS) Teletype Relay was provided with dual AUTODIN access with the installation of a Mode 1 terminal to Korat Automatic Switching Center (ASC). This action enhances the AUTODIN restoral posture for Phu Lam ASC subscribers.

b. The Nha Trang ASC is now serving 24 subscribers operating 26 high and low speed terminals. The number of messages processed per day rose to 29,500.

c. The low speed Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) which was to arrive in RVN during Feb 69 was rescheduled to Jun 69. Action is being taken to install the maximum number of Mode V terminals and to obtain additional Mode 1 leased terminals to prove AUTODIN service until DSTE arrives.

6. (C) Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSVOCOM): There were no new Secure Cord Switchboard (SECORDS) activated during the 1st Qtr, CY69. Construction work was completed at the Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon SECORDS sites. MACV requested that CINCPAC assign 16 personnel spaces to USAF in order to permit activation of these sites.

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Philco-Ford completed their portion of the Phase I implementation during Jan 69. Military teams took over terminal and switchboard installation. Narrow and wideband conditioning continued where required.

### 7. (U) RVNAF Military Telecommunications Network - Vietnam (MTN-V):

a. General: The MTN-V was designed to upgrade or expand existing RVNAF fixed C-E facilities, provide new facilities as required in areas of troop build-up, and to provide long distance interconnects for command and control communications within the RVNAF. Facilities installed under the MTN-V are designed for integration into the public communications system, as appropriate, during the posthostilities period.

### b. MTN-V Project Status (as of 31 Mar 69):

TABLE 2

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CY65-68 TOTAL PROJECTS PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>*TOTAL PROJECTS OPERATIONAL</u>	<u>**TOTAL PROJECTS COMPLETED</u>
Inside Plant	67	48	0
Outside Plant	79	14	0
Comm Center	53	14 Tape Relay & Fac Control	0
		33 Tape Relay Only	
Radio	<u>19</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	218	118	0

\* An operational project is defined as one which has sufficient equipment installed to provide the communications service for which the facility was designed.

\*\* A complete project is one which has all Bill Of Materials (BOM) equipment on hand and installed.

### c. MTN-V Construction Status (as of 31 Mar 69):

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TABLE 3

<u>TYPE BUILDING</u>	<u>BUILDINGS IN FY67 MASF PROGRAM</u>	<u>BUILDINGS IN FY69 MASF PROGRAM</u>
DCO	3	0
DCO/Comm Center	2	0
Comm Center	22	8
Radio Relay	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTALS	41	21

TABLE 4

<u>BUILDINGS IN FY70 MASF PROGRAM</u>	<u>BUILDINGS COMPLETED</u>	<u>BUILDINGS PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR ON CONTRACT</u>
0	1	1
0	0	1
5	0	3
<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
7	1	10

8. (U) OVERALL ASSESSMENT:

a. The complete Communications - Electronics (C-E) complex in RVN has continued to expand and the service provided has continued to improve.

b. Phase III of the IWCS was completed on 11 Jan 69. This completed the phased upgrades of IWCS as Phase IV was not approved for implementation. Transportable microwave terminals have been funded to provide a degree of flexible augmentation. The equipments are expected in-country in the Apr-May 69 period.

c. Automatic Telephone Service in SEA expanded with the acceptance of two more Tandem Switches during 1st Qtr, CY69 leaving three to be completed. System operation is expected in mid-summer CY69.

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d. AUTOSEVOCAM RECORDS site activation continues to be hampered by a shortage of personnel to operate and maintain the sites at Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon. MACV requested relief from CINCPAC.

e. Power failures as a cause of circuit outage continued to increase during this quarter.

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## RVNAF PERSONNEL/TRAINING

### 1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. General Personnel Situation: (See Annex E). The 31 Mar 69 estimated assigned strength of RVNAF is 842,500, an increase of 23,291 from the 31 Dec 68 reported strength of 819,209. The total authorized strength of RVNAF Phase II Accelerated is 875,790 as of 31 Mar 69. Estimated strength of paramilitary forces (National Police and CIDG) is 121,120, an increase of 438 from 31 Dec 68. Estimated strength of other paramilitary forces (Kit Carson Scouts, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams and Song Tan Cadre) is 60,526. Total strength of SVN forces as of 31 Mar 69 is estimated to be 1,024,146.

### b. Significant Activities:

(1) Manpower Mobilization: The following actions were taken by the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs pertaining to general mobilization during 1st Qtr, CY69:

(a) The following conscriptees were provided by the Mobilization Directorate to RVNAF:

TABLE 1

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>NCO's</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JGS Quota	2,400	3,192	8,785	14,377
Conscripted	3,201	1,269	16,943	21,413

(b) Ministry of Defense letter of 13 Jan 69 extended the draft deferment period for Category E personnel (personnel deferred for three months) from 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

(c) Ministry of Defense communique of 22 Jan 69 announced the call up schedule for men born in CY51 and having no baccalaureate or equivalent diploma, as follows:

TABLE 2

<u>DATE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>REPORTING DATE</u>
1 Jan - 31 Mar 51	1 - 31 Mar 69
Born in 1951 and date of birth unknown	1 - 31 Mar 69

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<u>DATE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>REPORTING DATE</u>
1 Apr - 30 Jun 51	1 - 30 Jun 69
1 Jul - 30 Sep 51	1 - 30 Sep 69
1 Oct - 31 Dec 51	1 - 31 Dec 69

Men born between 1 Jan - 30 Jun 51 or born in CY51 with unknown birth dates who are presently attending the last year of junior high school or first year or senior high school are deferred until completion of the 1968 - 1969 academic year. These youth will report for military service between 1 - 30 Sep 69.

(d) A Joint General Staff postal message, dated 2 Feb 69, authorized active duty reserve officers who graduated from officer training classes during the period 30 Sep - 30 Dec 68 and who were former government schoolteachers to apply for detached service with the Ministry of Education and Youth.

(e) Ministry of Defense letter, dated 27 Feb 69, informed all GVN ministries that public servants, 34 years of age and younger, will be called up for military training in phases, receive nine weeks of recruit training and be detached back to their civilian positions. Each ministry or agency concerned was to provide the Ministry of Defense with rosters of personnel affected.

(f) Ministry of Defense communique of 8 Feb 69 authorized age groups 39-43 to submit requests for draft deferments for family reasons under the following schedule.

## NLT 31 Mar 69:

Men born between 1928 - 1930 (39-41 years of age), to include ex-servicemen with less than 12 years of previous service.

Service veterans born between 1931 - 1934 (35-38 years of age), with less than 12 years of previous service.

Service veterans born in 1935 and later (34 and younger), with more than five years but less than 12 years of previous service.

NLT 30 Apr 69: Men born between 1926 - 1927 (42-43 years of age), to include service veterans with less than 12 years of previous service.

(g) Ministry of Defense communique of 9 Mar 69 directed the call up, by name, of 226 doctors, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians and medical students who completed their last year of studies during the school year 1967 - 1968.

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## (2) RVN Veterans Affairs:

(a) The projected date of operation of the new Vocational Training Center at Da Nang was 12 Apr 69. Approximately 80 students will be enrolled in four classes: typing, English language training, driver training and auto mechanics. Supplies, equipment, instructor personnel and construction aid for the facility are being furnished by the Naval Support Activity at Da Nang.

(b) On 17 Mar 69 a formal ceremony was held to mark the reorganization of the Directorate General of War Veterans as the Ministry of Veterans Affairs reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Mr. Nguyen Thach Van was appointed as the Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs. The reorganization has resulted in problems concerning funding of the activities of the Ministry, and solutions were being evaluated.

## (3) Prisoner of War Program:

(a) During the period 1 Jan 69 to 31 Mar 69 a total of 1782 PW were transferred within the PW camp system. Of this total 1318 were transferred from the mainland PW camps to the Central PW Camp, Phu Quoc (CPWC), 192 youth were transferred to the Bien Hoa PW Camp (Youth Rehabilitation Center), and 118 female PW were transferred to Qui Nhon PW Camp (Female Camp). Bien Hoa has a total population of 2965 (including 1222 youth, 17 years old and younger) while 739 female PW were included in the total of 1196 PW interned in Qui Nhon as of 31 Mar 69. These figures do not include deaths, escapes, releases, repatriation and reclassifications. These figures do not indicate a capture rate but are solely a measure of camp inputs. Transfers to the CPWC will continue at a rate commensurate with ongoing construction there.

(b) In Mar, Enclosure #7 at the CPWC was completed, raising normal capacity to 14,000 and limited emergency capacity to 25,000. Enclosure #8 is now under construction while grading and clearing operations continue on enclosures #9 and #10.

(c) A 5 Feb 69 Ministry of Defense letter informed the JCS/RVNAF of the GVN decision to reopen the Chieu Hoi Program to both NVA and VC PW. On 11 Feb 69 the Provost Marshal General (TPMG), RVNAF, ordered PW camp commanders to segregate NVA and Regroupee PW from VC PW. This action was completed in all camps by 19 Feb 69 without incident. TPMG further instructed PW camp commanders to screen and segregate prospective Chieu Hoi candidates from other PW to avoid contact between them and hard core PW. A 20 Feb 69 postal letter directed agencies concerned to recommend deserving PW for a change of status to Hoi Chanh under the Chieu Hoi Program.

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(d) During the quarter, delegates to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), escorted by a MACJ15 representative, visited a total of 16 PW facilities in RVN as follows: 11 ARVN, three US, one Australian and one Korean.

### (4) Desertion Control:

(a) An 8 Jan JGS Memorandum announced policies for annual and special leaves during the TET holiday period. Annual leaves were cancelled during the period 9-25 Feb 69 and personnel were restricted to unit areas for celebrations. Where transportation assets permitted, dependents were permitted to join the servicemen in the unit areas for TET.

(b) On 11 Jan 69 JGS announced a test program involving the 25th Infantry Division and the 42d Separate Regiment in which air transportation was scheduled to enable the maximum number of personnel to take advantage of annual leave with assured air spaces for their return to units. Because of coordination problems, results of the test were inconclusive and plans were made for a second phase to begin after the TET holiday restrictions on annual leave. On 8 Mar 69, phase II was postponed because of the accelerated enemy activity.

(c) On 29 Jan 69, J1/JGS implemented a requirement for detailed reports from major units in an effort to identify general and specific causative factors for desertions.

### c. Problem Areas and Trends:

(1) Desertions continued to be the major personnel problem in RVNAF. Jan desertions (10,391) and Feb desertions (7,856) continued the decline noted in Nov 68. The sharp reduction in Feb desertions is considered to be deceptive as an indicator of trend in view of the stringent controls imposed on RVNAF personnel during the TET holiday period, 9-25 Feb 69. Estimated Mar desertions tend to confirm this evaluation and will probably fall between Jan and Feb totals.

(2) In Feb 69, JGS announced its approved annual promotion list for CY69. In view of the limited extent to which the approved promotions contributed to filling CY69 quotas, MACV proposed additional actions to the Chief, JGS, which would provide for increased special promotions and additional annual promotions during CY69.

### d. Overall Assessment:

(1) As of 31 Mar 69, the estimated strength of RVNAF was progressing satisfactorily toward Phase II Accelerated Force goals. However, unless

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the desertion rate continues to decline materially, current manpower estimates indicate that RVNAF may not be able to maintain currently approved force levels beyond the last half of CY70.

(2) JGS continued to emphasize desertion control measures as a command responsibility, and these increased efforts appeared to be achieving success in the continuing reduction of desertion rates for all forces.

## 2. (C) RVNAF TRAINING:

### a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):

#### (1) Objectives and Results:

(a) The Joint General Staff/Central Training Command (JGS/CTC) training program for 1st Qtr, CY69 placed emphasis on the training of 278 new Regional Force (RF) companies, in addition to meeting ARVN and RF recruit training requirements, to support the activation of new units and to provide replacements to sustain the existing force. The objectives and results for major JGS/CTC training programs as of 31 Mar 69 were as follows:

TABLE 3

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>1ST QTR PROGRAMMED INPUT</u>	<u>1ST QTR ACTUAL INPUT</u>	<u>1ST QTR % OF PROGRAM ACHIEVED</u>	<u>1ST QTR COMPLETED TRAINING</u>
Individual:				
ARVN + RF Recruit	25700	29259*	114	24044*
OCS Preparatory	3180	3450	109	3828
NCO Preparatory	5800	1534	26	1700
PF Recruit	4977	3177	64	2527
PF Squad Leader	1174	551	47	774
PF Platoon Leader	910	433	48	814
Special NCO	1000	975	98	1476
Unit:				
New Inf Bn	1	1	100	0

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<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>1ST QTR PROGRAMMED INPUT</u>	<u>1ST QTR ACTUAL INPUT</u>	<u>1ST QTR % OF PROGRAM ACHIEVED</u>	<u>1ST QTR COMPLETED TRAINING</u>
Inf Bn Refresher	6	2	33	2
ARVN Recon Co	12	10	83	12
New RF Co	278	260	94	99
RF Co Refresher	12	10	83	18
New PF Platoon	50	75	150	110
PF Platoon Refresher	133	56	42	23

\*Does not include Mar data for 2d Division Training Center.

(b) Activation, training and deployment of new units continued during the quarter. Five Field Artillery Battalions were trained, equipped and deployed. Four FA Battalions were activated and commenced training and three additional FA Battalions were activated. The 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron completed training and deployed to II CTZ. The 15th Armored Cavalry Squadron was activated and began unit training. Conversion and retraining of all mechanized rifle troops in I, II, and III CTZ to armored cavalry assault troops was completed.

(c) Programmed and actual input during 1st Qtr, CY69, for the 21 military schools controlled by the Central Training Command were:

TABLE 4

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED INPUT</u>	<u>ACTUAL INPUT</u>
Administration	205	34
Adjutant General	360	561
Language	2930	2460
Armor	779	1116
Artillery	460	866
Command and Staff	150	151
Engineer	37	798
Infantry	38	3800

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<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED INPUT</u>	<u>ACTUAL INPUT</u>
Intelligence	385	411
Junior Military Academy	0	0
Dog Training Center	136	113
Music	50	60
Military Police	1370	392
NCO Academy	6159	3345
National Defense College	0	0
Ordnance	1107	684
Quartermaster	309	241
Signal	1311	648
Transportation	1940	2642
Military Academy (VNMA)	0	0
WAFC	<u>904</u>	<u>902</u>
TOTALS:	22,680	10,524

(2) Significant Activities:

(a) RVNAF Schools and Academies:

MP School - The MP NCO course was reduced from 12 to 6 weeks by elimination of all Infantry and general subjects. Special, 6 week, MP NCO, and Basic MP Recruit courses were initiated for training of the newly activated 14th MP Bn.

Signal School - The first NCO Technical Facilities Controller course was initiated. Student input was 22 and instructors were provided by the 1st US Signal Brigade.

RVNAF Language School - The use of tape recorders in the classrooms was introduced as a substitute for language laboratory training. The English Language Training Program for VNAP and VNM students being trained in support of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program was successfully initiated.

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Command and Staff College - Student input increased significantly over 4th Qtr, CY68 from 59 to 151.

Armor School - Assumed the functions previously performed by the Lai Thien Regional Force Mechanized Training Center. Training activities at that center were discontinued.

Infantry School - Starlight Scopes were issued to ARVN units. Two training sessions were conducted at the Infantry School for Mobile Training Team personnel and service school cadre in the use of this equipment.

National Defense College - A decree from the Prime Minister's Office establishing criteria for selection of students was published for the class which will commence in 2d Qtr, CY69.

VN National Military Academy - Imposition of strict standards resulted in disenrollment of cadets on academic grounds for the first time.

(b) Recruit Training: ARVN and RF recruit training is conducted at CTC controlled training centers and ARVN division training centers. To meet CY69 training requirements, it was necessary to continue following the nine week recruit training program. Input of ARVN and RF recruits to the training centers remained ahead of schedule throughout the 1st Qtr, CY69. Popular Force recruit training, in contrast, fell behind schedule. This was primarily a result of the emphasis placed on recruiting for new RF companies.

(c) New RF Company Training: As a priority requirement in support of the CY69 Pacification Campaign, 278 new RF companies were scheduled to complete training by 30 Jun 69. To meet this goal, it was necessary to adhere to a rigid schedule of input to the training centers. All units which required the 14 week cycle were scheduled to begin training by the last week in Mar so that training would be completed by 30 Jun. Delays in the program resulted in a JGS decision to form companies consisting of personnel who have completed Basic Combat and Advanced Infantry Training. Such units require only five weeks of training and, therefore, could begin training as late as 26 May and still meet the program deadline. By 31 Mar, 260 new RF companies had entered training centers.

(d) New Infantry Battalion Training: On 4 Mar 69, the 4th Bn, 53d Inf, 23d ARVN Div, entered training at Lam Son National Training Center (NTC). This battalion will complete training on 22 Apr as the only new infantry battalion scheduled for training in CY69.

(e) Training Development Plan: The Training Base Development Plan was enlarged to include all aspects of CTC operations and renamed the



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CTC Training Development Plan. The purpose of the Training Development Plan is to provide a systematic approach in the development of procedures which will improve CTC's capability to accomplish its assigned objectives. The Training Development Plan contains six master programs. These are: (1) Regional and Popular Force Training, (2) Regular Force Training, (3) Citizens Military Training, (4) CTC's Upgrading Program, (5) Military School System Program, and (6) Military Training Center System. Detailed plans for the accomplishment of each master program were completed by 31 Mar 69.

(f) M16 Rifle Marksmanship Training: The M16 rifle marksmanship training program prescribes 76 hours of M16 training for all ARVN, RF and PF recruits. New RF/PF units that have not been issued the M16 rifle receive 28 hours of training with M16s furnished by the respective training center and 48 hours of training with the M1 rifle. All training centers had received their allocations of M16 rifles and were conducting M16 rifle marksmanship training.

(g) Enemy Activity Against Training Centers: In Jan 69, enemy activity against training centers consisted of one attack by fire. In anticipation of increased enemy activity during the TET holiday period, training center commanders adopted measures to enhance security. These included increased security forces, practice alerts, increased patrolling and sweeps of likely enemy avenues of approach. During the period 13-27 Feb 69, seven training centers were attacked by mortar and rocket fire. Two of these centers, Cao Lanh and Van Kiep, were subjected to two attacks during this period. Casualties were light with the exception of Van Kiep, which sustained 7 KIA and 30 WIA on 23 Feb 69 and 13 KIA and 64 WIA on 26 Feb 69. Damage to facilities was minor in all cases.

### (3) Problem Areas and Trends:

(a) The shortage of qualified university level instructors continues to be a problem at the Vietnamese National Military Academy.

(b) During 1st Qtr, CY69, significant training shortages developed in the NCO Academy, four individual training programs, four unit training programs, and five schools.

The shortage at the NCO Academy was primarily attributable to a shortfall in the NCO Preparatory Course at Quang Trung Training Center which provides a major source of student input to the Academy. The shortfall at Quang Trung developed because the Mobilization Directorate was unable to provide sufficient qualified personnel. As a result, J1, JGS reduced the quota assigned to the Mobilization Directorate for input to the NCO Preparatory Course. To compensate for this reduction, provisions were made for selection of additional in-service personnel who are qualified to enter the 9 week NCO courses without preparatory training.

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The PF Recruit shortage developed primarily because of the emphasis placed on recruiting for new RF companies. To correct this situation, CTC dispatched a message to all Corps directing that special attention be given to PF recruiting.

The shortage in PF Platoon Leader and Squad Leader Training was caused by the reluctance of commanders to release personnel to enter these courses. Specific Corps not meeting quotas have been identified and CTC has dispatched messages directing corrective action.

Shortages in categories of refresher training were occasioned by security and operational requirements in support of the CY69 Pacification Campaign. JGS policy has been to approve all requests for postponement of unit refresher training when commanders consider that scheduled units are necessary to satisfy operational requirements. In cases where significant shortfalls occur, CTC and MACT are taking action to revalidate the training requirements and accomplish reprogramming.

Significant deficiencies occurred in student input to the Engineer, Military Police, Ordnance and Signal Schools, caused primarily by failure or inability of field units to meet assigned quotas and the lack of input from the pipeline to entry MOS courses. The input data for the Mar 69 showed significant improvement however.

(4) Overall Assessment: The RVNAF Military School system functioned effectively during 1st Qtr, CY69. The JGS/CTC CY69 training program emphasized the training of ARVN and RF replacements and new units. These programs made satisfactory progress. New unit activations were accomplished on schedule. All PF individual training programs require close attention and corrective action to resolve input deficiencies. The student shortage at the NCO Preparatory Course at Quang Trung was being resolved by program revisions which reduce the quota to be furnished by Mobilization Directorate and which increase the quota of in-service personnel to be sent to nine week NCO courses. Emphasis given to employing all available units for pacification is expected to continue causing shortfalls in unit refresher training programs; however, some reduction may result from actions taken to revalidate and reprogram unit refresher training requirements.

b. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNNC):

(1) Significant Activities (VNN):

(a) Naval Training Center (NTC), Saigon, has undergone an extensive rebuilding and expansion program. Two new barracks having a total capacity of 450 men and one building with fourteen classrooms were completed. Two classes totaling 303 men have begun the petty officer course and sixty men began training in the warrant officer school. In Mar 69, NTC's final "A" School class consisting of 24 radiomen graduated.

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(b) NTC Cam Ranh Bay was the first to receive an extensive rehabilitation and expansion program. Three classroom buildings, six barracks, a messhall and galley have been built and extensive improvement undertaken on all existing buildings. During the 1st Qtr, CY69, three "A" School classes totaling 759 trainees commenced training in the Boat-swain's Mate, Disbursing Clerk, Gunner's Mate, Commissaryman, and Yeoman ratings.

(c) In order to train the large number of men required by the rapid expansion of the Navy, all recruit training has been conducted at Lam Son, an ARVN recruit training center. Twenty-four hundred Navy men commenced recruit training during the 1st Qtr, CY69, with the first class of 803 graduating in mid-Mar.

(d) PCF and PER crews began training at the Small Boat Orientation School in Saigon. The first class of 165 graduated in Mar 69 and are in training as PER crews; Class 2 and 3 totaling 503 men are presently in training.

(e) WPB training is being conducted by the Coast Guard. Twenty-six men began training in Feb in preparation for the turnover of 2 WPB's.

(f) English language training is being conducted at the Armed Forces Language School, Saigon, to prepare men for overseas schools. Two hundred seventy-four students commenced training in Feb and Mar 69.

(g) A POLWAR School for commanding officers was developed during the Qtr. Instruction will commence in Apr, and includes training in leadership, pacification, and development programs.

### (2) Significant Activities (VNMC):

(a) During 1st Qtr, CY69, average recruit population at the VNMC Training Command, Tu Duc, was 1,030 and three new recruit barracks were completed.

(b) Improved facilities and training continued to become available during the Qtr. Small arms marksmanship training was marked by the introduction of a sniper school including the use of the Starlight Scope, and the concluding phases of construction of a new rifle range. A new training aids library was completed and expanded airmobile training utilizing helicopter simulators commenced.

(c) Fifteen officers and four enlisted men were undergoing offshore training during the Qtr. Training included the USMC Amphibious Warfare and Officers Basic Schools and artillery, communications, motor transport, engineer individual combat and recruit training courses.

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(3) Overall Assessment: Training during 1st Qtr, CY69 in the VNN and VNMC continued with the objective of continued development and improvement of their respective combat capabilities. Progress toward training goals was generally satisfactory, particularly as regards the continuing completion of new training facilities, improvement of existing facilities and progress toward completion for utilization of still others.

c. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

(1) Objectives: The AFGP-PTR objective is to ensure that necessary training is accomplished to provide the flying, technical, and support personnel essential to the mission. This objective is accomplished by a combination of in-country and off-shore training by US personnel and by development or expansion of VNAF training capability.

(2) Significant Activities:

(a) UH-1H helicopter maintenance transition training status as of 31 Mar 69:

TABLE 5

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>REQ PER SQ</u>	<u>GRADUATES</u>		<u>IN TNG</u>	<u>TO BE TRAINED</u>
		<u>211 SQ</u>	<u>217 SQ</u>		
Helicopter Maint	63	63	27	10	26
Jet Engine	20	20	25	0	0
Flight Mech	20	20	2	0	18
Radio Nav Aids	7	7	7	0	0
Gunners	20	25	25	0	0

(b) The training requirements for the 211th Squadron are completed and the 217th Squadron is 58.3 percent complete. The call-up of civilian technical representation training personnel for the 213th and the 215th Squadrons was initiated by PACAF on 5 Mar 69. Eight technical representative teams are due in-country by 1 Apr 69.

(c) The A-37 Mobile Training Team Program for the 516th Squadron progressed on schedule. The A-37 MTT will complete all training commitments on 25 Apr 69 and depart by 1 May 69.

(d) VNAF reported a monthly average of 704 airmen in OJT status for the 1st Qtr. A total of 444 airmen were upgraded: 266 airmen to the 3 level, 12 airmen to the 5 level, 166 airmen to the 7 level; 73 NCOs and

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airmen completed MAP OJT during this period. As of 31 Mar 69, 51 airmen were in MAP OJT. 33 VNAF officers received UH-1H helicopter transition training with US Army units.

(e) During 1st Qtr, CY69, VNAF averaged 2,567 students per month in formal in-country training. VNAF entered 5,851 students and graduated 3,182 students during the reporting period. A breakdown of formal training areas is outlined below.

TABLE 6

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>NO. IN TNG MAR, CY69</u>	<u>NO. GRAD MAR, CY69</u>	<u>ELIMINATED OR WITHDRAWN</u>
Flying	45	0	4
Air Liaison Off/Forward Air Controller	69	45	0
Technical	208	93	0
Comm Elect	110	39	0
General Services	110	50	0
VNAF English Language	323	114	19
RVNAF Eng Lang	2,023	14	87
VNAF HQs	37	37	0
33d Wing	15	0	0
Air Log Wing (ALW)	181	159	0
Mil Off Tng Phase I	304	77	0
Mil Off Tng Phase II	483	170	0
NCO Training	566	270	0
Military Enl Basic Tng	2,950	1,964	0
ARVN Formal Schools	206	120	0
23d Wing	<u>78</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	7,708	3,182	110

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(f) During Jan 69, five additional USAF instructors from the Armed Forces Language School were assigned to temporary duty at the VNAF Language School, Nha Trang. Three previously assigned temporary duty instructors who had been TDY returned to their 7AF units.

(g) Helicopter Specialized Terminology (Series 3500) was received by the VNAF Language School in Jan 69. This material will enable the Language School to provide the entire language requirement for helicopter trainee candidates.

(h) The VNAF Language School elimination policy approved by VNAF in Dec 68 was implemented in Feb 69 to remove nine air cadets from the language program for academic deficiencies.

(i) The first Technical Instructor Course (TIC) consisting of 18 VNAF ATC instructors was conducted during Mar 69. This new course was conducted by USAF instructors from the AFAT-4 staff. VNAF instructors will teach the next course in May 69 under the supervision of USAF instructors, and subsequent classes independently.

(j) During Mar 69, the Armed Forces Language School, Saigon, graduated 14 helicopter maintenance candidates from the language program with English Comprehension Level scores of 70 or higher. These were the first graduates of the school since its expansion in Nov 68 to provide all language training in-country to support VNAF Phase II expansion.

(k) During Mar 69, the Joint General Staff (JGS) approved a VNAF proposal to discontinue Phase II officer military basic training for flying candidates. Henceforth, VNAF officers will complete nine weeks of Phase I officer military basic training, at which time they become Air Cadets. As Air Cadets they will enter the language program and subsequently the flying training program. Upon graduation from Technical Training (Flying School) they become Warrant Officers.

(l) A total of 349 students are currently training in CONUS and PACAF; 293 of this number are in the FY69 training program.

Departees during the 1st Qtr, CY69, totaled 137. This included 42 physiological altitude trainees, 13 UH-1 helicopter pilots, six under-grad/T-28 pilots, 21 transition/T-28 special pilot trainees, two under-grad/T-41/T-37/T-38 pilot trainees, and various officer and enlisted specialists in staff, administrative, medical, technical and training fields.

Returnees for the 3d Qtr totaled 98 officers and 27 enlisted personnel. These figures included 42 physiological altitude trainees, 22 A-37 pilots, four F-5 pilots, four A-1 pilots, 10 H-34 helicopter pilots, and six C-47 pilots. Also included were officer and enlisted specialists in the several fields noted above.

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(m) Preliminary planning was initiated to develop a fixed wing UPT program to support the Phase II VNAF force. The proposed program is three-phased, tailored to the three fixed wing types of operational aircraft in VNAF: liaison, reciprocating engine, and jet.

### (3) Problem Areas and Trends:

(a) The VNAF technical training capability must be enlarged to support the Phase II VNAF force structure. An estimated 2,500 students must be in technical training each year to support the force. This is an increase of approximately 1,500 students over the current VNAF technical training capability. A joint VNAF-AFJP working group has been established, co-chaired by VNAF DCS/Training and AFJP-PTK, to plan and oversee the expansion of the technical training program. It is presently planned to expand the training capability at Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. Although the requirements have been known for several months, no progress has been made in turning over any existing facilities or in planning for new construction. Because of the long lead time which may at times be required for construction, the lack of facilities may well be the critical factor causing slippage in the expansion of the in-country training program.

(b) Fifteen training spaces for CONUS training were deleted during the Qtr. An additional 58 training spaces have been deferred until later in 2d Qtr, CY69. These deletions and deferrals are the result of VNAF's inability to provide language qualified personnel in the numbers needed to meet CONUS quotas. Language training remains the single most critical factor in training expansion.

(4) Overall Assessment: CONUS and in-country training is being programmed to meet the regular VNAF requirements plus the additional requirements for Phase II expansion. The capabilities and resources of VNAF are being extended to their limits to meet these requirements.

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## SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

1. (C) FRIENDLY INITIATED OPERATIONS: During the quarter there was a total of 152 friendly-initiated operations resulting in 30 or more enemy/friendly KIA: 56 in I CTZ, 43 in II CTZ, 18 in III CTZ, and 65 in IV CTZ. Results included 30,118 enemy KIA and 3,126 friendly KIA for an overall enemy/friendly kill ratio of 9.63:1. A total of 11,918 enemy weapons were captured while friendly forces lost 126 weapons, a ratio of 94.59:1 (Appendix 1).

2. (C) ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: During the quarter there was a total of 116 enemy-initiated attacks in three categories of large scale significant, large-scale and significant: 20 in Jan, 54 in Feb, and 42 in Mar. Results included 2,596 enemy KIA and 502 friendly KIA, an enemy/friendly ratio of 5.17:1. The criteria used in assessing the significance of enemy attacks are at Appendix 2.

a. LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT: During the quarter there were ten enemy initiated attacks classified as large scale significant: one in I CTZ, one in II CTZ, seven in III CTZ, and one in IV CTZ. Results included 928 enemy KIA and 90 friendly KIA for an overall enemy/friendly kill ratio of 10.31:1.

b. LARGE SCALE: During the quarter there were two large scale enemy initiated attacks. One in II CTZ and one in III CTZ. Results included three enemy KIA and five friendly KIA for an overall enemy/friendly kill ratio of 1.67:1 in the enemy favor (Appendix 4).

c. SIGNIFICANT: There were 104 enemy initiated attacks classified as significant: 24 in I CTZ, 23 in II CTZ, 40 in III CTZ, and 17 in IV CTZ. Results included 1,665 enemy KIA and 407 friendly KIA, an enemy/friendly kill ratio of 4.09:1 (Appendix 5).

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LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(50 OR MORE EN/FED KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	SPAS/LOST	KIA	WIA	REMB/LOST
I. CTZ								
31 OCT 67 28 FEB 69	KENTUCKY	USMC	QUANG TRI	92	41	29	91	0
14 APR 68 28 FEB 69	SCOTLAND II	USMC	QUANG TRI	198	43	55	172	0
17 MAY 68 28 FEB 69	NEVADA EAGLE	USA/ARVN	QUANG TRIEN	341	303	172	1566	0
28 OCT 68 2 JAN 69	YEN TRO DI DAN	ARVN	QUANG TRI	41	53	0	7	0
2 NOV 68 28 FEB 69	VERNON LAKE II	USA	QUANG NGAI	260	36	26	41	0
28 NOV 68 26 JAN 69	DAWSON RIVER	USMC	QUANG TRI	35	12	0	11	0
30 NOV 68 1 JAN 69	VICTORY DRAGON VI	ROK	QUANG NAM	36	27	0	11	0
1 DEC 68 28 FEB 69	HARDEN FALLS	USA	QUANG TIN	42	2	1	14	0
6 DEC 68 7 MAR 69	TAYLOR CANYON	USMC/ ARVN	QUANG NAM	1106	564	135	1190	6
8 DEC 68 10 FEB 69	LF LOI I	ARVN	QUANG NAM	148	29	38	192	0
9 DEC 68 28 FEB 69	MARSHALL MTN	USA	QUANG TRI	146	157	6	118	0
14 DEC 68 28 FEB 69	SAVETTE CANYON	USA	QUANG NAM	91	45	0	10	0
25 DEC 68 1 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 225/XD	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	19	4	9	23	1
4 JAN 69 1 FEB 69	VICTORY DRAGON VII	ROK	QUANG NAM	259	108	9	42	0
16 JAN 69 23 JAN 69	HUNG QUANG 1/02	ARVN	QUANG NAM	71	20	10	36	0
19 JAN 69 19 JAN 69	DONG CHIEN 43	ARVN	QUANG TIN	40	4	11	19	0
22 JAN 69 9 FEB 69	PHI PHUNG 1/E/69	ARVN	QUANG NAM	45	19	1	31	1
22 JAN 69 18 MAR 69	DEWEY CANYON	USMC	QUANG TRI	1355	1291	121	820	3
26 JAN 69 8 FEB 69	HUNG QUANG 1/03	ARVN	QUANG NAM	236	63	11	32	0
26 JAN 69 8 FEB 69	HUNG QUANG 1/03	ARVN	QUANG NA	215	53	20	68	0
26 JAN 69 7 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 20	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	47	18	8	26	1
27 JAN 69 6 FEB 69	LINH RIVER	ARVN	QUANG NAM	53	16	9	45	0
1 FEB 69 28 FEB 69	VICTORY DRAGON VIII	ROK	QUANG NAM	211	94	15	59	0
5 FEB 69 11 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 21	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	3	1	10	31	0
11 FEB 69 15 FEB 69	LIEN KET 18	ARVN		59	7	11	42	0
13 FEB 69 22 FEB 69	HUNG QUANG 1/05	ARVN	QUANG NAM	43	8	6	19	0

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(80 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	FRIENDLY				
				EN	FRD	EN	FRD	EN
2 FEB (CONT)								
21 FEB 69	LE LOI 2	ARVN	QUANG NAM	50	19	2	3	0
25 FEB 69								
21 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 93	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	23	18	2	4	0
26 FEB 69								
22 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 207	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	23	3	3	12	3
23 FEB 69								
23 FEB 69	IRON MOUNTAIN 1/05/2	ARVN	QUANG NAM	176	61	27	89	5
27 FEB 69								
23 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 22	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	776	123	103	315	19
10 MAR 69								
26 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 400	ARVN	QUANG TIN	168	21	6	9	0
26 FEB 69								
24 FEB 69	TUALUC 9/TIEN PHUOC	ARVN	QUANG TIN	88	53	6	10	0
25 FEB 69								
27 FEB 69	HUNG QUANG 1/05/00/2	ARVN	QUANG NAM	43	5	7	49	0
3 MAR 69								
2 MAR 69	LUC SOAT 51	ARVN	QUANG NAM	42	4	3	13	0
4 MAR 69								
4 MAR 69	HUNG QUANG 106	ARVN	QUANG NAM	51	31	16	60	0
22 MAR 69								
5 MAR 69	TU LUC 14/T/PHUOC	ARVN	QUANG TIN	42	2	2	7	0
6 MAR 69								
6 MAR 69	LIEN KET 36	ARVN	QUANG TIN	18	2	3	13	0
9 MAR 69								
7 MAR 69	TU LUC 16/T/PHUOC	ARVN	QUANG TIN	12	0	1	24	0
11 MAR 69								
10 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 54	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	17	2	6	12	0
13 MAR 69								
12 MAR 69	QUYET THANG/318	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	44	9	5	18	0
14 MAR 69								
19 MAR 69	PHI PHUNG 10/69	ARVN	QUANG NAM	102	21	9	41	0
20 MAR 69								
22 MAR 69	HUNG QUANG 1/07	ARVN	QUANG NAM	25	4	1	8	0
27 MAR 69								
21 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 806	ARVN		20	7	10	34	0
25 MAR 69								
12 JAN 69	RUSSELL BEACH/ LIEN KET 9	USA/ARVN	QUANG NGAI	144	58	42	221	3
27 FEB 69	PURPLE MARTIN	USMC	QUANG TRI	50	82	26	89	0
1 MAR 69	VICTORY DRAGON IX	ROK	QUANG NAM	301	131	4	63	0
27 FEB 69	LE LOI 4	ARVN	QUANG NAM	321	28	9	93	0
1 MAR 69	KENTUCKY JUNGLES	USA	THUA THIEN	171	140	54	164	0
14 MAR 69	MAINE CRAG	USMC	QUANG TRI	63	367	12	82	0
11 MAR 69	FREDERICK HILL	USA	QUANG TIN	210	46	28	203	0
17 MAR 69	GENEVA PARK	USA	QUANG NGAI	54	4	2	37	0
17 MAR 69	IRON MOUNTAIN	USA	QUANG NGAI	95	13	8	110	0
19 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 25	ARVN	QUANG NGAI	348	55	59	117	2
10 SEP 68	LANSON 261	ARVN	QUANG TRI	46	65	12	32	3

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(50 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		TOTAL
				KIA	WPN LOSS	KIA	WPN LOSS	
I. OCT (CONT)								
15 OCT 68	LAMSON 274	ARVN	QUANG TRI	80	18	3	23	0
			TOTAL:	8836	4363	1109	6620	40
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	1.56:1				
II. NOV								
11 OCT 67 31 JAN 69	MACARTHUR/BINH TAY	USA/ARVN	PLEIKU	122	62	31	147	2
16 JAN 68 31 JAN 69	WALKER	USA	BINH DINH	49	36	9	58	0
20 JAN 68 31 JAN 69	MOLAIN/DAN THANG	USA/ARVN	LAM DONG	113	60	4	51	0
30 MAR 68 31 JAN 69	COCHISE GREEN/ DAN BINH	USA/ARVN	BINH DINH	23	27	9	27	0
28 DEC 68 15 JAN 69	DOK SURI BUN KAE 66/5	ROK	BINH DINH	154	257	18	15	0
2 JAN 69 15 JAN 69	DOK SURI JUM MA 5	ROK	PHU YEN	66	24	0	4	0
3 JAN 69 21 JAN 69	BINH TAY 48	ARVN	PLEIKU	37	37	15	57	0
5 JAN 69 11 JAN 69	DOK SURI KUN MA 12	ROK	BINH THUAN	60	18	0	3	0
19 JAN 69 27 JAN 69	BAK JEE 2-5	ROK	KHANH HOA	66	45	3	5	0
20 JAN 69 27 JAN 69	BINH TAY 49	ARVN	PLEIKU	254	1	20	51	0
20 JAN 69 8 FEB 69	HAE SAN JIN 6	ROK	PHU YEN	157	73	9	29	0
22 JAN 69 31 JAN 69	BOLLING/DAN HOA	USA	PHU YEN	20	9	1	18	0
23 JAN 69 28 JAN 69	DAN HOA 47/51	ARVN	PHU YEN	45	2	4	6	0
28 JAN 69 8 FEB 69	BINH TAY 50	ARVN	PLEIKU	304	13	1	47	12
29 JAN 69 2 FEB 69	TIEN BO 6/69	ARVN	DARLAC	9	9	5	87	0
31 JAN 69 17 FEB 69	GREENE THUNDER	USA	PLEIKU	125	5	26	54	0
31 JAN 69 6 MAR 69	DARRY MARCH	ROK	PHU YEN	28	18	8	30	0
2 FEB 69 13 FEB 69	KUN MA 6	ROK	PHU YEN	30	10	1	2	0
3 FEB 69 20 FEB 69	HANCOCK EAGLE	USA	BINH THUAN	66	29	3	33	0
6 FEB 69 15 FEB 69	KUN MA 12	ROK	PHU YEN	96	33	0	0	0
7 FEB 69 12 MAR 69	GREENE CYCLONE	USA	PLEIKU	23	2	10	14	0
10 FEB 69 28 FEB 69	MAYNE GREEN	USA	KONTUM	15	10	1	14	0
13 FEB 69 3 MAR 69	BAK JEE 2-6	ROK	KHANH HOA	72	22	1	3	0
17 FEB 69 5 MAR 69	BEUNG MA/6	ROK	KHANH HOA	27	8	0	0	0

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNS LOST	KIA	VIA	WPNS LOST
II CTZ (CONT)								
21 FEB 69	PLEIKU 10	ARVN	PLEIKU	17	2	13	2	3
25 FEB 69								
24 FEB 69	DAN QUYET 2	ARVN	PLEIKU	57	3	2	3	0
27 FEB 69								
25 FEB 69	DAN QUYEN 42/10	ARVN	KONTUM	18	3	0	25	0
26 FEB 69								
26 FEB 69	SUN KEE 69-2	ROK	BINH DINH	42	37	3	5	0
12 MAR 69								
1 MAR 69	DO DAE BEE 2-6	ROK	PHU YEN	28	14	2	0	0
17 MAR 69								
4 MAR 69	HANCOCK QUEEN	USA	LAM DONG	26	22	2	23	0
22 MAR 69								
5 MAR 69	DAN QUYEN 42/15	ARVN	KONTUM	24	6	2	14	0
8 MAR 69								
8 MAR 69	PHU BON 18	ARVN	PHU BON	16	12	2	12	0
12 MAR 69								
31 JAN 69	DARBY CREST/DAN LINH 41/86 II	USA/ARVN	BINH DINH	73	22	3	13	0
25 MAR 69								
6 MAR 69	DAN PHU 47/4	ARVN	PHU YEN	20	6	4	18	0
23 MAR 69								
3 MAR 69	BAK JEE 3-8	ROK	KHANH HOA	28	7	7	15	0
24 MAR 69								
19 MAR 69	DAN QUYEN 18	ARVN	KONTUM	11	4	7	24	0
22 MAR 69								
24 MAR 69	DAN PHU 47/5	ARVN	PHU YEN	20	6	4	18	0
24 MAR 69								
31 JAN 69	PUTNAM PANTHER	USA	KONTUM	165	24	34	195	0
3 FEB 69	DARBY TRAIL II	USA/ARVN	BINH DINH	167	41	5	29	0
28 FEB 69	QUEEN THUNDER II	USA/ARVN	PLEIKU	79	12	12	56	0
1 MAR 69	WAYNE GREY	USA	KONTUM	504	105	76	267	0
23 MAR 69	HANCOCK EAGLE III	USA/ARVN	BINH THUAN	26	22	2	23	0
25 MAR 69	DONG BO	ROK	NINH THUAN	30	10	0	2	0
			TOTAL:	3495	1191	373	1520	17
			RATIO: (EN/FR)	9.37:1				
III CTZ								
31 MAY 68	TOAN THANG II	US/FN/ARVN	III CTZ	2937	1356	353	2058	0
16 FEB 69								
16 JAN 69	TOAN THANG 500	ARVN	PHUOC LONG	11	64	2	20	0
17 FEB 69	B/23/176							
19 JAN 69	TOAN THANG 199/1510	ARVN	TAY NINH	4	1	10	45	0
23 JAN 69								
19 JAN 69	TOAN THANG 199/1510	ARVN	TAY NINH	52	9	12	46	0
23 JAN 69								
23 JAN 69	TOAN THANG 199/1546	ARVN	LONG AN	43	23	0	4	0
24 JAN 69								
24 JAN 69	TOAN THANG 199/1530	ARVN	TAY NINH	24	13	2	38	0
30 JAN 69								
3 FEB 69	TOAN THANG 399/114	ARVN		2	1	0	10	21
5 FEB 69								
7 FEB 69	BONG THAN 301/69	ARVN	TAY NINH	10	386	4	85	0
16 FEB 69								

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCE	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNs LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNs LOST
III. CTZ 1600								
15 FEB 69	TOAN THANG 213/2/	ARVN	BINH DUONG	43	2	4	5	0
21 FEB 69	7							
21 FEB 69	TOAN THANG 199/	ARVN	LONG AN	36	13	4	5	0
22 FEB 69	1705							
2 DEC 68	AO MOOSE	ARVN	PHUOC TOY	61	30	0	38	0
23 MAR 69								
30 JAN 69	DAI BANG 1/69	ARVN	TAY NINH	304	204	132	640	7
26 MAR 69								
22 FEB 69	GIA TOA BA BIEH	ARVN	BIEH HOA	278	115	16	88	14
24 MAR 69	HCA							
18 MAR 69	SONG THANH 206	ARVN	LONG KHANH	52	8	7	24	0
22 MAR 69								
16 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 21/15	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	177	59	39	132	0
29 MAR 69								
16 FEB 69	TOAN THANG III	USA/ARVN		5592	1787	417	2404	0
15 MAR 69	TOAN THANG 399/118	ARVN	LONG KHANH	17	5	26	65	0
16 MAR 69	TOAN THANG	ARVN	LONG KHANH	56	25	10	2	0
			TOTAL:	9265	4101	1047	5741	42
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	9.52:1				
IV. CTZ								
21 DEC 68	QUYET CHIEN 21/44	ARVN	AN XUYEN	97	188	45	66	0
7 JAN 69								
22 DEC 68	QUYET CHIEN 44/55	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	20	0	16	59	0
4 MAR 69								
25 DEC 68	QUYET CHIEN 21/45	ARVN	AN XUYEN	378	81	9	15	0
7 JAN 69								
1 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 7/12/	ARVN	DINH TUONG	31	41	1	17	0
4 JAN 69	02							
1 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 9/01	ARVN	VINH LONG	23	7	14	53	0
7 JAN 69								
4 JAN 69	QUYET THANG/KE/03	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	25	2	4	7	0
7 JAN 69								
9 JAN 69	QUYET THANG PD 33/	ARVN	PHONG DINH	11	0	2	18	0
12 FEB 69	7							
5 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 21/01	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	59	20	12	75	0
14 JAN 69								
10 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 1/1	ARVN	VINH BINH	3	1	2	36	0
11 JAN 69								
12 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 9/3	ARVN	CA DEC	109	25	5	69	2
22 JAN 69								
13 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 21/2	ARVN	PHONG DINH	53	44	0	66	0
23 JAN 69								
15 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 7/10/	ARVN	KIEN HOA	21	14	6	0	0
17 JAN 69	4							
19 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 44/6	ARVN	CAU DAT	113	292	19	44	0
27 JAN 69								
19 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 7/2	ARVN	DINH TUONG	25	33	3	30	0
23 JAN 69								
22 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 11/3	ARVN	BA XUYEN/BAC LY	89	5	2	5	0
25 JAN 69								
24 JAN 69	QUYET THANG 7/12/	ARVN	DINH TUONG	25	8	8	41	0
29 JAN 69	8							

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WIA/LOST	KIA	WIA	WIA/LOST
25 JAN 69 1 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 21/4 PD	ARVN	PHONG DINH	9	12	22	119	0
31 JAN 69 2 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 9/5	ARVN	VINH LONG	34	9	4	17	0
31 JAN 69 2 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 44/17	ARVN	VINH BINH	23	2	9	10	0
3 FEB 69 6 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 7/10/1 T	ARVN	KIEN HOA	30	4	12	43	0
3 FEB 69 10 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 40/50 C	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	23	4	3	46	0
3 FEB 69 12 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 7/6	ARVN	DINH TUONG	43	12	8	64	0
5 FEB 69 8 FEB 69	QUYET THANG BL/5	ARVN	BAC LIEU	35	2	6	0	0
6 FEB 69 7 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 14/20	ARVN	VINH BINH	45	12	4	26	0
7 FEB 69 9 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 33/1	ARVN	PHONG DINH	23	1	6	40	0
9 FEB 69 11 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 31/2/ CT/68	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	34	7	21	53	0
10 FEB 69 12 FEB 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	VINH LONG	13	2	6	25	0
14 FEB 69 18 FEB 69	QUYET THANG CD/32 BL/8	ARVN	BAC LIEU	49	54	1	2	0
17 FEB 69 18 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 14/27	ARVN	VINH BINH	31	3	1	5	0
18 FEB 69 20 FEB 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	63	12	4	13	0
21 FEB 69 27 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 21/9 B	ARVN	PHONG DINH	13	3	4	26	0
22 FEB 69 23 FEB 69	QUYET THANG KH/29	ARVN	KIEN HOA	16	3	6	19	0
22 FEB 69 23 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 14/31	ARVN	VINH BINH	23	12	2	11	0
22 FEB 69 6 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 21/11 (KJ)	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	54	203	6	21	0
23 FEB 69 23 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 10/KIEN PHONG/THANG BINH/ 53	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	20	8	6	13	3
24 FEB 69 25 FEB 69	QUYET THANG CD/28	ARVN	CHAU DOC	14	2	9	34	0
24 FEB 69 25 FEB 69	QUYET THANG VB/52	ARVN	VINH BINH	51	26	1	4	0
24 FEB 69 25 FEB 69	QUYET THANG VB/52	ARVN	VINH BINH	21	26	1	4	0
25 FEB 69 26 FEB 69	QUYET THANG 44/12	ARVN	CHAU DOC	157	35	3	54	0
28 FEB 69 1 MAR 69	QUYET THANG CD/ 32 + BX/41	ARVN	BA XUYEN	11	6	1	20	0
28 FEB 69 2 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 21/12/ P	ARVN	PHONG DINH	121	5	0	16	0
1 MAR 69 2 MAR 69	QUYET THANG SD/51	ARVN	SA DEC	21	7	2	8	0

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## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

(30 OR MORE EN/FRD KIA)

DATE	NAME OF OPERATION	FORCES	PROVINCE	ENEMY		FRIENDLY		
				KIA	WPNs LOST	KIA	WIA	WPNs LOST
IV CTZ (CONT)								
2 MAR 69	QUYET THANG SD 9/8	ARVN	VINH LONG	95	24	7	52	0
8 MAR 69								
3 MAR 69	QUYET THANG/KIEN	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	34	5	4	1	0
4 MAR 69	AN/52							
3 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 7/12	ARVN	DINH TUONG	17	26	0	15	0
4 MAR 69	(DNGC)							
4 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 44/14	ARVN	CHAU DOC	136	219	0	0	0
17 MAR 69								
5 MAR 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	CHUONG THIEN	32	3	8	11	0
6 MAR 69	1/31/ADMT/97							
5 MAR 69	QUYET THANG VL	ARVN	VINH LONG	24	0	1	24	0
6 MAR 69	49/ADMT							
5 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 7/15	ARVN	DINH TUONG	10	5	5	15	0
7 MAR 69								
7 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 21/	ARVN	KIEN GIANG	81	21	13	59	15
12 MAR 69	12 B							
15 MAR 69	QUYET THANG KP/62	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	16	3	2	12	0
16 MAR 69								
15 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 21/14	ARVN	PHONG DINH	17	4	9	21	3
17 MAR 69	(FD)							
16 MAR 69	QUYET THANG CD/44	ARVN	CHAU DOC	12	1	6	31	0
17 MAR 69								
19 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 33/38	ARVN	PHONG DINH	24	6	2	18	3
20 MAR 69								
19 MAR 69	QT/KP/65	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	27	0	1	15	0
21 MAR 69								
21 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 14/51	ARVN	VINH BINH	31	13	2	7	0
23 MAR 69	(VB)							
22 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 44/16	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	21	3	7	17	1
25 MAR 69								
24 MAR 69	QUYET THANG CD	ARVN	BAC LIEU	32	2	0	2	0
26 MAR 69	32/22							
24 MAR 69	QT/9/9	ARVN	VINH LONG	41	0	7	42	0
31 MAR 69								
25 MAR 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	DINH TUONG	115	44	17	80	2
28 MAR 69	7/11/36							
25 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 44/17	ARVN	KIEN PHONG	30	5	7	17	0
28 MAR 69								
26 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 7/22	ARVN	DINH TUONG	24	20	2	23	0
28 MAR 69								
20 NOV 68	SPEEDY EXPRESS	USA	DINH TUONG	4793	159	137	1201	0
15 MAR 69	QUYET THANG	ARVN	CHAU DOC	39	465	17	54	0
	C4/LLDB/2							
28 MAR 69	QUYET THANG 32/42	ARVN	PHONG DINH	18	2	8	31	0
			TOTAL:	7822	2263	537	3040	27
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	14.57:1				
			GRAND TOTAL:	30118	11918	3126	16421	126
			OVERALL RATIO:	9.63:1				

# UNCLASSIFIED

## ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS

1. The following criteria are used as a guide in assessing the significance of enemy initiated attacks.

a. Size: When the enemy force is estimated to be a battalion or larger, or

b. Casualties: When the attack results in a total enemy and friendly KIA and MIA of 30 or more, or

c. Objective: When the enemy has attacked a major installation such as a base camp, airfield, a logistical installation or political/military command and control installation, or

d. Damage: When there is a loss of a substantial amount of equipment, destruction or damage to aircraft or weapons systems or a large quantity of enemy material, supplies or equipment has been captured, or

e. New Weapons, tactics or techniques: When the enemy introduces a new weapon or employs a new tactic or technique.

2. Attacks are reported in three categories:

a. Large scale: Attacking force consists of a battalion or more (criteria 1a above).

b. Significant: Meets one or more of the criteria, 1b through 1e above.

c. Large Scale Significant: Meets the criterion of size plus one or more of the other criteria, 1b through 1e.

\*Reference MACV Dir 335-4, 22 Feb 68 (page 15 of Appendix 1 to Annex B).



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**ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>I CTZ</b>					
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Noi An City	Q.60 VC Bn; Elms of V25 VC Bn	8	40
23 Feb	Quang Nam	ARVN Elements	Elms 402d VC Bap; V25 VC Bn	12	103
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Hien Duu Dist HQs	3/141st NVA Regt; Elms 3/31st Ind NVA Regt; Q84 VC Co	10	30
23 Feb	Quang Nam	924th RF Co	Est En Bn	20	11
25 Feb	Quang Tri	F8B Russell	Prob Elms 27th NVA Regt	25	44
			TOTAL:	75	238
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	3.2:1	
<b>II CTZ</b>					
12 Feb	Binh Thuan	26th PF Plt; 27th PF Plt; L2 Barr	Est Bn, 186 VC Bn; 240 NVA Bn; 840 VC Bn	4	67
21 Feb	Darlac	U/I CSF Elem	Est NVA Bn	Unk	30
25 Feb	Kontum	Kop Ho (V)	Est Bn	53	Unk
			TOTAL:	57	97
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	1.7:1	
<b>III CTZ</b>					
12 Jan	Tay Ninh	34th Rgr Bn (ARVN)	Elms 165 NVA Regt	Unk	37
14 Jan	Tay Ninh	2/22d, 25th Div (US)	Elms 95C NVA Regt	7	122
25 Jan	Tay Ninh	127th RF Co (ARVN)	272 VC Regt	11	42
23 Feb	Tay Ninh	3/4th Cav (US) F8B Diamond (US)	1st and 3d Bns, 272 VC Regt	15	206
23 Feb	Bien Hoa	720th MP Bn (US) Long Binh Post (US)	Elms 274 VC Regt	8	194
23 Feb	Binh Duong	Dau Tieng Base Camp (US)	D5 VC Sapper Bn	5	71
23 Feb	Phuoc Long	MACV (US)	Unk En Bns	2	67
25 Feb	Tay Ninh	F8B Diamond (US)	Elms 272 VC Regt	1	78
26 Feb	Bien Hoa	3/48th (ARVN); 199th LTB (US); 5th Marine Bn (ARVN)	3d Bn, 275 VC Regt; 21 Bn, 5th VC Div	12	214
26 Feb	Hau Nghia	Cu Chi Base Camp (US)	D3 VC Sapper Bn	13	31
4 Mar	Hau Nghia	2/12th Inf (US)	3d Bn, 88 NVA Regt	6	179
8 Mar	Tay Ninh	1st Cav Div (US)	95C NVA Regt	11	157
9 Mar	Tay Ninh	1/5th Cav (US)	2d Bn, 272 VC Regt	14	34
9 Mar	Tay Ninh	8th AVN Bn (ARVN)	Unk En Bn	44	68
11 Mar	Tay Ninh	Elms 25th Div (US)	5th Bn, 188 NVA Regt	Unk	76
11 Mar	Tay Ninh	3/4th Cav (US)	Unk	3	77
11 Mar	Tay Ninh	2/12th Cav (US)	3d Bn, 101D NVA Regt	5	62
14 Mar	Long Khanh	4/43 (ARVN)	2d Bn, 33 NVA Regt	12	24
15 Mar	Long Khanh	2/43 (ARVN)	1st Bn, 275 VC Regt	13	59
16 Mar	Bien Hoa	3d Bn, 1st Bde (Thai Forces)	1st and 2d Bns, 274 VC Regt	3	65
17 Mar	Hau Nghia	1/5th Mech (US)	2d Bn, 268 VC Regt	Unk	30
17 Mar	Hau Nghia	Elms 25th Div (US)	2d Bn, 268 VC Regt	Unk	33

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## ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FED UNITS	EN UNITS	FED KIA	EN KIA
<u>III CTZ (CONT)</u>					
25 Mar	Long Khanh	1st and 24 Bns MFF (ARVN)	24 Bn, 275 VC Regt	26	199
25 Mar	Tay Ninh	3/4th Cav (US)	3d Bn, 101 NVA Regt	2	55
28 Mar	Tay Ninh	3/4th Cav (US)	Elas 955 NVA Regt; K31 Bn, 1st NVA Div	3	15
			TOTAL:	215	2248
			RATIO: (EN/FED)	10.3:1	
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
14 Jan	Kien Tuong	7/1st Cav	2515 VC Bn	3	43
25 Feb	Chau Doc	Three RF Cos; One APC TRF; ARVN Cav	509 VC Bn	2	187
			TOTAL:	6	230
			RATIO: (EN/FED)	38.3:1	

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**ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>II CTZ</b>					
17 Jan	Binh Thuan	953d RF Co	Est Bn	9	Unk
22 Feb	Binh Dinh	1 Plt of B/150 Mech Inf (US)	8/18 NVA Regt	Unk	10
23 Feb	Binh Dinh	77th FF Plt, RD Ta 8, FSBF	Est Bn, 18th NVA Regt	21	Unk
1 Mar	Kontum	U/I CIDG Patrol from Ben Ret CIDG Camp	Est Bn	Unk	Unk
3 Mar	Kontum	P-n Ret CIDG Camp	Est Bn	2	Unk
3 Mar	Kontum	A/3/8th Inf (US)	Est Bn	22	Unk
13 Mar	Kontum	Kon Re Long (H) Kon Sotui (H)	304 Sapper Bn	14	2
20 Mar	Kontum	FSB 2	Est 200 enemy	2	12
			TOTAL:	70	24
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	1:2.9	
<b>III CTZ</b>					
9 Jan	Phuoc Long	2/7th Cav (US)	K3 Bn, 174 NVA Regt	4	16
11 Jan	Binh Long	Elm 1st Cav Div (US)	Elm 320 NVA Regt	Unk	41
13 Jan	Binh Duong	3/4th Cav (US)	K2 Bn 268 VC Regt	0	6
1 Feb	Binh Duong	1/28th Inf (US)	Unk En Bn	2	3
3 Feb	Binh Duong	11th ACR (US)	K4 Bn, Dong Nai VC Regt	2	18
8 Feb	Binh Long	A 331st CIDG; 9th Cav (US)	Unk	Unk	32
23 Feb	Binh Duong	1/27th Inf (US)	Unk	3	38
23 Feb	Tay Dinh	4/28th Inf (US); 164th RF Co (ARVN)	Unk	3	35
23 Feb	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa City Rail Yard	1st Bn, 275 VC Regt; D2 VC Bn	0	4
24 Feb	Binh Duong	FSB Mahone (US)	Elm 141 NVA Regt	1	24
28 Feb	Tay Ninh	3/4th Cav (US)	24 Bn, 88 NVA Regt	2	28
4 Mar	Binh Duong	Elm 11th ACR (US)	K33 Bn, 96 NVA Arty Regt	7	23
11 Mar	Long Khanh	3d MSF Bn (ARVN)	Unk	0	37
11 Mar	Tay Ninh	A/3/4th Cav (US)	Elm of 160 NVA	0	38
15 Mar	Binh Duong	FSB Mahone	24 Bn, 141 NVA Regt	0	21
17 Mar	Bien Hoa	1/7th NDP	24 Bn, 174 NVA Regt	10	12
19 Mar	Binh Duong	1/11th ACR (US)	K8 Bn, 209 NVA Regt	0	20
24 Mar	Hau Nghia	Elm 25th Div (US)	1st Bn 268 Regt	0	12
24 Mar	Long An	2/47th (ARVN)	Unk	0	34
29 Mar	Tay Ninh	4/234 (ARVN)	Unk	2	36
30 Mar	Binh Duong	B/1/6th Cav (US)	Unk	8	38
			TOTAL:	44	516
			RATIO: (EN/FRD)	11.7:1	

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
1 OCT					
2 Jan	Quang Nam	Marble Mtn Air Facility	Unk Arty	0	0
11 Jan	Quang Nam	Hoi An and Dien Dan Dist HQ	Unk Arty	0	0
12 Jan	Thua Thien	Camp Eagle	Unk Arty	0	0
17 Jan	Quang Tin	Tan Ky	Unk	2	0
17 Jan	Thua Thien	Camp Evans	Unk	0	0
18 Jan	Quang Nam	Force Logistics Comd, Da Nang	Unk Sepper	0	0
22 Jan	Quang Nam	Da Nang Airbase	Unk Arty	1	0
23 Jan	Quang Nam	Coastal Cp 14	Prob Inf	1	1
25 Jan	Quang Tri	Quang Tri Citadel	Unk	0	0
1 Feb	Thua Thien	Nam Hoa	Unk Arty	0	0
1 Feb	Thua Thien	Hue	Unk Arty	0	0
2 Feb	Thua Thien	Camp Eagle	Unk Arty	0	0
3 Feb	Thua Thien	Hue	Unk Arty	0	0
12 Feb	Quang Tri	LZ Erskine	Unk Inf	1	12
13 Feb	Quang Tri	3/1/9th USMC	Unk Inf	3	12
14 Feb	Quang Nam	Que Son	Unk	4	0
15 Feb	Quang Tri	0/2/9th USMC	Unk Inf	0	45
17 Feb	Quang Tri	FEB Cunningham	Unk Inf	4	37
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Thuong Duc SF Camp	Unk	0	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Inf	4	17
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Duc Duc	Unk Inf	3	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	579th RF Co; 78th RF Plt at Duy Xuyen	Est En Co	25	19
23 Feb	Quang Tri	FEB Sword	Unk	0	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Que Son	Unk Inf	14	17
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Deep Water Pier, Da Nang	Unk Arty	4	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Da Nang Air base	Unk Arty	1	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Force Logistics Comd Da Nang	Unk Arty	0	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Marble Mtn Facility	Unk	0	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Da Nang (ARVN ammo depot)	Unk Arty	17	0
23 Feb	Quang Nam	Dien Ban	Elem of 34 NVA Sep Bn	1	4
23 Feb	Quang Tin	Chu Lai Air base	Unk Arty	2	0
23 Feb	Quang Tin	Cay Trai Post	Unk Inf	17	40
23 Feb	Quang Tin	Tan Ky	Unk Arty	14	0
23 Feb	Quang Tin	Tien Phuoc CIDG Camp	Unk Arty and Inf	65	59
23 Feb	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk Arty	7	6
23 Feb	Quang Ngai	Ha Thanh SF Camp	Unk Arty	0	0
24 Feb	Quang Tin	Tan Ky	Unk Arty	0	0
24 Feb	Quang Tin	Chu Lai Def Comd	Unk Arty	0	0

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## ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FED KIA	EN KIA
1 CTZ (CONT)					
24 Feb	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk	0	0
24 Feb	Quang Ngai	Nghia Hanh	Unk	6	0
25 Feb	Quang Tri	FSB Berville	Unk else else of 246 and 27 NVA Regt's	22	26
25 Feb	Quang Nam	Da Nang Air base	Unk Arty	1	0
25 Feb	Quang Nam	An Hoa Airstrip and city	Unk Arty	0	0
25 Feb	Quang Nam	Hieu Duc	Est En Co	2	10
25 Feb	Quang Nam	Duy Xuyen	Est En Co	0	3
25 Feb	Quang Nam	Quang Ngai City	Unk Arty	0	0
26 Feb	Quang Nam	An Hoa Airstrip	Unk	0	0
26 Feb	Quang Nam	Hoi An	Unk Arty	0	0
26 Feb	Quang Tin	Tan Ky	Unk Arty	0	0
26 Feb	Quang Ngai	4/4th ARVN Inf	Unk inf	7	23
26 Feb	Quang Ngai	A/4/24 Inf (US) (5 rds of total of 15 rds 82mm mortar believed to contain CS gas)	Unk	0	0
27 Feb	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk	0	0
27 Feb	Quang Nam	Hoi An	Unk	3	0
28 Feb	Quang Nam	LZ Ross	Unk Inf	6	0
28 Feb	Quang Nam	Force Logistics Comd	Unk Arty	0	0
28 Feb	Quang Tin	Chu Lai Def Comd	Unk Arty	0	0
28 Feb	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk Arty	0	0
1 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Airstrip	Unk Arty	4	0
1 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk	0	3
2 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Arty	0	0
2 Mar	Quang Tin	Tien Phuoc CIDG	Unk Arty	0	0
2 Mar	Quang Tin	Tan Ky (MACV Compound)	Unk Arty	0	0
2 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk	0	0
3 Mar	Quang Tri	FSB Mack	Unk Inf	13	20
3 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Arty	1	0
3 Mar	Quang Tin	Tien Phuoc CIDG	Unk Arty	3	0
3 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk	0	0
4 Mar	Quang Tin	Chu Lai Sub Sector	Unk Arty	0	0
5 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk Arty	0	0
7 Mar	Quang Nam	Marble Mtn Air Facility	Unk Arty	0	0
8 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Arty	1	0
8 Mar	Quang Nam	Duc Duc Refugee Camp	Unk Arty	14	0
8 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk	1	0
8 Mar	Quang Nam	Da Nang NAVEUP Hosp	Unk Arty	0	0
8 Mar	Thua Thien	Hue	Unk Arty	0	0

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## ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
1 CTE (cont)					
10 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Industrial Area	Unk Arty	1	0
20 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Arty and Inf	1	5
10 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk	2	0
11 Mar	Quang Ngai	B/4/21st Inf; E/2/1st Cav	Unk	2	2
12 Mar	Quang Nam	Duy Xuyen	Unk	1	0
15 Mar	Quang Tri	1st AB-RAC Bn	Unk Arty	1	0
15 Mar	Thua Thien	Hue	Unk Arty	0	0
16 Mar	Thua Thien	Camp Eagle	Unk Arty	6	0
19 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Combat Base	Unk Arty	1	0
19 Mar	Quang Nam	Da Nang City	Unk Arty	6	0
19 Mar	Quang Nam	Hieu Duc	Unk Inf	2	15
19 Mar	Quang Nam	Dien Ban	Unk Arty	12	15
19 Mar	Quang Nam	1/5th USMC	Unk	12	72
19 Mar	Quang Tin	Chu Lai Airbase	Unk Arty	0	0
19 Mar	Quang Tin	Tam Ky	Unk	5	0
19 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk Arty	0	0
19 Mar	Quang Ngai	Ha Thanh SF Camp	Unk	0	0
19 Mar	Quang Ngai	Ba To Sub-Sector HQs	Unk Inf	0	27
20 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Airbase	Unk	0	0
20 Mar	Quang Nam	Da Nang	Unk Arty	2	0
20 Mar	Quang Nam	Marble Mtn Air Facility	Unk	0	0
20 Mar	Quang Ngai	2d ARVN Div HQs	Unk Arty	2	0
20 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk	1	0
21 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk Arty	0	0
23 Mar	Quang Nam	139th; 706th RF Cos	Unk Inf	15	14
23 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Airfield	Unk	0	0
24 Mar	Quang Nam	Da Nang Airbase	Unk Arty	0	0
24 Mar	Quang Ngai	Ha Thanh SF Camp	Unk	1	0
24 Mar	Quang Ngai	2d ARVN Div HQs	Unk	0	0
24 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai Orphanage	Unk	1	0
25 Mar	Quang Tri	Quang Tri City	Unk	4	0
25 Mar	Quang Nam	39th Fgr Bn (ARVN)	Est 2 En Co's	5	100
25 Mar	Quang Tri	Gio Linh SS HQ	Unk Arty	0	0
25 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk Arty	0	0
26 Mar	Quang Nam	An Hoa Cbt Base	Unk	0	0
27 Mar	Quang Nam	Marble Mtn	Unk Arty	0	0
27 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk	0	0
28 Mar	Thua Thien	Phu Bai	Unk Arty	0	0
28 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk Arty	0	0

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## ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<u>I CTZ (CON)</u>					
29 Mar	Thua Thien	3d Regt Base Camp	Unk Arty	9	0
29 Mar	Quang Nam	Que Son Sub-Sector	Unk	4	0
30 Mar	Quang Nam	Hoi An Airfield & City	Unk	0	0
31 Mar	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai City	Unk	0	0
		TOTAL:		388	644
		RATIO: (EN/FRD)		1.7:1	
<u>II CTZ</u>					
3 Jan	Binh Dinh	Tank Farm of 240th GM Bn (US)	Unk size sapper elm	0	7
14 Jan	Quang Duc	Duc Lap SS Compound and OP	Unk	1	Unk
16 Jan	Darlac	Ban Me Thuot City Airfield, 155th AHC	Unk	Unk	Unk
18 Jan	Darlac	Ban Me Thuot City Airfield, 155th AHC	Unk	1	Unk
18 Jan	Kontum	Kontum Airfield	Unk	Unk	Unk
10 Jan	Quang Duc	MACV Compound, 4/45th Inf (ARVN)	Unk	3	Unk
13 Jan	Xuyen Duc	Duc Trong Dist Town	Unk	2	Unk
13 Jan	Xuyen Duc	Duc Trong Dist Town	Unk	2	Unk
18 Jan	Darlac	23d ARVN Div HQ	Unk Arty	0	Unk
20 Jan	Fleiku	11th ARVN Sgr Bn	U/I Co. of 4/24 NVA Regt	8	40
21 Jan	Binh Dinh	An Xuyen (H), An Tuc Dist HQ	Unk	1	Unk
22 Jan	Fleiku	U/I ARVN Elm	Est Co	9	34
25 Jan	Phu Yen	47th ARVN Regt CP	Unk	Unk	5
26 Jan	Binh Thuan	Phan Rang Airbase	M-13 NVA Sapper Co	Unk	16
27 Jan	Fleiku	Le Trunk District Town	Unk	11	Unk
28 Jan	Fleiku	Plei Pham Klah (V)	Est Co	Unk	0
9 Feb	Binh Thuan	Phan Thiet	Unk	5	Unk
11 Feb	Binh Thuan	Phan Thiet	Unk	0	3
11 Feb	Phu Bon	Cheo Reo HQ Compound	Unk	24	7
13 Feb	Fleiku	Dependent Housing Area for 2d ARVN Sgr Co	Unk	8	Unk
15 Feb	Binh Dinh	Dinh Khe Dist HQ	Unk	3	1
22 Feb	Binh Thuan	LE Betty	Unk	2	12
12 Feb	Binh Dinh	Phu Cat Airbase	Sqd of 200 NVA Sapper Bn	Unk	4
22 Feb	Binh Dinh	Phu My SS HQ	Unk	Unk	1
23 Feb	Binh Thuan	44th ARVN Regt CH; 44th ARVN Recon Co	Unk	1	10
23 Feb	Phu Yen	Tuy An Dist HQ	Est Co	Unk	5
23 Feb	Darlac	Lac Thien Dist Town	Unk	6	Unk
23 Feb	Kontum	Kontum City	Unk	Unk	Unk
23 Feb	Kontum	Ben Het CIDG Camp	Unk	1	Unk

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**ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS**

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<b>II CTZ (CONT)</b>					
24 Feb	Kontum	Ben Het CIDG Camp	Unk	Unk	2
24 Feb	Pleiku	Pleiku City	Unk	2	Unk
25 Feb	Kontum	Duc Co CIDG Camp	Unk	1	Unk
23 Feb	Quang Duc	Duc Xuyen (H)	Unk	8	40
23 Feb	Kontum	Kon Horeng	Unk	68	24
1 Mar	Kontum	A/312 US Inf	Unk	1	30
3 Mar	Khanh Hoa	Cam Ranh Bay, Pier #1	Unk	2	Unk
3 Mar	Kontum	Ben Het CIDG Camp	Unk Armor	Unk	Unk
3 Mar	Kontum	Ben Het CIDG Camp B/1/69 Armor (US)	Unk	2	Unk
6 Mar	Xuyen Duc	Daist City	Unk	1	Unk
7 Mar	Kontum	Kon Honong (V)	Est Co	4	20
9 Mar	Kontum	B/1/22d US Inf	Unk	9	46
9 Mar	Kontum	42d ARVN Regt HQ	Est Co	7	2
9 Mar	Kontum	3/12th US Inf CP at LZ Swinger	Unk	4	3
10 Mar	Kontum	3/12th US Inf CP at LZ Swinger	Unk	1	Unk
10 Mar	Kontum	Ben Het CIDG Camp	Unk	1	Unk
20 Mar	Binh Thuan	Hoa Da District HQ	Unk	Unk	2
20 Mar	Binh Dinh	D/2/1st US Cav, 586th Signal Co, Camp Radcliff	Unk	2	Unk
21 Mar	Dar Lac	RF/PF Training Center; 185th AHC 853d ARVN Co; 23d ARVN Div at Ban Ne Thuot	Unk	2	Unk
21 Mar	Pleiku	Pleiku City	Unk	Unk	Unk
21 Mar	Pleiku	Plei Ring De (H)	Unk	2	5
21 Mar	Pleiku	Plei Djereng	Unk	Unk	Unk
21 Mar	Kontum	42d ARVN Regt Compound	Unk	9	1
21 Mar	Kontum	18th US Engr Rock Crusher Complex	Unk	Unk	Unk
21 Mar	Khanh Hoa	92d AHC	Unk	0	Unk
21 Mar	Binh Dinh	FOL Tank Park	Unk Sapper Elm	Unk	Unk
22 Mar	Binh Dinh	An Duong (H), 15th RF Plt	Est two plts	3	Unk
22 Mar	Pleiku	Duc Co CIDG Camp	Unk	1	Unk
22 Mar	Binh Thuan	Thien Gia District HQ	Unk	2	34
23 Mar	Binh Dinh	5th Maint Bn, 18th Base Depot	Unk	1	Unk
26 Mar	Kontum	1/6th US Inf CP at FSB 20	Unk	2	Unk
27 Mar	Kontum	1/9th US Inf CP at FSB 20	Unk	1	Unk
TOTAL:				224	346
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				1.5:1	
<b>III CTZ</b>					
11 Jan	Gia Dinh	30th Reg Bn (ARVN)	Unk	10	0

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## ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
<u>III. CTZ (CONT)</u>					
12 Jan	Binh Long	Elm 1st Div (US)	Unk; En; En		16
15 Jan	Tay Ninh	A/136th SF (ARVN)	Elm 34 Bn, 27 VC Regt	7	2
18 Jan	Long An	FRU, MDP	Unk; En Co	1	16
19 Jan	Tay Ninh	5/7th Cav (US)	Elm 1st Bn, 165th Regt		5
19 Jan	Binh Long	Kuan Hung Hamlet	Unk; En Co	1	5
21 Jan	Tay Ninh	1/9th Inf (US)	Unk		24
21 Jan	Long An	3/7th Inf (US)	228 VC Bn	1	3
28 Jan	Tay Ninh	6th ABN Bn (ARVN)	Unk	2	27
31 Jan	Long An	32nd MSF (ARVN)	Unk; En Bn		16
1 Feb	Binh Duong	1/26th Inf (US)	Elm 101 NVA Regt	2	14
4 Feb	Tay Ninh	5/7th Cav (US)	Elm 143 NVA Regt		2
17 Feb	Hau Nghia	1/8th (US)	Elm 69 VC Arty Command		2
23 Feb	Phuoc Tuy	Ba Ria Tag Cntr.	Dak 5 VC Bn	9	14
23 Feb	Gia Dinh	Saigon (Rkt Atk)	Unk	11	
3 Mar	Gia Dinh	Saigon (Rkt Atk)	Unk	11	
6 Mar	Gia Dinh	Saigon (Rkt Atk)	Unk	22	
9 Mar	Tay Ninh	9th Bn (ARVN)	Unk		29
TOTAL:				78	145
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				1.9:1	
<u>IV. CTZ</u>					
4 Jan	Dinh Tuong	Unk	Unk	1	31
11 Jan	Chuong Thien	32d ARVN Regt	Unk	5	30
12 Jan	Sa Dec	9th ARVN Div	Unk	14	101
12 Jan	Kien Giang	21st ARVN Div	Unk	12	53
12 Jan	Sa Dec	15th ARVN Regt; Two Recon Co	Unk	4	58
14 Jan	Kien Phong	B/7/1st Cav (US)	Unk	5	96
17 Jan	Phong Dinh	Unk	Unk	12	52
23 Jan	Chau Doc	Three RF Cos; Five MSF Cos	Unk	17	98
23 Jan	An Xuyen	21st ARVN Div; 1 and 2/9th Cav; 1/3rd Inf	Unk	2	45
25 Jan	Dinh Tuong	D/5/60th Inf (US)	Unk	6	30
26 Jan	Chau Doc	Three RF Cos; 42d, 43d ARVN Rgr Bns	Unk	0	47
30 Jan	Phong Dinh	31st ARVN Regt	Unk	15	112
31 Jan	Bac Lieu	1/9th APC TRP; One RF Co	Unk	0	37
2 Feb	Vinh Long	Unk	Unk	14	36
4 Feb	Kien Giang	Two RF Cos	Unk	0	34
5 Feb	Dinh Tuong	1st Bde, 9th US Div	Unk	0	35
6 Feb	Dinh Tuong	Unk	Unk	8	42
6 Feb	Bac Lieu	Unk	Unk	0	34
11 Feb	Kien Phong	B/7/1st Cav	Unk	0	38

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## ENEMY INITIATED SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

DATE	PROVINCE	FRD UNITS	EN UNITS	FRD KIA	EN KIA
IV. CTZ (Cont)					
14 Feb	Dinh Tuong	39th and 31st Inf; Bas ((US)	Unk	0	34
14 Feb	Kien Hoa	3 and 4/47th; 3/60th Inf ((US)	Unk	0	62
15 Feb	Bac Lieu	1/32 Inf; Mine; RF Cos; Four PF Plts	Unk	1	49
18 Feb	Vinh Binh	14th Inf; Two RF Cos	Unk	1	31
25 Feb	Unk	Three RF Cos; One APC TRP ARVN Cav	Unk	11	51
25 Feb	Vinh Binh	Unk	Unk	0	39
1 Mar	Phong Dinh	33d Inf; Seven RF Cos	Unk	Unk	98
3 Mar	Kien Giang	Two RF Cos	Unk	2	35
5 Mar	Chau Doc	Five RF Cos; 12th Armed Cav	Unk	1	69
5 Mar	Kien Giang	4/33d; 3/31st Inf; Five RF Cos	Unk	12	31
6 Mar	Chuong Thien	1/31st ARVN Regt	Unk	3	32
7 Mar	Vinh Long	Two ARVN Bgr Bns; Four RF Cos	Unk	11	72
7 Mar	Vinh Binh	Unk	Unk	0	45
11 Mar	Dinh Tuong	6/31st; 39th Inf	Unk	1	57
14 Mar	Chuong Thien	Elas (PRU); 8/7/1 Cav	Unk	0	37
15 Mar	Kien Hoa	B/3/6th; 3 and 4/47th; 3/5th Cav	Unk	0	144
16 Mar	Dinh Tuong	B/2/32d Inf	Unk	Unk	37
22 Mar	Chuong Thien	21st ARVN Div	Unk	113	52
22 Mar	Kien Hoa	D/3/5th Cav; 10th Inf	Unk	0	39
23 Mar	Dinh Tuong	D/4/39th Inf	Unk	2	34
23 Mar	Kien Phong	4/39th Inf	Unk	2	77
25 Mar	An Xuyen	1/32d Inf; 21st Recon Co	Unk	0	31
27 Mar	Dinh Tuong	36th Inf ((ARVN)	Unk	7	42
29 Mar	Chuong Thien	4th VNMC Bn	Unk	1	30
30 Mar	Dinh Tuong	A/7/1st Cav	Unk	0	39
31 Mar	Dinh Tuong	A/2/39th Inf ((US)	Unk	0	30
TOTAL:				158	2206
RATIO: (EN/FRD)				14:0:1	

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## STATISTICS

### 1. (C) FRIENDLY PERSONNEL DATA:

#### a. Strength:

#### (1) Free World Forces:

	END PREVIOUS QUARTER	JAN	CURRENT QUARTER FEB	MAR*
Australia	7,649	7,708	7,734	7,562
China	29	29	29	30
Korea	49,887	50,154	50,366	50,207
New Zealand	575	549	546	549
Philippines	1,593	1,583	1,579	1,558
Spain	12	12	12	12
Thailand	5,900	7,783	11,577	11,527
United States	<u>536,134</u>	<u>540,196</u>	<u>538,569</u>	<u>540,306**</u>
TOTAL	601,779	608,014	610,412	611,751

#### (2) GVN:

##### RVNAF:

Regular Force	426,911	429,073	431,347	434,500
Regional Force	219,762	220,865	228,488	232,000
Popular Force	172,536	174,466	174,673	176,000

##### PARAMILITARY:

National Police	77,411	77,867	77,435	77,110
CIDG	<u>42,251</u>	<u>42,783</u>	<u>43,647</u>	<u>44,000</u>
GVN TOTAL	938,871	945,054	955,640	963,610

\*Not Confirmed.

\*\* (Army - 362,657; Navy - 36,461; Marines - 80,291; Air Force - 60,454; Coast Guard - 443).

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
EOD 02 5200.10

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## b. Casualties:

		<u>PREVIOUS</u> <u>QUARTER*</u>	<u>CURRENT QUARTER</u>			
			<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RVNAF	KIA	3,511	1,419	1,614	1,210	4,243
	WIA	10,264	4,483	4,702	3,697	12,882
	MIA	105	42	52	75	169
US	KIA	2,052	795	1,073	1,092	2,960
	WIA	4,752	5,569	5,966	2,228	13,763
	MIA	74	25	46	118	189
FWMAF	KIA	196	71	87	83	241
	WIA	359	148	182	175	505
	MIA	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL						
FRD	KIA	5,759	2,285	2,774	2,385	7,444
	WIA	15,375	10,200	10,850	6,100	27,150
	MIA	179	67	98	193	358

\*Corrected Figures.

## c. RVNAF Desertions:

	REGULAR FORCE	REGIONAL FORCE	POPULAR FORCE	RVNAF TOTAL
Dec 68 Total	7,090	2,935	1,278	11,303
Rate/1000	16.6	13.4	7.4	13.8
Jan 69 Total	6,548	2,739	1,104	10,391
Rate/1000	15.3	12.4	6.3	12.6
Feb 69 Total	5,129	2,040	687	7,856
Rate/1000	11.9	8.9	3.9	9.4

## 2. (C) ENEMY PERSONNEL DATA:

### a. Estimated strength:

	END PREVIOUS QUARTER*	JAN**	FEB***	MAR***
VC		162,225	153,814	143,120

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	<u>END PREVIOUS QUARTER</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
NVA Unit		<u>87,160</u>	<u>67,001</u>	<u>85,235</u>
TOTAL	259,235	249,385	240,815	229,415

\*Updated figures are not broken down by VC/NVA.

\*\*In addition to NVA in NVA Units there are approximately 16-18,000 NVA in VC Units.

\*\*\*In addition to NVA in NVA Units there are approximately 17-19,000 NVA in VC Units.

## b. Losses:

	<u>PREVIOUS QUARTER</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VC/NVA KIA	29,500	11,510	15,860	21,220	48,590
DOW/DIS	10,320	4,030	5,551	7,430	17,011
PW	1,900	470	360	50	880
Non-Battle	6,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	6,000
Military Returnees	<u>5,470</u>	<u>2,170</u>	<u>1,660</u>	<u>2,490</u>	<u>6,320</u>
TOTAL	53,190	20,180	25,431	33,190	78,801

## 3. (C) GENERAL STATISTICS:

### a. VC Incidents:

Attacks-by-fire	358	139	191	301	631
Assaults/Ambushes	169	76	134	142	352
Terrorism/Harassment	3,658	1,289	1,721	1,937	4,947
Sabotage	47	25	29	7	61
Antiaircraft	2,722	1,155	1,189	1,073	3,417
Propaganda	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	6,960	2,690	3,273	3,464	9,427

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~~RED~~  
~~PREVIOUS~~  
~~CLASS~~

		<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<b>b. Weapons:</b>					
Lost (Friendly)	759	230	397	381	1,008
Captured (Enemy)	12,885	5,952	6,926	8,074	20,952

**c. Operations (En or Larger/With Contact):**

GVN	1,868/859	832/332	717/320	786/357	2,335/1,009
US	58/56	19/19	21/19	28/28	68/66
Other FW	34/30	10/9	11/9	25/23	46/41
Combined	50/39	30/22	20/17	24/18	74/57
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,010/984</b>	<b>891/382</b>	<b>769/365</b>	<b>863/426</b>	<b>2,523/1,173</b>

**d. Battalion Days on Large Operations:**

GVN	7,270	3,390	2,836	2,983	9,211
US	7,207	1,254	1,358	2,230	4,842
Other FW	932	272	232	648	1,152
Combined	<u>10,231</u>	<u>5,226</u>	<u>3,694</u>	<u>5,129</u>	<u>14,049</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>25,640</b>	<b>10,142</b>	<b>8,122</b>	<b>10,990</b>	<b>29,254</b>

**4. (C) SECURITY STATUS OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC):**

**a. Definitions of LOC Security Terms:**

GREEN (SECURE): Travel permissible during daylight hours without armed escort. Isolated incidents may occur.

AMBER (OPEN): Travel permissible during daylight hours. Armed escort is required. Frequent incidents may occur.

RED (CLOSED): Travel impossible because of VC/NVA control of area or physical condition.

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## b. Railroads:

GREEN (OPEN): Rail line is physically open. Security of area permits operation during daylight hours without escort.

AMBER (OPEN): Rail line is physically open. Security of area permits operation during daylight hours ~~with armed escort~~. Frequent incidents may occur.

RED (CLOSED): Rail line is unusable because of VC/NVA control of area or physical condition.

## c. Essential Military Roads (as of 31 Mar 69):

<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>I CTZ</u>					
<u>Route QL 1</u>					
24.0	DMZ to Dong Ha		24.0		24.0
39.0	Dong Ha to Quang Tri	15.0			15.0
101.0	Quang Tri to Hue	62.0			62.0
205.0	Hue to Da Nang	104.0			104.0
244.0	Da Nang to Thang Binh	39.0			39.0
334.0	Thang Binh to Quang Ngai	90.0			90.0
372.0	Quang Ngai to Duc Pho	15.0	23.0		38.0
396.0	Duc Pho to Tan Loc		24.0		24.0
399.0	Tan Loc to I-II CTZ Boundary		3.0		3.0
<u>Route S 540</u>					
440.0	Da Nang to An Hoa			41.0	41.0

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<u>CUM. KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route QL 9</u>					
465.0	Dong Ha to Thon Son Lam	15.0	10.0		25.0
477.0	Thon Son Lam to Ca Lu		8.0	4.0	12.0
	I CTZ TOTAL	340.0	92.0	45.0	477.0
	PERCENT	71.3	19.3	9.4	

## II CTZ

### Route QL 1

501.0	I-II CTZ Boundary to Bong Son	24.0			24.0
553.0	Bong Son to Phu Cat	52.0			52.0
579.0	Phu Cat to Jet 440 (Qui Nhon)	26.0			26.0
669.0	Jet 440 (Qui Nhon) to Tuy Hoa	90.0			90.0
784.0	Tuy Hoa to Nha Trang	115.0			115.0
892.0	Nha Trang to Phan Rang	108.0			108.0
950.0	Phan Rang to Tuy Phong	37.0	21.0		58.0
980.0	Tuy Phong to Phan Le Cham		30.0		30.0
1047.0	Phan Le Cham to Phan Thiet		67.0		67.0
1070.0	Phan Thiet to II-III CTZ Boundary		23.0		23.0

### Route LTL 7B

1095.0	Tuy Hoa to Phong Hau	8.0	17.0		25.0
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<u>GIM KM</u>		<u>SECURE</u> <u>GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN</u> <u>AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED</u> <u>RED</u>	<u>IN</u>
1149.0	Phong Hau to Phu Tuc		54.0		54.0
1190.0	Phu Tuc to Chao Reo	21.0	20.0		41.0
1244.0	Chao Reo to Jet QL 14	25.0	29.0		54.0
	<u>Route LTL 8B</u>				
1282.0	Dao Thong to Gia Nghia		38.0		38.0
	<u>Route QL 11</u>				
1307.0	Phan Rang to Ap Tan My	25.0			25.0
1358.0	Ap Tan My to Xuan Truong	51.0			51.0
1376.0	Xuan Truong to Da Lat	18.0			18.0
	<u>Route QL 14</u>				
1421.0	Dak To to Kontum	45.0			45.0
1479.0	Kontum to Jet 19 (East)	58.0			58.0
1536.0	Jet 19 (East) to Plei Klu	24.0	33.0		57.0
1583.0	Plei Klu to Ban Blech		47.0		47.0
1658.0	Ban Blech to Ban Me Thout		75.0		75.0
1732.0	Ban Me Thout to Dao Thong		74.0		74.0
	<u>Route S 344</u>				
1753.0	Gia Nghia to Kien Duc		21.0		21.0
	<u>Route QL 19</u>				
1768.0	Qui Nhon to Jet 441 (An Nhon)	15.0			15.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1828.0	Jet 441 (An Nhon) to An Khe	60.0			60.0
1851.0	An Khe to Phu Danh	33.0			33.0
1911.0	Phu Danh to Pleiku	50.0			50.0
	<u>Route QL 20</u>				
1937.0	Da Lat to Duc Trong		26.0		26.0
1986.0	Duc Trong to Di Linh		49.0		49.0
2060.0	Di Linh to II-III CTZ Boundary		74.0		74.0
	<u>Route QL 21</u>				
2097.0	Ban Me Thout to B Ea Phe	37.0			37.0
2148.0	B Ea Phe to Khanh Duong	51.0			51.0
2188.0	Khanh Duong to Duc My	40.0			40.0
2199.0	Duc My to Kinh Hoa	11.0			11.0
	II CTZ TOTAL	1024.0	698.0	0.0	1722.0
	PERCENT	59.5	40.5		
	<u>III CTZ</u>				
	<u>Route QL 1</u>				
2288.0	II-III CTZ Boundary to Xuan Loc	21.0	68.0		89.0
2335.0	Xuan Loc to Bien Hoa	47.0			47.0
2363.0	Bien Hoa to Saigon	28.0			28.0
	<u>Route S 316</u>				
2396.0	Saigon to Jet QL 1	33.0			33.0

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<u>QAL AM</u>		<u>SECURE</u> <u>GRADE</u>	<u>OPEN</u> <u>AREA</u>	<u>CLOSED</u> <u>REF</u>	<u>RM</u>
	<u>Route LTL 1A</u>				
2437.0	Phu Cuong to Phuoc Vinh	25.0	13.0		41.0
	<u>Route QL 1/22</u>				
2496.0	Saigon to Go Da Hau (Jct 1 & 22)	59.0			59.0
2530.0	Go Da Hau (Jct 1 & 22) to Tay Ninh	34.0			34.0
	<u>Route LTL 2</u>				
2580.0	An Tan Phan (Jct 1 & 22) to Phuoc Le	25.0	12.0	13.0	50.0
	<u>Route LTL 2B</u>				
2600.0	Han Tan to JCT QL 1		20.0		20.0
	<u>Route QL 4</u>				
2628.0	Saigon to Ben Luc	28.0			28.0
2643.0	Ben Luc to Tan An	15.0			15.0
2650.0	Tan An to III-IV CTZ Boundary	7.0			7.0
	<u>Route LTL 5A</u>				
2692.0	Saigon to III-IV CTZ Boundary	42.0			42.0
	<u>Route QL 13</u>				
2721.0	Saigon to Phu Cuong	29.0			29.0
2744.0	Phu Cuong to Ben Cat	23.0			23.0
2798.0	Ben Cat to An Loc	34.0	20.0		54.0
2822.0	An Loc to Loc Ninh			24.0	24.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route QL 15</u>					
2894.0	Bien Hoa to Phuoc Le	72.0			72.0
2916.0	Phuoc Le to Vung Tau	22.0			22.0
<u>Route QL 20</u>					
2945.0	II-III CTZ Boundary to Xa Dinh Quan		29.0		29.0
2978.0	Xa Dinh Quan to Tuc Trung		33.0		33.0
2997.0	Tuc Trung to Jct Rt QL 1	17.0	2.0		19.0
<u>Route LTL 23</u>					
3028.0	Phuoc Le to Xuyen Noc		12.0	19.0	31.0
<u>Route S 314</u>					
3035.0	Bien Hoa to JCT S 313	7.0			7.0
<u>Route S 313</u>					
3049.0	JCT S 314 to Phu Cuong	14.0			14.0
<u>Route L 8 A</u>					
3069.0	Phu Cuong to Cu Chi	20.0			20.0
	III CTZ TOTAL	605.0	209.0	56.0	870.0
	PERCENT	69.6	24.0	6.4	
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
<u>Route QL 4</u>					
3082.0	III-IV CTZ Boundary to Jct 6A	13.0			13.0
3107.0	Jct 6A to Cai Lay		25.0		25.0

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<u>QUM 34</u>		<u>ENTIRE</u> <u>QUM 34</u>	<u>OPEN</u> <u>34331</u>	<u>CLOSED</u> <u>RED</u>	<u>IN</u>
3151.0	Cai Lay to Vinh Long		44.0		44.0
3202.0	Vinh Long to Than Hoa	30.0	21.0		51.0
3244.0	Than Hoa to Soc Trang	42.0			42.0
3293.0	Soc Trang to Bac Lieu	49.0			49.0
3323.0	Bac Lieu to Gia Rai	30.0			30.0
3360.0	Gia Rai to Ca Mau	37.0			37.0
	<u>Route ITL 5A</u>				
3375.0	III-IV CTZ Boundary to Co Cong	15.0			15.0
	<u>Route ITL 6A</u>				
3389.0	Jct QL 4 to Ben Tre	14.0			14.0
	<u>Route ITL 7A</u>				
3439.0	Vinh Long to Jct QL 4		50.0		50.0
3452.0	Jct QL 4 to Phu Vinh		13.0		13.0
	<u>Route ITL 8A</u>				
3475.0	Vinh Long to Sa Dec		23.0		23.0
3493.0	Sa Dec to Jct 147		18.0		18.0
3520.0	Jct 147 to Long Xuyen		27.0		27.0
	<u>Route ITL 8A</u>				
3587.0	Jct 9/27 to Ap Rach Soi	36.0	22.0		58.0
3586.0	Ap Rach Soi to Rach Gia	8.0			8.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
<u>Route LTL 10/9</u>					
3627.0	Chau Doc to Jet 9	41.0			41.0
3640.0	Jet 9 to Long Xuyen (9)	13.0			13.0
<u>Route TL 24</u>					
3675.0	My Tho to Go Cong	35.0			35.0
<u>Route TL 26</u>					
3711.0	Ben Tre to Ba Tri		36.0		36.0
<u>Route LTL 27/9</u>					
3731.0	Can Tho to O Mon	20.0			20.0
3753.0	O Mon to Thot Noi	22.0			22.0
3771.0	Thot Noi to Long Xuyen	18.0			18.0
<u>Route LTL 31</u>					
3805.0	Vi Thanh to Rach Goi		34.0		34.0
3811.0	Rach Goi to Thanh Hoa		6.0		6.0
	IV CTZ TOTAL	423.0	319.0	0.0	742.0
	PERCENT	57.0	43.0		
	OVERALL TOTALS	2392.0	1318.0	101.0	3811.0
	OVERALL PERCENT	62.8	34.5	2.7	

d. Essential waterways, I, III, and IV CTZs (as of 31 Mar 69):

I CTZ

SONG CUA VIET

15.0	Cua Viet to Dong Ha	15.0			15.0
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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>SONG HUONG (PERFUME)</u>				
35.0	Tan My to Hue	20.0			20.0
	I CTZ TOTAL	35.0			35.0
	PERCENT	100.0			
	<u>III CTZ</u>				
185.0	<u>SONG VAM CO DONG</u>				
	Tay Ninh to Ben Luc		100.0		100.0
	Ben Luc to junct w/Song Nha Be		50.0		50.0
250.0	<u>SONG VAM CO TAY (in- tsec. w/IV CTZ bound. to junct w/Song Vam Co Dong)</u>		65.0		65.0
280.0	<u>RACH CAN GIOUC (Saigon to junct w/Song Vam Co Dong)</u>		30.0		30.0
375.0	<u>SONG SAIGON</u>				
	Tri Tam to Phu Cuong	5.0	50.0		55.0
	Phu Cuong to junct w/ Song Nha Be	40.0			40.0
410.0	<u>SONG NHA BE (junct w/Song Saigon)</u>	35.0			35.0
420.0	<u>SONG SOIRAP (Song Vam Co Dong to outlet)</u>	10.0			10.0
474.0	<u>SONG DONG NAI (Tan Uyen to junct w/Saigon)</u>	54.0			54.0
519.0	<u>SONG LONG TAU (junct w/Song Nha Be to out- let)</u>	45.0			45.0
	III CTZ TOTAL	189.0	295.0		484.0
	PERCENT	39.0	61.0		

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>IV CTZ</u>				
669.0	<u>SONG TIEN GIANG</u> Cambodian Bar to Vam Nao	50.0			50.0
	Vam Nao wtrway to Kinh Cho Lach	100.0			100.0
739.0	<u>SONG MY THO (Kinh Cho Lach to outlet)</u>	70.0			70.0
746.0	<u>KINH CHO LACH (Song Co Chien to Song Tien Giang)</u>	7.0			7.0
776.0	<u>KINH CHO GAO (Song Tien Giang to Song Vam Co Dong)</u>		30.0		30.0
861.0	<u>SONG CO CHIEN</u> Vinh Long to Vung Liem	40.0			40.0
	Vung to outlet	45.0			45.0
1056.0	<u>SONG HAU GIANG</u> Chau Doc to Vam Hao Wtrway	35.0			35.0
	Vam Nao Wtrway to outlet	160.0			160.0
1066.0	<u>VAM HAO WATERWAY</u> (Song Tien Giang to Song Hau Giang)	10.0			10.0
1101.0	<u>KINH SA DEC (Song Tien Giang to Song Hau Giang)</u>		35.0		35.0
1141.0	<u>MANG THIET-NICHOLAI WATERWAY (Tra On to Song Co Chien)</u>		40.0		40.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1201.0	<u>KINH CAI BAN</u> (Rach Gia to Song Hau Giang)	35.0	25.0		60.0
1214.0	<u>SONG CAN THO</u> (Kinh Ba No to Song Hau Giang)	13.0			13.0
1249.0	<u>KINH XA NO</u> (Song Can Tho to Vi Thanh)	35.0			35.0
1304.0	<u>KINH XANG</u> (Song Can Tho to Soc Trang)		55.0		55.0
1354.0	<u>KINH NHU GIA</u> (Soc Trang to Bac Lieu)	50.0			50.0
1424.0	<u>KINH CA MAU</u> (Bac Lieu to Cau Mau)	70.0			70.0
1494.0	<u>SONG HAM LUONG</u> (Junct w/Tien Giang to outlet)	70.0			70.0
1516.0	<u>KINH SAINTARD</u> (Song Hau Giang to Ba Xau)	22.0			22.0
1522.0	<u>KINH XANG</u> (Soc Trang to Ba Xau)	6.0			6.0
1541.0	<u>RACH NHU GIA</u> (Song My Thanh to Ba Xau)	19.0			19.0
1577.0	<u>SONG MY THANH</u> (Bac Lieu to Rach Hau Gia)	31.0	5.0		36.0
1636.0	<u>KINH RACH GIA</u> (Rach Gia to Song Hau Giang)	30.0	29.0		59.0
1653.0	<u>RACH LONG XUYEN</u> (Long Xuyen to Kinh Rach Gia)	17.0			17.0
1670.0	<u>SONG CAN THO</u> (Rach O Mon to Kinh Xa No)		17.0		17.0

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<u>CUM KM</u>		<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
1678.0	<u>RACH O MON (Song Hau Giang to Son Can Tho</u>	8.0			8.0
1694.0	<u>WATERWAY SONG MY THO - BENTRE - SONG HAM LUONG (Song My Tho to Song Ham Luong)</u>		16.0		16.0
	IV CTZ TOTAL	923.0	252.0		1175.0
	PERCENT	78.6	21.4		
	OVERALL TOTAL	1147.0	547.0		1694.0
	OVERALL PERCENT	67.7	32.3		

e. Vietnamese National Railroads (as of 31 Mar 69):

<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>I CTZ</u>				
27.0	HUE to TRUOI			27.0	27.0
41.1	TRUOI to CAU HAI		14.1		14.1
53.3	CAU HAI to THUA LIU		12.2		12.2
67.1	THUA LIU to LANG CO		13.8		13.8
87.4	LANG CO to LIEN CHIEU		20.3		20.3
103.1	LIEN CHIEU to DA NANG		15.7		15.7
	I CTZ TOTAL		76.1	27.0	103.1
	PERCENT		73.8	26.2	
	<u>II CTZ</u>				
113.6	KHANH PHUOC to PHU CAT		10.5		10.5
127.5	PHU CAT to BINH DINH			13.9	13.9

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<u>CUIN KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
138.3	BINH DINH to DIEU TRI		10.8		10.8
153.6	DIEU TRI to TANG VINH	15.3			15.3
166.2	TANG VINH to VAN CANH		12.6		12.6
182.2	VAN CANH to PHUOC LANH		16.0		16.0
197.2	PHUOC LANH to LA HAI		15.0		15.0
213.2	LA HAI to CHI THANH			16.0	16.0
226.7	CHI THANH to HOA DA	13.5			13.5
240.2	HOA DA to TUY HOA	13.5			13.5
245.1	TUY HOA to DONG TAC	4.9			4.9
256.0	DONG TAC to THACH TUAN	10.9			10.9
263.0	THACH TUAN to HAO SON		7.0		7.0
275.0	HAO SON to DAI LANH		12.0		12.0
285.8	DAI LANH to TU BONG		10.8		10.8
296.9	TU BONG to GIA		11.1		11.1
323.3	GIA to NINH HOA		26.4		26.4
345.7	NINH HOA to LUONG SON		22.4		22.4
357.5	LUONG SON to NHA TRANG	11.8			11.8
375.6	NHA TRANG to SUOI DAU		18.1		18.1
406.6	SUOI DAU to HOA BA		31.0		31.0
424.7	HOA BA to KA ROM		18.1		18.1
450.4	KA ROM to THAP CHAM			25.7	25.7
479.1	THAP CHAM to CA MA			28.7	28.7

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# SECRET

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<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>MAIN RAILROADS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
508.3	CA MA to SONG LONG SONG			29.2	29.2
	II CTZ TOTAL	69.9	221.8	113.5	405.2
	PERCENT	17.3	54.7	28.0	
	<u>III CTZ</u>				
520.2	LONG KHANH to DAU GIAY		11.9		11.9
536.4	DAU GIAY to TRANG BON		16.2		16.2
546.9	TRANG BON to HO NAI		10.5		10.5
556.4	HO NAI to BIEN HOA	9.5			9.5
565.6	BIEN HOA to DI AN	9.2			9.2
572.4	DI AN to THU DUC	6.8			6.8
581.0	THU DUC to GO VAP	8.6			8.6
585.1	GO VAP to SAIGON (FT)*	4.1			4.1
588.6	SAIGON (FT) to SAIGON (PAX)	3.5			3.5
	TOTAL III CTZ	41.7	38.6		80.3
	PERCENT	51.9	48.1		

\*Freight Terminal

<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>SPURS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>II CTZ</u>				
598.8	DIEU TRI to QUI NHON	10.2			10.2
603.1	NGA BA to BA NGOI	4.3			4.3

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# SECRET

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<u>CUM KM</u>	<u>SPURS</u>	<u>SECURE GREEN</u>	<u>OPEN AMBER</u>	<u>CLOSED RED</u>	<u>KM</u>
	<u>II CTZ</u>				
687.1	THAP CHAM to DA LAT			84.0	84.0
	TOTAL	14.5		84.0	98.5
	PERCENT	14.7		85.3	
	OVERALL TOTAL	126.1	336.5	224.5	687.1
	OVERALL PERCENT	18.4	49.0	32.6	

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